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**ADMIRAL GORSHKOV ON
"NAVIES IN WAR AND PEACE"**

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

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Institute of Naval Studies

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
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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Contribution summarizes and analyzes the series of articles entitled "Navies in War and Peace," by the Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov. The analysis adds to the understanding of the future roles and missions of the Soviet navy, and should be of value to all concerned with U.S. defense planning.
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FOREWORD

"Navies in War and Peace," by Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet navy, appeared in 11 installments in the journal Morskoi sbornik (Naval Digest) in 1972 and 1973. It is clear from the identity of its author and its length that Admiral Gorshkov's statement is important, but what is its significance?

That question was put to three experienced analysts of Soviet politics and the Soviet navy: Robert G. Weinland, Michael K. McGwire and James M. McConnell. Their analyses are presented in this report. Each of them focuses on a somewhat different aspect of "Navies in War and Peace."

Weinland's chapter begins with a summary of the Gorshkov series and the points Gorshkov made in his statement. Weinland concludes that the stimulus to the appearance of the Gorshkov series was a review of Soviet state policy, occasioned by SALT. The review dealt with Soviet foreign policy and its military requirements, and was thus viewed as a threat to the momentum of the development and peacetime employment of the Soviet navy. Morskoi sbornik provided a forum for Gorshkov to state the case that navies are important instruments of state policy in both war and peace, and that the Soviet Union cannot afford to limit the growth and use of the navy. If limited, the navy will not be able to promote Soviet overseas interests in peacetime, deter attacks on the Soviet Union, protect the homeland if it is attacked, or achieve the objectives of war. The publication of the series in itself suggests that an important segment of Soviet leadership agreed with Gorshkov. The increasingly active use of the Soviet navy as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy in the past few years suggests that Gorshkov's views may be holding sway.

McGwire, too, views the Gorshkov series as evidence of an internal debate over policy. He concludes that the debate arises from a deep cleavage within the Soviet hierarchy, and that there was a serious attack being mounted against the navy, with the main weight probably against future shipbuilding requirements. While Gorshkov appears not to have won the battle over shipbuilding, he may well have carried the day for an assertive naval policy.

McConnell finds that the Gorshkov series represents the formulation of a new Soviet naval doctrine, mainly occasioned by the introduction into the fleet of large numbers of SLBMs over the past decade and especially by the recent acquisition of the Delta-class SSBN and the long-range SS-N-8 missile, which reduce the wartime vulnerability of the submarine. This has apparently led the Soviets to a decision to withhold their SLBMs from the initial strikes of a general war to provide leverage for the Soviet bargaining position. The doctrine also officially reconfirms the growing importance of the navy in peacetime deterrence and fostering of Soviet state interests, especially in the Third World. McConnell agrees with Weinland and McGwire that there is evidence of an

internal debate over arms limitation and the relative standing of the navy in a land-oriented military establishment, but feels the first issue is only a subsidiary target of the Gorshkov series, while the second issue has been officially resolved in the navy's favor.

While there is disagreement among the three authors as to whether in "Navies in War and Peace" Gorshkov was advocating or announcing Soviet naval policy and doctrine, it is possible that he was doing both. That is, in the face of internal opposition on some questions, Gorshkov was promoting the interests of the navy; with regard to other questions he may have been stating official views of the state on the use of the navy in peace and war. If there was a debate, events during and since the publication of "Navies in War and Peace" suggest that the debate has been resolved in favor of Gorshkov, at least in the area of naval activism to support state policy in peacetime. Marshal Grechko has recently written, in an uncharacteristic vein, on the international importance of military forces. Even before that, the Soviet navy's overseas activities had become more politicized than ever--deployment of a ballistic missile submarine to Cuban waters during SAL negotiations, support of Soviet attempts to win friends in the Third World, and attempts to foster Arab unity and military cooperation.

In any event, Gorshkov's statement is a sustained argument for Soviet naval power -- in war and peace -- to protect the "Socialist commonwealth" and secure state interests. Without a strong navy the gains of land warfare may be lost; a strong navy provides an important bargaining tool in general war; and without a strong navy the overseas interests of the USSR and other countries of the "Socialist camp" cannot be protected in peacetime against imperialist coercion.

"Navies in War and Peace" must not be regarded as simply a challenge that requires U.S. policies similar to Admiral Gorshkov's. His statement is in fact a challenge to U.S. policy makers to think clearly about several questions: How will a more capable and more active Soviet navy affect U.S. interests, in peace and in war? Should U.S. responses be merely reactive, or are there U.S. initiatives that can avert Soviet gains without confrontation? What role should the U.S. Navy play in any new peacetime strategy; and what would that role mean for the size, structure, and deployment of the Navy? An indispensable step in thinking about such questions is understanding what Admiral Gorshkov said, and how it relates to Soviet state policy. This understanding has been advanced by the authors of the accompanying analyses.

Thomas E. Anger

Director, Plans and Policies Program
Institute of Naval Studies
Center for Naval Analyses

"NAVIES IN WAR AND PEACE:"
CONTENT, CONTEXT, AND SIGNIFICANCE

Robert G. Weinland

Admiral Gorshkov has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy for some 18 years; he is a Deputy Minister of Defense; and he is a full member of the CPSU Central Committee. Given his position, he must choose his words carefully; and what he chooses to say must be given careful consideration--since it is inevitably considered to carry the weight of authority.

Admiral Gorshkov publishes infrequently. His last major article in Morskoi sbornik had appeared in February 1967. In the five years between its appearance and the initial installment of "Navies in War and Peace," Admiral Gorshkov published only two minor articles in Morskoi sbornik. Furthermore, Morskoi sbornik normally publishes neither works of this length nor serialized articles. Thus, the form in which "Navies in War and Peace" appeared lent import to Gorshkov's statement.

The real importance of Admiral Gorshkov's statement lies primarily in its content. Taken as a whole, and viewed in context, the articles seem to advance views at variance on critical points with established Soviet foreign and military policy.

This discussion has three parts. The first summarizes the arguments advanced by Admiral Gorshkov. The second examines potential links between the publication of his statement and the domestic and international political context in which it appeared. The third presents my conclusions on the meaning and import of "Navies in War and Peace."

ADMIRAL GORSHKOV'S STATEMENT

"Navies in War and Peace" was published as a series of separate but related articles. However, it was obviously meant to be considered as a whole--an integrated, 18 chapter, 54,000 word statement.¹

Robert G. Weinland is a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. Mr. Weinland is a specialist in Soviet naval matters and has done several studies on the Soviet navy. He directed the analyses of "Navies in War and Peace." His analysis was completed after the other analyses and summarizes some of their findings. The author is indebted to the authors of the other chapters published here, and to Robert W. Herrick, who also participated in this project.

Subject and Objectives

In his introduction Admiral Gorshkov identifies two principal subjects of discussion:

- "the role and place of navies [within the system of component branches of the armed forces]
 - in various historical eras, and
 - at different stages in the development of military equipment and the military art, " and
- "the dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and the goals of the state policies they were intended to serve."

He also places a number of explicit caveats on the discussion: it is restricted to questions applicable to the navy; it is not intended to be a history of the "naval art"; and it does not attempt to define "the prospects for the development of naval forces."

He states that his objective in conducting this examination of "the employment of various branches of armed forces in time of war or in peacetime" is to "determine the trends and principles of change" in

- "the role and place of navies in wars, " and
- "[navies'] employment in peacetime as instruments of state policy [Emphasis added]."

He implies that he wants to advance not only "the development of the military art" but also "the development of a unity of operational views in the command personnel of the armed forces"--which is fostered by the "command personnel" understanding "the specific features with which each of the branches of the armed forces is imbued."

Central Argument

Admiral Gorshkov's basic argument is that the navy's status within the armed forces should be redefined to reflect the increasing importance of the navy in wartime and in peacetime--although he does not identify the specific policy implications of this argument.

The argument contains five fundamental theses:

- Given the increasing importance of the oceans as an arena of potential military conflict, and the navy's special military features*, the wartime importance of the navy is increasing. Although, since Soviet military doctrine considers concerted action by all branches of the armed forces to be essential to victory, this increased importance does not give the navy a unique position within the armed forces.

*high maneuverability, capability for covert concentration, and relative invulnerability to the effects of nuclear weapons--when compared with land-based forces.

- Despite the introduction of nuclear weapons and the advent of detente, the armed forces have not lost their historic importance as instruments of state policy in either wartime or peacetime (if anything, the political influence of demonstrably superior military potential has increased).
- Given the increasing economic and hence political importance of the oceans, and the navy's special political features*, the peacetime utility and importance of the navy are increasing, which gives it a unique position--compared to the other branches of the armed forces--as an instrument of foreign policy.
- The structures of armed forces and the roles and places of their component branches can and do change. Such changes are situationally-dependent, can occur in peacetime as well as in the course of war, but have limits--e.g., maritime states must have navies as well as armies; and if they are to achieve and maintain great power status, their navies must be commensurate with the full range of their interests.
- There is a necessary link between the acquisition and maintenance of armed forces and the goals of the state policies they are intended to serve. In order to achieve those goals, command echelons must have a shared understanding of the relative capabilities and optimal modes of employment of each branch of the armed forces.

These fundamental theses are outlined at the outset, and the bulk of the subsequent discussion is devoted to elaborating and supporting them.

Historical Discussion

In introducing this discussion, Admiral Gorshkov states that he intends "only to express a few thoughts" on the "historical" and "problem," or contemporary, aspects of the subjects under discussion. Contemporary military questions are rarely addressed directly in the Soviet open literature, unless in the context of a formal doctrinal pronouncement. Generally, military questions are approached indirectly in their "historical aspect" or, when in their "problem aspect," then less in terms of the Soviet than of Western armed forces. "Navies in War and Peace" contains few exceptions to this pattern.

*it can be employed in peacetime for demonstrating the economic and military power of the state beyond its borders; it is the only branch of the armed forces capable of protecting the state's over-seas interests.

As Table 1 shows, less than 20 percent of the discussion is devoted to the contemporary or "problem" aspect of the questions at hand. The bulk of the discussion is devoted to history: more than a third to the pre-Soviet era; more than half to the period before World War II; more than three-quarters to the pre-nuclear era.

In this historical discussion, Admiral Gorshkov makes no attempt to present a balanced, comprehensive description of the "role and place" of seapower in Russian and Soviet, **not** to mention Western, history. Rather, he employs history forensically to support the "system of views" he is advancing. His discussion of the past develops five major themes.

1. Exploitation of the sea, and seapower -- in all of its forms -- are necessary to achieve and maintain Great Power status, and consequently have always been and will always be important to maritime states in general, and Russia in particular.
2. Large and modern* naval forces are the sine qua non of effective seapower.
3. Seapower can be used in peacetime as well as in wartime to implement state policy.
4. These facts were often overlooked by the Tsarist leadership. Because of this, Russia lost wars, or lost the gains of those wars it won, and was often unable to implement its policies in peacetime. When they did appreciate and support the navy, both the wartime and the peacetime goals of state policy were achieved.
5. The Soviet leadership -- in contrast to their predecessors -- have consistently recognized the importance of seapower. But, because of the economic and technological constraints that prevailed during the early years of the Soviet era, and the necessary concentration on land warfare that characterized Soviet military experience in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War/World War II, ** it was not until relatively recently that the Soviet Union acquired the effective seapower it now possesses.

*Modernity -- which is measured in terms of the quality of ships, the level of training of their crews, and the level of development of the tactics they employ -- is a critical factor. Naval victory is a function of numerical superiority, given equivalent modernity of opposing forces; however, given parity in numbers, victory becomes a function of modernity -- because the more modern and hence more capable force is able to seize the initiative.

**to which the Soviet navy nevertheless made vital contributions [the description of which absorbs a large share of the discussion]

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTENTION IN "NAVIES IN WAR AND PEACE"

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Approx. no. words/ chapter</u>	<u>Coverage/ historical period*</u>
(Introduction)	1520	
The Distant Past, but Important for Understanding the Role of Navies	2490	28 percent Pre-World War I
Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea	3050	
The Russians in the Mediterranean	2440	
Into the Oceans on Behalf of Science	860	
The Russian Fleet During the Industrial Revolution and the Transition from Sailing Vessels to Steam Vessels	1685	
Navies at the Beginning of the Era of Imperialism	3550	9 percent World War I
The First World War	5045	
The Soviet Navy	3770	18 percent Inter-War Period
The Development of the Soviet Navy in the Period from the End of the Civil War to the Outbreak of the Great Patriotic War (1921-1928; 1928-1941)	5335	
The Second World War	4565	26 percent World War II/ Great Patriotic War
The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War	3700	
The Basic Missions Executed by Navies in the Second World War	4840	
Navies as a Weapon of the Aggressive Policy of the Imperialist States in Peacetime	3555	19 percent present era
(Intermediate Conclusion)	935	
Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean	2655	
The Problems of a Modern Navy	3480	
(Conclusion)	520	
Total	53,995	

*Calculated after subtraction of introductory and concluding chapters from total

Each major theme is illustrated with specific examples, most focusing on the consequences of prevailing policies: losses sustained, benefits derived. In general -- since the Tsarist leadership did not understand seapower, and until recently the Soviet could not afford it -- this historical discussion is largely a chronicle of losses.

One chapter, "The Russians in the Mediterranean," stands out as an exception. It concentrates on the benefits derived from the possession and use of naval forces, and explicitly links the past and the present -- i.e., it treats the subject in both its "historical" and its contemporary or "problem" aspects. Historically, Russia's intermittent deployments of naval forces to the Mediterranean have been undertaken primarily to insure its security from the Southwest. Militarily, Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean acted as a "forward defense," providing strategic support to the army. Politically, they acted as a powerful -- at times the most powerful -- weapon of Russian foreign policy, contributing to change in the political situation in Europe. At present, Soviet naval forces are deployed in the Mediterranean primarily as a defensive response to the presence of opposing naval forces that threaten direct attack on the Soviet homeland. They are also there in the "active defense of peace" to deter intervention in littoral affairs by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to deter aggression by littoral powers supported by the Sixth Fleet. The presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean thus achieves three objectives: the strategic defense of the Soviet Union, increasing Soviet "international authority" (coercive or negative political influence), and evoking "international sympathy for the Soviet Union" (positive political influence).

Discussion of the Present

His discussion of the contemporary or "problem" aspects of the subject continues two of the main themes developed in his historical discussion. The first of these is the importance of the sea and all forms of seapower to a maritime state such as the Soviet Union. This is treated in terms of observations on the current movement to redefine questions of maritime boundaries and the ownership of oceanic resources. The second theme, which is closely linked with the first, is the utility of seapower as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. This is treated largely in terms of the Western experience. In addition, in the chapter on "The Problems of a Modern Navy" and the two concluding sections, he deals directly with three current military questions:

- the threat posed to the Soviet Union and its interests by imperialist naval forces,
- Soviet policy regarding the response to those threats, and
- the materiel and other requirements of implementing that policy.

In keeping with standard practice, much of this portion of the discussion focuses on Western armed forces, although his treatment of the contemporary Soviet naval mission and force structures is unusually explicit.

According to Admiral Gorshkov, the two principal features of the contemporary era are the continuing aggressiveness of imperialism and the growth of the economic power and defense capability of the Soviet Union. The latter provide for the security of the entire socialist community and -- given the new balance of forces in the international arena -- are altering the structure and content of international relations in favor of the forces of "peace and progress." The growth of the Soviet navy, and its emergence onto the high seas, have made a major contribution to these changes.

The imperialists (primarily in the United States, in which the Navy is the "pet" instrument of foreign policy) have actively exploited the special political features of navies -- their ability to demonstrate economic and military power, and to protect overseas interests through coercion, largely without resort to force. They have used their navies in a variety of ways -- including general support for their diplomacy -- but their primary employment has been

- demonstrations of force to put pressure on the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community; and
- threatened or actual use of force to retain or restore supremacy over former colonies and other victims of economic oppression.

Their specific objectives in taking such actions have included showing their own resolve, deterring the intended actions of opponents, and providing support to friendly states. The imperialists are also employing their naval forces in support of efforts to dominate ocean resources.

Admiral Gorshkov states that the Soviet Union has decisively opposed all of these imperialist actions. In contrast to the imperialists, the Soviet navy, while fulfilling its mission of defending the Soviet Union against attacks from the sea, has by its presence acted as a diplomatic force to deter and contain aggression. It has thus been employed as an important political weapon in its own right, as well as providing significant support to other instruments of foreign policy -- especially through the increasing number of official visits and business calls by Soviet warships to foreign ports, which improve inter-state relations and strengthen the "international authority" of the Soviet Union.

Given the imperialists' actions, the Soviet Union needs a powerful navy not only to defend its state interests on the seas and oceans but to defend itself against attack from the sea. The magnitude of the latter problem has grown since the end of World War II; and the threat of sea-based nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union has elicited, in

response, the construction of a new, ocean-going Soviet navy -- which now poses to a potential aggressor the same threat posed to the Soviet Union. This new Soviet navy is nevertheless unique. Its composition has been determined by the technological and economic base upon which it is constructed, its assigned missions, and the threat. It has acquired nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (which gave it strategic capability and a strategic role), cruise missiles (for use against surface targets), SAMs (the main means of AAW at sea), AAA guns, electronics, and nuclear propulsion for its submarines (which gave it ASW capability). As a result, its combat capabilities have been greatly increased.

Submarines -- especially nuclear-powered submarines -- and aircraft have become its primary strike forces, although there is a continuing need for various types of surface ships -- to "give combat stability to" (i.e., protect) submarines, and to carry out a wide variety of tasks in both peacetime and wartime. The diversity of those tasks requires the construction of numerous types of surface ships, with different armament for each type.

The acquisition of these capabilities reflects the changing role of the Soviet Navy, which now has three components:

1. Strategic defense -- "participating in crushing an enemy's military-economic potential;"
2. Strategic deterrence -- "becoming one of the most important factors in deterring an enemy's nuclear attack" (SSBNs are more survivable than land-based launchers, and consequently represent a more effective deterrent); and
3. Peacetime political influence -- "visibly demonstrating in peacetime to the peoples of friendly and hostile countries" both the extent of Soviet capabilities and Soviet readiness to use those capabilities in defense of its state interests and for the security of the socialist commonwealth.

The navy has acquired these capabilities because only a force capable of blocking aggression can deter it; and -- together with the Strategic Missile Forces -- the navy now represents such a force.

THE CONTEXT OF GORSHKOV'S STATEMENT

We do not know when or under what circumstances the statement was written; but we do know when it was published and, therefore, something about the surrounding domestic and international circumstances which may provide some clues to its significance. Also, Admiral Gorshkov and other members of the Soviet leadership have written elsewhere on the subject, and attention to the consistency between "Navies in War and Peace" and the other statements should also prove rewarding.

Possible Political Influences on Publication

Morskoi sbornik is published under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense, and serves as the navy leadership's principal medium of mass communication. Its primary function is the dissemination of "military scientific knowledge" to, and the political and military education of, the officer corps of the navy -- its primary audience.² It has other audiences, however, * and it probably has other functions -- for instance, mobilizing support for the navy's case in debates within the military establishment, and possibly at the national decision-making level as well.

"Navies in War and Peace" was published without fanfare. Neither the preceding issues of Morskoi sbornik nor the annual production plans released at the beginning of the year by the publishing house of the Ministry of Defense gave advance notice of its appearance. With the exception of a one paragraph editors' introduction to the first installment, Morskoi sbornik made no reference to it in the course of its publication -- nor was it discussed during that period in any of the other major organs of the Soviet military press.

As indicated in Table 2, which provides the basic details of its publication, the 11 installments of "Navies in War and Peace" appeared in the 13 issues of Morskoi sbornik published from February 1972 through February 1973. There were two interruptions in the series. While the July 1972 issue did contain an article by Admiral Gorshkov, it was a discussion of the role of the commanding officer of a ship rather than a continuation of the series. The January 1973 issue contained no article by Admiral Gorshkov.

While it has not been possible to establish the actual publication dates of individual issues of Morskoi sbornik, the dates that it is "signed to press" and "signed to typesetting" are duly noted in each issue. Examination of these dates for the issues containing installments of "Navies in War and Peace" reveals significant deviations from established practice. These dates are shown in Table 3. The data reveal that --

- the April 1972 issue was "signed to typesetting" a month late;
- the July 1972 issue -- the initial interruption in the publication of the series -- was "signed to press" a month early;
- the August 1972 issue -- which resumed the series -- and all subsequent issues -- including the January 1973 issue, which was the second interruption in its publication -- were late being "signed to press;" and
- regular publication practices were not restored until after the conclusion of the series.

*It has been available to subscribers outside the Soviet Union since 1963

TABLE 2
PUBLICATION OF "NAVIES IN WAR AND PEACE"
IN MORSKOI SBORNIK

<u>Install- ment</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Chapter headings</u>
1	2-72	20-29	(Introduction) The Distant Past, but Important for Understanding the Role of Navies.
2	3-72	20-32	Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea. The Russians in the Mediterranean.
3	4-72	9-23	Into the Oceans on Behalf of Science. The Russian Fleet During the Industrial Revolution and the Transi- tion from Sailing Vessels to Steam Vessels. Navies at the Beginning of the Era of Imperialism.
4	5-72	12-24	The First World War.
5	6-72	11-21	The Soviet Navy. The Development of the Soviet Navy in the Period from the End of the Civil War to the Outbreak of the Great Patriotic War (1921-1928).
	7-72	*	
6	8-72	14-24	" (1928-1941)
7	9-72	14-24	The Second World War
8	10-72	13-21	The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War.
9	11-72	24-34	The Basic Missions Executed by Navies in the Second World War.
10	12-72	14-22	Navies as a Weapon of the Aggressive Policy of Imperialist States in Peacetime. (Intermediate Conclusion)
	1-73	*	
11	2-73	13-25	Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean. The Problems of a Modern Navy. (Conclusion).

*Interruption in publication of the series.

TABLE 3
DATES MORSKOI SBORNIK
 "SIGNED TO TYPESETTING" AND "SIGNED TO PRESS"

Issue	Signed to Typesetting	Signed to Press
2-72	21 Dec 71	28 Jan 72
3-72	20 Jan 72	25 Feb 72
4-72	19 Mar 72	31 Mar 72
5-72	22 Mar 72	29 Apr 72
6-72	19 Apr 72	29 May 72
7-72	19 May 72	4 Jun 72*
8-72	22 Jun 72	11 Aug 72
9-72	21 Jul 72	7 Sep 72
10-72	22 Aug 72	6 Oct 72
11-72	21 Sep 72	2 Nov 72
12-72	21 Oct 72	8 Dec 72
1-73	21 Nov 72	10 Jan 73**
2-73	20 Dec 72	5 Feb 73

*First interruption in the series.

**Second interruption in the series.

Given the relative stability of publication practices during the preceding five years, these deviations are obviously unusual; and they deserve to be explained, if possible. One approach is to attempt linking the contents of the installments with external events at the time each was being prepared for publication.

The delay in typesetting the April 1972 issue of Morskoi sbornik might only reflect apprehension over the effect of the initial installment. Then again, this third installment contains exceptionally forceful denunciations of the Tsarist lack of appreciation of sea-power -- e.g., references to "dull" figures and emigre reactionaries in the naval leadership, who "dismantled" the fleet. These cannot have been welcome words to the Soviet leadership in February and March 1972, when they were preparing for the opening of the final SAL negotiating session, in which limitations on naval systems were to figure prominently.

The July 1972 issue of Morskoi sbornik was signed to press a month early, but did not contain a sixth installment of "Navies in War and Peace" -- although it did have an article by Admiral Gorshkov on the role of the commanding officer of a ship. It is difficult to escape the impression that this latter article was a "filler," inserted perhaps to mitigate embarrassment at the interruption in publication of "Navies in War and Peace." If so, then it is likely that there were objections to publication of the sixth installment -- at least at that time, since it eventually appeared in the August 1972 issue.

The sixth installment, which covers the 1928-1941 period, contains disparaging references to both the naval arms limitations conferences of the interwar period -- "the war of the diplomats for supremacy at sea" -- and various "minuses" in the prewar construction and training of the Soviet fleet, most stemming from underestimation of the combat capabilities and potential strategic contributions of naval forces. The July 1972 issue was signed to press five days after the signature of the SALT agreement placed rigid constraints on the further growth of the Soviet SLBM force, at a point when the Soviet leadership would have been sensitive to the appearance of critical words from the Navy on naval arms limitations and the failure to appreciate the potential of naval forces.

Perhaps the July 1972 article on the role of the commanding officer is itself an important statement, more important than the interruption in the publication of "Navies in War and Peace." Party control of the Soviet military is not contested directly. However, it is contested indirectly, through emphasis on military professionalism; and Admiral Gorshkov's discussion of the role of the naval officer epitomizes that professionalist argument. Perhaps then it was a message deliberately issued at that time, for its own sake as an oblique protest to the interruption of the series.

The second interruption in the series occurred with the January 1973 issue of Morskoi sbornik. This interruption is more difficult to explain. The final installment, in the February 1973 issue, contains the only portion of the text that, judged on the grounds of content, style, and continuity with the general thrust of the discussion, appears "out of place" in the statement: an excursion into questions of the Law of the Sea and the ownership and exploitation of oceanic resources. This segment may well be an afterthought, and the delay in publication of the final installment due simply to technical difficulties.

However, the concluding installment also contains a vigorous exposition of the navy's role in the "active defense of peace" -- including an explicit claim that the navy's presence on the high seas is a vivid demonstration of the willingness and capability of the Soviet Union to defend not only itself and its own interests, but the security of socialist countries as well. But, when the January 1973 issue was being prepared for publication the Soviet Union was not "actively defending" the security of one socialist country, the DRVN, which was under heavy attack by the U.S. in the Linebacker II operation. It may have been felt that the conspicuous absence of Soviet naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin would raise embarrassing questions of Soviet credibility, and that a month's delay in the appearance of the conclusion of "Navies in War and Peace" would be "the better part of valor."

It is also worth noting that, beginning with the resumption of publication of the series after the July 1972 interruption, Morskoi sbornik was consistently late being "signed to press," and that the publication schedule that had obtained over at least the previous five years was not reestablished until after the series had been concluded.* This implies the establishment of some sort of additional review and screening procedures for "Navies in War and Peace," probably coincident with the May 1972 decision to interrupt publication. It also suggests -- as do the other, more dramatic anomalies in its publication -- that Admiral Gorshkov's military or political superiors (or both) were not entirely happy with "Navies in War and Peace" -- at least as initially proposed by Admiral Gorshkov.

Other -- and far less dramatic -- publication anomalies also support this suggestion. Morskoi sbornik normally contains some 30 individual articles, averaging 5,000 words each, organized under the following general headings:

- Lead articles -- often containing one or more special sub-divisions of articles focused on a current event such as "The Decisions of the XXIV CPSU Party Congress" or "The 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR"
- The Naval Art
- Combat and Political Training

*Only 11 percent of the 61 issues published prior to the appearance of "Navies in War and Peace" were late being "signed to press;" on the other hand, 54 percent of the 13 issues spanning the publication of the series were late.

- The Pages of History
- Armament and Technology
- Phenomena of Nature
- Foreign Navies
- Critique and Bibliography

Given the position Admiral Gorshkov holds, the relationship between that office and Morskoi sbornik, and the obvious importance of what he was saying, one might expect the installments of "Navies in War and Peace" not only to have been published without interruption but to have been given a prominent place in each issue of Morskoi sbornik. While all 11 installments appeared in the "lead articles" section, none appeared as the "lead article" -- although Admiral Gorshkov's July 1972 article on the role of the commanding officer of a ship did.

The placement of the installments of "Navies in War and Peace" within the "lead articles" section varied widely:

Issue	Placement	Issue	Placement
2-72	5	8-72	3
3-72	4	9-72	3
4-72	3	10-72	8
5-72	3	11-72	10
6-72	3	12-72	7
		2-73	3

When special subdivisions of the "lead articles" section appeared they were given precedence over the installments of "Navies in War and Peace," with one exception. The exception was the May 1972 issue, in which the fourth installment of "Navies in War and Peace" appeared ahead of a special subdivision devoted to "The 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR." While the subordinate placement of other installments can be explained without inferring a deliberage policy to minimize their importance, the placement of the May 1972 issue cannot be ignored. The placement of the fourth installment ahead of the special subdivision was an obvious attempt to give it prominence. While it covered the period of the First World War -- an ostensibly innocuous period in Russian and Soviet naval history -- the contents of that installment were anything but innocuous. It

- explicitly criticized the prevailing technique* for determining the required size and composition of the Soviet armed forces;
- implicitly claimed an expanded role for and increased effectiveness of naval strategic strike forces -- especially in achieving the political objectives of a war;
- advocated the establishment of naval supremacy as much, if not more, for its peacetime political impact as for its wartime military utility; and
- explicitly attacked naval arms limitations.

It was, of course, in May 1972 that the SAL negotiating process moved into its final stages -- and produced an agreement. The appearance of such criticism at this time may have played a major role in the decision to interrupt the publication of "Navies in War and Peace" and to introduce the implied review process that disrupted Morskoi sbornik's publication cycle. Given these circumstances, the placement of the July 1972 article on the role of the commanding officer as the "lead article" lends credence to the hypothesis that it was intended to be more than just a "filler," and -- however implicitly -- conveyed a message.

It is obvious that the SAL negotiations had considerable influence on the publication of "Navies in War and Peace." However, other events must also have affected the series.

The XXIV CPSU Party Congress and the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975), which implemented the programs promulgated by the Congress, were significant events that occurred prior to its publication that also had an effect on the series. The Soviet military establishment cannot have been pleased with either. The Congress signalled quicker movement toward detente with the West -- specifically endorsing efforts to achieve an arms limitation agreement and to implement other conflict-dampening measures. It also signalled increased attention to Soviet domestic needs; and this latter emphasis was reflected in the Plan. In essence, the Congress gave the military this message: the Soviet Union's ability to influence international events -- including its ability to deter an attack on itself -- depended on its economic as well as its military power; strengthening the economic and technological capabilities of the Soviet Union was the most effective way to strengthen its defense capability; consequently there would be more emphasis on the industrial capacity to produce military goods, but no major increase in the actual production of military goods; so that, in order to achieve the increase in combat capability they desired, the military would have to make better use of the resources they already had.³

*the "retrospective method," which -- in conformity with Marxist-Leninist methodology -- emphasizes the discovery and generalization of the "lessons" of experience (i.e., the last war); and according to Admiral Gorshkov must be augmented by "scientific prediction" of the future development of science and technology and the **probable** conditions of future combat if misleading results are to be avoided.

In endorsing detente with the West, the Congress was by no means endorsing Soviet "isolationsim" -- quite the contrary! The relaxation of tension in direct Soviet-Western relationships was but one of four parts of the "Peace Program" promulgated by the Congress, and those other three parts called for the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed forces to play a more active role in the international arena. These other components were:

- increased cooperation with the member states of the socialist commonwealth;
- more intense effort to achieve international agreements that would minimize occasions for conflict; and
- the "active defense of peace" -- which encompassed not only deterrence of Western attempts to coerce the members of the socialist commonwealth, the newly-independent states, and national liberation forces, but active support of them in case they should be attacked.

In effect, cooperation in direct Soviet-Western relations was to be complemented by continued -- if not increased -- competition with the West in the "third world."⁴

"Navies in War and Peace" explicitly incorporated -- and exploited -- this line. It argued that by demonstrating its military -- and hence its economic and technological -- capability in the international arena the Soviet Union acquired influence over events in that arena; that the navy was the branch of the armed forces best suited to making such demonstrations in peacetime; and that the navy through its "forward deployments" was, in fact, effectively engaged in the "active defense of peace."

Comparison with Other Statements

There are significant differences between "Navies in War and Peace" and earlier statements by Admiral Gorshkov -- in particular his last major article, "The Development of Soviet Naval Art," in the February 1967 issue of Morskoi sbornik. It also focused on the role, place and employment of the Soviet navy, but dealt almost exclusively with the military aspect of these questions: the evolution of the navy's general roles, specific missions, and actual uses in wartime; the relationship between those roles, missions, and uses and the evolving naval force structure; and the course of future development of the navy's combat capabilities. Like "Navies in War and Peace" it also drew heavily on the lessons of history, but its focus was restricted to the Soviet era, which meant that it dealt almost exclusively with military history: World War I, the Civil War, the Intervention, and the Great Patriotic War.

"Navies in War and Peace," focuses less on the military than on the foreign policy aspect of the navy's role, place, and employment; and thus employs a far broader historical base as a source of "lessons" in support of its argument. It could not be otherwise.

Marxist-Leninist methodology requires that Admiral Gorshkov's argument be based on the lessons of experience; but the only relevant Russian experience he can cite is that of the Tsarist era. Until quite recently, the Soviets have not really used their fleet, and political sensitivities preclude his reference to those more recent uses.

There is a second reason for Admiral Gorshkov's taking "Navies in War and Peace" far beyond Soviet military history. When discussing that history for military purposes he is bound by the dictates of Soviet military doctrine. However, his principal topic -- the employment of naval forces in peacetime and for political purposes -- lies outside the purview of military doctrine, and to the extent that he can keep the discussion beyond these boundaries, he retains considerable freedom of expression.

Furthermore, were "Navies in War and Peace" a doctrinal discussion like "The Development of Soviet Naval Art," it would cover not only the role, place, and employment of the fleet but its future development as well. In 1967 Admiral Gorshkov stated that discussion of the latter was a "natural" concomitant of a discussion of the former; and one of the principal functions of Soviet military doctrine is the control of future developments. In 1972-73, however, he explicitly eschewed discussion of the future course of naval construction -- and deviated from that guideline on very few occasions.

"Navies in War and Peace" is unique in other respects as well. There are significant differences between what Admiral Gorshkov said there and what his military superiors were saying at the time and have said since -- although a recent statement by Marshal Grechko provides some evidence that the Soviet military leadership may be moving toward endorsement, or have already endorsed, the active Soviet military role in the international arena that Admiral Gorshkov was advocating. The political leadership had already endorsed the experience of the "internationalist functions" of the Soviet armed forces at least as early as the XXIV Party Congress: but -- except for Admiral Gorshkov -- the military leadership in general, and Marshal Grechko in particular, appeared reluctant to even discuss, let alone embrace, that mission. Until May 1974, Marshal Grechko, in describing the missions of the Soviet armed forces, had routinely limited them to the defense of the Soviet Union per se, and the defense -- in concert with the armed forces of the other member states of the Warsaw Pact -- of the entire "Socialist Commonwealth." On rare occasions, he had stated that the mission might also include the defense of the state interests of the Soviet Union, but without indicating what or where those interests might be. (At times he even appeared to equate the defense of Soviet state interests with the defense of the Soviet Union itself.) In the May 1974 issue of Voprosy istorii KPSS (Questions of CPSU History), however, he explicitly stated that the armed forces' "internationalist functions" had been given "new content," and clearly implied that this "new content" was the protection and promotion of the overseas interests of the Soviet Union -- which is precisely what Admiral Gorshkov was discussing in "Navies in War and Peace."

CONCLUSIONS

Given the context of "Navies in War and Peace" it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary stimulus to its appearance was a review of Soviet state policy -- occasioned by the impending conclusion of a SAL agreement; conducted at the central decision-making level; and covering Soviet foreign policy, its attendant military requirements, and the resources necessary to meet those requirements.

The navy leadership and their supporters at the central decision-making level probably feared that the outcome of the review would prove unfavorable to the hard-won momentum for the development and employment of Soviet naval capabilities. They attempted to mobilize the additional support necessary to at least continue that momentum. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, the highly political atmosphere in which such a review would have been taking place, and the fluid state of affairs in the international arena at the time, incremental publications of the statement provided an opportunity to minimize unfavorable reactions and to take advantage of developments that would strengthen the argument it presented. Its appearance in a navy publication is probably attributable to high-level opposition to the policy it advocated -- opposition sufficient to block access to broader forums but insufficient to prevent its appearance in a navy-controlled journal. It is an extended historical discussion for two reasons: (1) it is only in terms of oblique discussion that current or anticipated Soviet state policy can be openly criticized by the military; and (2) because of the domestic and international sensitivity of its argument, recourse to pre-Soviet naval history was the only available way to advocate a more active anti-imperialist policy -- and the navy as the principal instrument of that policy.

"Navies in War and Peace" is an argument that navies are important and effective instruments of state policy in both war and peace: more important and effective in wartime than has heretofore been recognized in Soviet military doctrine; more effective and utilitarian in peacetime than any of the other branches of the armed forces -- not only as deterrents, but also in the accomplishment of positive ends. This effectiveness of navies is based not only on their combat capabilities but also on their potential for the exercise of political influence. That potential cannot be exploited, however, unless its existence is recognized and adequate steps are taken to meet its necessary conditions -- provision must be made for the acquisition of a large and modern navy; and once acquired both its numerical and its technological strengths must be maintained.

Given its context and its content, "Navies in War and Peace" appears to be addressed to several audiences --

- the other branches of the Soviet armed forces (which do not understand what the navy can do and covet the resources now being allocated to it)

- the Soviet military leadership (who are drawn from and favor the army, are in general insufficiently "progressive" and in any event tend to equate "internationalism" with "adventurism")
- detente-oriented factions in the Soviet political leadership (who underestimate the threat posed to both the Soviet Union itself and its overseas interests by Western naval forces).

The message is that the Soviet Union cannot afford to limit the growth and employment of its navy. If it does, it will be unable to adequately protect and promote its overseas interests in peacetime, deter attacks upon itself, protect itself if attacked, or achieve the ultimate policy objectives of any war it might have to fight with the Imperialist Powers. On the other hand, if it maintains a large and modern navy commensurate with its interests as a Great Power, and exploits the political influence potential provided by such a navy, it will be able to implement its policies more effectively both in peacetime (as is well known) and in wartime (a fact not generally appreciated).

Finally, the appearance of "Navies in War and Peace" implied that at the time serious consideration was being given in the Soviet Union to placing limitations on the growth and employment of the Soviet navy. At the same time, however, its appearance implied that a significant element of the Soviet leadership appreciated the potential benefits to be derived from the acquisition, maintenance and employment of a large and modern navy -- an appreciation that not only prevented limitations on the capabilities of the navy but resulted in an increase in its use as an active instrument of Soviet state policy, during and since publication of "Navies in War and Peace." The deployment of Soviet mine-sweeping and salvage units to clear the ports in Bangladesh coincided with the appearance of the initial installments of the series, and may well have been undertaken to make the same points to the Soviet leadership in action language that Admiral Gorshkov was then beginning to elaborate in *Morskoi sbornik*. The movement of a ballistic-missile submarine to Cuba in April 1972 was probably intended to have an influence on the final SAL negotiations, and possibly also undertaken as a further illustration of Admiral Gorshkov's message. A firepower demonstration off the Egyptian coast in May 1972 was probably part of a Soviet attempt to forestall the imminent expulsion of their forces from Egypt. In 1973, after the publication of "Navies in War and Peace," the Soviet navy was intimately involved in Arab world politics -- a visit of Admiral Gorshkov and a contingent of ships to Iraq during the Iraq-Kuwait border conflict, and transport of Moroccan forces to Syria in the months before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.⁵

There are no signs that these kinds of activities are abating. Taken together with the evidence of Admiral Gorshkov's statement, it is clear that Western navies cannot "rest on their oars."

NOTES

1. The complete text of "Navies in War and Peace" is published in translation in the January through November 1974 issues of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
2. (Anonymous), "About the Journal Morskoi sbornik," Morskoi sbornik, No. 2, 1973, pp. 33-34; Fleet Admiral N. Sergeyev, "Friend and Advisor of Naval Officers," Morskoi sbornik, No. 3, 1973, pp. 17-22.
3. Capt. 1st Rank A.N., Kramar, and Capt. 1st Rank S.M. Yefimov, "The New Five Year Plan and Questions of Strengthening the Defense Capability of the Country," Morskoi sbornik, No. 8, 1971, pp. 3-9.
4. V. V. Zhurkin and Y. M. Primakov (eds.) Mezhdunarodnyye konflikt (International Conflicts), "International Relations" Publishing House, Moscow, signed to press: 15 August 1972 (translated in: JPRS 58443, 12 March 1973); V. M. Kulish (Ed.), Voyennaya sila i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya (Military Force and International Relations), "International Relations" Publishing House, Moscow, signed to press 14 September 1972 (translated in: JPRS 58947, 8 May 1973).
5. For a detailed discussion of Soviet naval diplomacy and of the changing character of Soviet naval deployments see Anne M. Kelly, "The Soviet Naval Presence During the Iraq-Kuwaiti Border Dispute, March-April 1973," CNA Professional Paper 122, June 1974; Charles C. Petersen, "The Soviet Port-Clearing Operation in Bangladesh, March 1972 - December 1973," CNA Professional Paper 123, June 1974; and Robert G. Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations -- Ten Years of Change," CNA Professional Paper 125, August 1974.

ADVOCACY OF SEAPOWER IN AN INTERNAL DEBATE

Michael K. MccGwire

The Gorshkov series is primarily a polemic, which argues persuasively that the Soviet Union needs a powerful navy. Its publication is politically significant and discloses the existence of a major cleavage of opinion within the Soviet political and military leadership, which extends beyond the navy's role to wider issues of peace and war and the nature and style of Soviet foreign policy.

Gorshkov¹ is advocating an increase in naval strength, increased emphasis on the peacetime role and the warfighting capability, and he favors a more assertive policy. He does not want more stress placed on deterrent tasks, although he needs more and different ships to discharge them effectively; there is a faint possibility that he might be in favor of dropping the task of countering Polaris, which interferes most with an extended peacetime role. His main concern is to get more surface ships, but he is also short of attack submarines.

The most significant aspect of the Gorshkov series is the insight it provides to an internal debate which reaches beyond the navy's role to the wider issues of peace and war, and the nature and style of Soviet foreign policy.

The articles throw light on both sides of the debate and serve to identify important proposals which are inimical to the navy's interests, and which Gorshkov is seeking to rebut. Three which can be inferred are:

- a. Agreement should be sought with the U.S. on the restrictions of naval operations, probably including some form of mutual withdrawal from the Mediterranean.
- b. The navy's and the fishing industry's interest in the freedom of the high seas and in narrow territorial waters should be sacrificed in favor of gaining diplomatic influence with Third World countries.
- c. The allocation of resources to warship construction should not be increased, and should preferably be reduced.

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GORSHKOV IS ADVOCATING

My initial analysis, which concentrated on the content of the articles, concluded that in their published form the series would serve both to advocate and to educate, but that the underlying structure of the argument strongly suggested that their primary purpose was to persuade.² A wider ranging analysis lends support to this assessment. "Educate" includes both "informing" and "laying-down a line;" "advocate" extends to argument and debate.

It is unlikely that these articles were the primary vehicle for Gorshkov's arguments, which possibly stem from a shorter, higher-staff paper. But advocacy can also educate, and these articles could serve the dual purpose of advocating a certain policy within government while establishing Gorshkov's line within the fleet.

There are several reasons for concluding that this series is not announcing a new departure in Soviet policy, but reflects an internal policy debate which has probably been underway for several years.

- a. The most authoritative confirmation comes from a detailed comparison of the statement by Gorshkov in his report on the XXIII Congress that "unified views have been developed," with the editors introduction to this series in February 1972 which talks of "fostering the development of a unity of views."³
- b. The only use of authenticating signals such as "the will of the Central Committee," concerns policy which is already clearly established and does not extend to the new departures.⁴
- c. While Grechko's 1971 Navy Day article stressed the importance of the navy to Russia in standard naval phraseology, the article gives no hint of a change along the lines of Gorshkov's articles. There are indications of the opposite being the case.
- d. If Gorshkov was promulgating agreed doctrine, one would expect to find indications of such a change of policy elsewhere in the Soviet press. Failing that, one would have to assume that Gorshkov had been given the task of announcing a major shift in foreign policy in Morskoi sbornik. This seems unlikely.
- e. Without knowing the rules of the game, one might speculate that the publication of this series falls into that period between Party congresses, when open discussion of certain major policy issues is permitted. It does not fit the pattern of Party-approved pronouncements.

Further evidence that Gorshkov is advocating will emerge in the course of this analysis. The opposite conclusion, that Gorshkov is in fact announcing a major shift in policy, depends almost wholly on the assessment (based on precedent) that the Commander-in-Chief of the navy would not himself get involved in a doctrinal dispute, but would use a surrogate. The strength of this argument must depend on the issues involved. The present series is unprecedented, and in such circumstances the evidence of 'precedent' would seem to lack force. It is however relevant to the political implications of Gorshkov's advocacy.

THE DEBATE

The Wider Debate and Cleavage in High Political Circles

Gorshkov's introductory section implies that a debate is in progress.⁵ There are possible indications of a vertical cleavage of opinion reaching from the policy-making level down to the naval commands.

The unprecedented nature of the Gorshkov series and the fact that he is advancing a thesis which appears to run against the decisions of the XXIV Party Congress, suggest that he is not on his own. There would seem to be a vertical cleavage of opinion within the leadership of which the naval argument is only part, albeit significant.⁶

It seems probable that at least some of the political arguments central to the debate are addressed by Gorshkov in the section entitled "The Leninist Principles of Military Science."⁷ It is sandwiched between sections on the October Revolution and the Civil War, and its content is not directly relevant to either. Gorshkov stresses the contemporary validity and relevance of the ten principles which he chooses to discuss. These are summarized below, each being followed by a possible inference which might be drawn, on the assumption that the section is directed towards the present debate. The page and paragraph number of the June issue are shown in brackets.

1. The outcome of an armed struggle depends not only on the army, but also on the entire people, i.e., the rear, in the broadest sense of the word. (13/5) Possible inference: defense must take precedence over other calls on the economy.
2. Not to master all weapons and means of combat which one's adversary has or could have, is foolish or worse. (13/7) Possible inference: plans and procurement must be based on enemy's capabilities.
3. Victory depends on the morale of those who have to do the fighting, and this derives from the conviction that one's cause is worth dying for. (13/2) Possible inference: detente will destroy the will to fight.

4. The supremacy of the policy of the Communist Party must be openly acknowledged. (14/3) Possible inference: Gorshkov is on the same side as the Party ideologs.⁸
5. Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the art of war, and above all to strategy, which is inseparably linked to state policy. (14/6) Possible inference: military force is a recommended instrument of policy.
6. The principles underlying victory are: (a) a local superiority at the decisive moment⁹ (b) mastery of all forms of combat (c) the combination of offense and defense (d) surprise attacks (e) seizing and maintaining the initiative (f) high military vigilance (g) the decisive offensive leading to the rout of the enemy. (14/7) Possible inference: an argument for a more active and assertive military policy.
7. The need for firmness and purposefulness in carrying out intended plans and the falseness of any kind of wavering and indecisiveness at the crucial moment in the struggle. (14/8) Possible inference: an argument against detente, and against a reversal of the assertive forward policy decided at the XXIII Party Congress.
8. The organized preparation of battle is the only way to reduce the possibility of defeat in battle. (15/1) Possible inference: a nuclear war-fighting capability is necessary.
9. The principles of strategy: (a) study your enemy's strengths and weaknesses (b) predict his intentions (c) activeness and daring (d) purposefulness and flexibility in plans (e) achieve local superiority in the main sectors (f) identify the main threat at a given moment (g) decisiveness of action. Possible inference: as for 6. above.
10. The principle of one man leadership,¹⁰ centralism and a unity of wills from top to bottom is the basis of correct and goal-oriented leadership. Possible inference: there is disagreement at the higher levels of political leadership.

One might be inclined to see the deployment of these ten principles as related to the educational purpose of the series, except that they are so tucked away as to be ineffective in this respect. In most ways, this section stands out as a massive non-sequitor, the only justification for its location being historical chronology.¹¹

Taking the section as a whole, Gorshkov could be interpreted as quoting Lenin in support of an assertive foreign policy based on military power. Detente as a political tactic undermines fighting morale. Defense requirements must be based on the enemy's present and future capabilities and must come before all others. The armed forces must be

structured to fight and win a nuclear war if necessary. The more active foreign policy should use surprise and local military superiority to exploit the adversary's weaknesses and to seize and retain the initiative. Once the policy and plan of action have been decided there must be no faltering, or political backsliding from the on-going struggle. This echoes the tone of the whole series.

The fact that Gorshkov was able to run his own argument in eleven installments in his own service journal strongly reinforces the other evidence of a major cleavage of opinion within the Soviet leadership, which appears to extend into the foreign policy and domestic fields. The navy's role is only one aspect of a wider debate about the question of detente; about arms' control, limitation and mutual withdrawal; about East-West trade and technological aid; about the importance of the Third World; and about a whole range of defense issues concerning deterrence, the risk and likelihood of nuclear war, the type and length of war, and other subjects which have been argued over for the last fifteen years.

Brezhnev and Grechko appear on the opposite side of the cleavage to Gorshkov, who is also identified with those who argue against detente. The recent changes in the Politburo suggest that the former's opinions have prevailed, but this does not mean that Gorshkov's forceful advocacy of seapower has been totally rejected in favor of the opposite viewpoint. Although it appears probable that the Soviet navy has not been authorized the increase in surface warship construction which Gorshkov considers essential,¹² the employment of existing naval forces is likely to reflect a compromise between the extreme positions, biased in favor of arms limitation agreements and perhaps a less assertive operational and deployment policy.

The cleavage of opinion seems to run vertically through various groups as well as between them. With Gorshkov as a constant factor throughout the analysis it has been possible to get some idea of where various attitudes, interests and individuals are placed in relation to the cleavage. Despite the naval focus of this analysis it may be useful to list these placings, emphasizing the tentative nature of the findings.

The opposing lists are not intended to be symmetrical. I have made no attempt at comprehensiveness and I have avoided listing anti-theses except where this seemed justified by the analysis. Gorshkov appears to hold all the opinions listed under "his" side of the cleavage; but there will be other opinions held by those on his side which he has not brought out, as being irrelevant to his case.

The range of attitudes listed under the "other" side is somewhat wider and is inferred both from the content and the fact of Gorshkov's argument. It is not implied that any one person or institution holds all these opinions, but it gives some idea of how the interests and attitudes might cluster. It is certainly not being suggested that Brezhnev and Grechko subscribe to all these opinions.

It is unavoidable that the lists should mainly comprise "attitudes" rather than "interests," since the evidence derives from one side of an on-going debate. For the same reason it has been found both impractical and undesirable to present this information in tabular form, since it would create a false impression of the symmetry and comprehensiveness of the data.

On the same side of the cleavage as Gorshkov are the party ideologues -- who hold Leninist theories of military doctrine -- and the fishing industry -- who want to maintain their rights under existing law of the sea. They believe:

- that military power decides the outcome of all international relations
- that mutual deterrence permits greater freedom of military action
- that the navy is an important instrument of state policy in peacetime
- in the involvement of Soviet forces to curb imperialist aggression in local wars.
- that imperialist aggression is on the rise and will extend to ocean resources
- that the risk of escalation from local to nuclear war is low
- that the threat of a deliberate attack on the Soviet Union by the West continues to be real
- that expenditure of defense must come before all else
- that if nuclear war comes, political objectives can still be achieved
- in Phase II of a nuclear war
- in the importance of a balanced fleet
- that the Soviet Union requires a world wide maritime capability
- that freedom of the high seas is important to Soviet interests
- that territorial waters should be limited to twelve miles.

They are against accommodation and detente with the West and arms limitation or control agreements. On the other side from Gorshkov are Brezhnev -- who proposed in June 1971 to limit naval operations -- and Grechko. In addition, Gorshkov is up against the

intellectual defense establishment, some (or all) of the professional naval strategists, the merchant fleet -- in competition for shipyard resources --, the air defense forces (PVO Strany), and elements of the domestic economy.

These opponents believe:

- in the benefits of detente
- in the importance of Western technology and trade to the USSR
- that military power has low utility as an instrument of state policy outside the Soviet Bloc
- in the value of arms control and limitations
- that an assertive naval policy has been counter productive
- that the risks of nuclear war are high
- that political objectives could not be achieved after nuclear war
- that the danger of a deliberate U.S. attack is negligible
- that the Soviet-U.S. confrontation risks nuclear war
- that protracted war at sea is impractical.

They include those who want to:

- give priority to the domestic economy over defense
- give priority to good relations with Third World countries
- align the Soviet position on the Law of the Sea closer to Third World interests
- reduce the Soviet Union's physical presence in the Third World;

those who are concerned about:

- the diplomatic isolation of the USSR
- the ideological implications of naval intervention

- the political costs of forward deployment
- the political costs of foreign bases
- the economic costs of a large navy;

and those who believe that the navy's tasks can be discharged:

- mainly by nuclear submarines and aircraft
- in large part by strategic surveillance and shore based missiles.

Some of Gorshkov's opponents appear to be within the navy. In his discussion of the inter-war years, Gorshkov explicitly identifies two opposing schools of naval thought. A misguided, defensively-oriented, narrowly defined strategy, which emphasized the defensive use of submarines; and a correctly perceived, offensively-oriented outward-looking strategy (which was not however adopted).¹³ In drawing conclusions from World War II, Gorshkov stresses the penalties of a narrowly defined mission and points out how Germany's dependence on submarines forced her to adopt a defensive maritime strategy, and at the same time brings out the advantages of a "balanced fleet."¹⁴ Other less explicit references reinforce the impression that in this series Gorshkov is trying to establish that there is a correct, offensively-oriented strategy which relies on a properly balanced fleet; and a misguided, defensively-oriented strategy which places primary reliance on submarines.

The actual existence of these two schools of thought within the Soviet navy is suggested by Gorshkov's 1967 article in Morskoï sbornik, which reviews the development of Soviet naval art. The greater part of this was devoted to criticizing the way Soviet naval strategy developed between 1930 and 1955 (when he took over); one third of the article gave a more extended treatment to the interwar years, drawing the same conclusions as to defensive orientation, but without making the clear-cut distinction between goodies and badies.¹⁵ It is significant that Gorshkov should consider it necessary to repeat this cautionary tale, with greater explicitness, five years later. But more important is his discussion of the post-1955 period, when he refers to the beginnings of a well-balanced fleet, which he defines rather loosely as one which is effective in both nuclear and non-nuclear war, and can secure state interests in peacetime.¹⁶

The significance of Gorshkov's review derives from the article by Professor Admiral Panteleev, published 12 months previously in February 1966, i.e., within the bracket of "Party-approved pronouncements" relating to the XXIII Congress. This presents a distinctly different viewpoint to Gorshkov on amphibious operations and the battle of sea-communications; more important, Panteleev appears to ridicule the notion that all types of unit are needed in the fleet.¹⁷ Admiral Kharlamov, writing in the previous issue is more ambiguous on this issue, but uses the same arguments as Panteleev about there being no

need for large numbers of ships, or to concentrate forces,¹⁸ Gorshkov's 1967 article shows signs of being a rebuttal to these and other arguments.

Ullman's independent research has established that during the 1960-62 defense debate there were two schools of naval thought about the best method of meeting the requirement to defend Russia against attack from the sea.¹⁹ One favored a well-balanced mix of forces -- submarines, aircraft and surface ships; the other considered that the Soviet navy could discharge its mission if primary reliance was placed on nuclear submarines and aircraft.

We therefore have some evidence which might suggest that what was originally a difference of professional opinion in 1960-61 as how best to discharge the navy's mission, has now developed, as the result of the shift to forward deployment, into a substantial professional disagreement about the size, shape and role of the Soviet navy.

There also seems to be debate within the higher defense community, as evidenced by the scope of his articles, which go beyond purely naval concerns to questions of military strategy.

Gorshkov's 1967 article is entitled "The development of the Soviet naval art" and it concentrates on the inter-war and post-war periods. The book, History of the Naval Art devotes only two-thirds as much space to these periods, in two separate sections entitled "The development of naval theory, 1921-41" and "The post-war development of the Soviet fleet and naval art."²⁰ The subject matter is nominally the same, but the treatment is very different. Gorshkov is highly critical of developments prior to the middle fifties, after which he claims the first foundations of a "balanced fleet." In contrast, the History implies general approval of past developments, and at worst is non-committal.²¹ The transformation of the fleet into a "balanced, harmoniously developed arm of the long-range forces" is claimed, but in the explicit context of submarine and aircraft during the first post-war decade.²² A discussion of the principles of mass and maneuver could be read as having overtones of some of Panteleev's arguments.²³ However, the conclusions on Soviet post-war developments read very much like a standard ex-cathedra naval statement, and refer to the present existence of a balanced fleet.²⁴ The divergence between the two works is particularly marked in the inter-war period, to which Gorshkov devotes three times as much space (in a journal article) as does the History.

There is a comparable degree of divergence between his recent series and the History, although Gorshkov stops short at the end of World War II, and avoids any detailed discussion of post-war Soviet naval developments. Where the two works are covering the same ground there are significant differences in emphasis, perhaps the most noticeable being Gorshkov's handling of the struggle for sea-communications in World War II.

Although the Gorshkov series are only one quarter the length of the History, he devotes twice as much space to the inter-war years. One third of this section discusses "The

Leninist principles of Soviet Military Science." No reference is made to these principles in History. It might be argued that these Leninist principles have been extracted from the History into a more specialized work, (e.g., Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), except that the 1968 edition of Military Strategy shows similar signs of studied neglect. A whole series of references in the first and second editions have been omitted from the 25 third, along with certain references to Frunze, another authority quoted by Gorshkov. It would appear that these deletions must have some special significance, since they do not affect the meaning of the text.

Apart from taking up such a disproportionately small part of the book, the naval content of Military Strategy is notable for its consistency throughout all three editions. The 1963 version reclassified the counter-Polaris task from "important" to "most important" (i.e., on a par with the anti-carrier task) and discussed the operational requirement at somewhat greater length.²⁶ It also added a three-line reminder about joint operations in the section on "Structuring the Armed Forces," and a four-line paragraph about disrupting enemy landings, in the "Military Operations" section.²⁷ However, the largest addendum was related to anti-carrier operations, which continue to precede counter-Polaris in the text.²⁸ None of this was altered in the 1968 edition,²⁹ in which the major naval change was the promotion of the Soviet missile-armed nuclear submarines to a par with the Strategic Rocket Troops (SRT) throughout the book.³⁰

The navy's objections to the first edition were mainly corrected in the 1963 version, except that there was no increased emphasis on the role of surface ships.³¹ But although the navy could complain that insufficient space was devoted to its affairs, the treatment of its role, mission and tasks was factual, and reflected foreseeable capabilities. What it did not do was to discuss the navy's potential.

The scope of Gorshkov's articles makes them more properly comparable to the Strategy than the History, and it could be argued that he wrote the series as a way of breaking out from the army's total preoccupation with continental war. Although Military Strategy defines various kinds of war,³² the only one discussed in operational terms is nuclear-missile general war. In the 1963 edition, the authors state that the Soviet Union helps oppressed people in their struggle with imperialism "not only ideologically and politically, but materially as well," and adds in the 1968 edition that "the USSR will render, when it is necessary, military (voennaya) support as well;" but there is no discussion as to how this might be done.³³

It is hard to be certain where Gorshkov stood in 1960-61,³⁴ but there would seem to be sufficient evidence to suggest that by 1966 at least, he was in disagreement with members of the intellectual defense establishment, who have a large say in the formulation of military doctrine, which is "wholly oriented toward the future."³⁵ This is not to suggest a total rift; but certainly a divergence of opinion which was and is sufficiently serious for Gorshkov to take the rather extreme step of setting out his ideas at considerable length, invoking Party Holy Writ in his support.

What may be one of Gorshkov's major points is contained in a rather obscure paragraph, which takes up one tenth of the substantive part of his final conclusions. This point indicates the debate within the political leadership.

I interpret him to be saying that maritime power is not some all-purpose commodity which one buys by the ton, but that its type and quality stem directly from a country's perception of its particular requirements for maritime power, and from the naval policy it decides to adopt.³⁶ From this I infer him to be saying that the leadership must make a conscious decision on the future role of naval power in Soviet foreign policy, and they must not expect to be able to rely on the by-products of a policy tailored to deterrence and nuclear-missile war. Earlier in the series Gorshkov stresses the adverse effects of a narrowly defined mission and task-specific forces.³⁷

Gorshkov points out that "like a red thread running through all of Lenin's directives, letters and orders, runs the idea of the need for firmness and purposefulness in carrying out intended plans, and of the falseness of any kind of wavering and indecisiveness at the crucial moments of the struggle."³⁸ I would judge this to be a serious contemporary charge, although it is not clear whether it concerns naval, defense or foreign policy objectives.

Throughout the series Gorshkov stressed how the imperialists have always fostered the false impression that Russia is a land power with no requirement for a large navy,³⁹ but that from the earliest days, the Soviet leadership perceived the requirement for a powerful fleet⁴⁰ whereas Tsarist regimes never grasped the lesson.⁴¹

Both Gorshkov and Military Strategy bring in at an early stage Lenin's dictum that "politics is the reason, and war is the instrument, and not the other way around. Consequently it only remains to subordinate the military point of view to the political." But only Gorshkov goes on to say that in the past the outcome of foreign policy negotiations has depended on relative military power.⁴² He returns to stress this point in the course of his historical review.⁴³

Together with the whole thrust and flavor of the Gorshkov series, these specific points suggest that he is involved in an argument at the national policy level. This is supported by more direct evidence of disagreement over whether or not naval arms limitation is in Russia's interests. In June 1971, following diplomatic soundings, Brezhnev offered negotiations with the U.S. on mutual limitations of naval deployment.⁴⁴ In his articles (written after Brezhnev's initiative), Gorshkov brings out how the Western powers have continually sought to use arms limitation treaties to retain their maritime superiority in peacetime.⁴⁵ Although this is nominally advanced as evidence of the importance of navies in general, I would infer that Gorshkov is arguing that such agreements work in the dominant power's interests.⁴⁶

The Debate Clarifies Soviet Naval Developments

Analysis of the Gorshkov series also throws light on the events and pronouncements of the last twelve years, and this clarifies the background to the current debate. The Soviet Union embarked on the construction of a large, conventional navy after the war, and then abruptly altered course in 1954 to place primary reliance on long-range cruise missiles fitted to surface ships, diesel submarines and aircraft.

In 1955, Khrushchev brought 45 year old Gorshkov to Moscow to implement a new operational concept which had been strongly opposed by the former Commander-in-Chief of the navy.⁴⁷ The concept relied on the reach and payload of long-range cruise missiles (which had still to be developed) to substitute for tactical mobility and mass, in order to release resources from warship construction to the domestic economy. The building of cruisers was halted in mid-course, the mass-production of medium-type diesel submarines was sharply tapered to a halt, and while the destroyer, escort and sub-chaser programs ran their full course, their successor classes were put back four years. At this same period, the fighter elements of the naval air force were transferred to the PVO Strany.

The concept of operations was predicated on engaging the enemy carrier groups within range of shore-based air cover, and envisaged a coordinated missile attack by strike aircraft, diesel submarines and light cruisers. These units would begin to enter service in 1962. However, by 1958 the basic premise had been falsified and a further change of plans became necessary; it was decided to go for an all-submarine solution. This implied nuclear propulsion, and plans to treble production capacity were put in hand, for increased deliveries from 1968 onwards. The missile cruiser and SSG programs were cancelled, the latter's missile systems being used to reconfigure the second generation of ballistic-missile units to SSGN.

Khrushchev's new deterrence-based defense policy announced in January 1960 had little impact on naval interests. It reaffirmed the navy's contribution to the strategic strike forces. It also confirmed that submarines would provide the defense against attack from distant sea-areas, but that otherwise the navy was not intended to challenge the West's world-wide maritime capability.

It was a very different matter when, some 18 months later, the decision was reached that the navy must deploy forward in a damage limitation role; I suspect that the army-dominated leadership did not fully perceive the implications of what they were demanding.⁴⁸ The navy was being required to discharge continuously in peacetime what were essentially wartime tasks, in sea areas which were remote from Soviet bases and were dominated by their potential adversaries. The areas of most immediate concern were the South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The navy was ill-equipped and ill-prepared for such a radical adjustment of role,⁴⁹ and while the army continued to argue about the way a nuclear missile war would be fought, it seems likely that the navy's prior concern was twofold:⁵⁰ (a) the type of forces it needed to discharge this new and demanding task, and (b) the vulnerability of its forces on distant deployment.⁵¹

At the beginning of 1962, the Soviet navy had reached a low ebb. Surface ship deliveries were recommencing after a 4 year hiatus, but the building rate of the destroyer-size ship would only average $2\frac{1}{2}$ units a year throughout the sixties. The design concept of the missile cruiser had been found inadequate and the programs curtailed or modified. Diesel submarine deliveries were down to 8 a year.

Technological deficiencies had also exacted their toll. The first generation of nuclear submarines and of SLBM had both proved to be inadequate for their designed role of strategic delivery; the second generation of nuclear submarines had been configured to SSGN, using an unproven missile-system designed for a restricted geographical scenario; the means of providing the system with target location data had yet to be developed.

By this date preliminary design and procurement for the 1970 delivery of the follow-on destroyer-size class (Krivac) would have been in hand, the two programs for major conversion to SAM-armed ASW ship would have been authorized. Specifications for the Kara probably date from 1961, but the actual construction of this class, and the fate of the existing ASW helicopter-cruiser program had yet to be decided.⁵²

Gorshkov and his First Deputy had been elected full Members of the Central Committee by the XXII Party Congress in October 1961, and in April 1962 he was promoted Fleet Admiral and named a Deputy Defense Minister.⁵³ Despite these signs of favor it appears that it was not until 1963-64 that the Soviet leadership was finally convinced that the Mediterranean deployment would require a substantial surface component with high survivability, demanding additional new construction.⁵⁴ It was probably at this period that authority was given (a) to build both Kara and Krivac, using facilities already assigned to naval construction,⁵⁵ and (b) to complete two Moskva's and build a much larger class of air-capable ship, for delivery in 1973-74.⁵⁶

By 1965, it would seem that the navy's interests were receiving due attention.⁵⁷ Furthermore a new family of nuclear submarines was due to begin entering service in 1968, at the increased rate decided ten years previously. However, the SSBN configuration would take half the annual production.⁵⁸

Directly related to the requirement for surface ships was the question of forward support, and by 1965 it was clear that, lacking the necessary afloat support,⁵⁹ the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would require access to base facilities in the area.⁶⁰ This requirement, coupled with the increased allocation of resources to naval surface construction, coincided with other developments such as the rising U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Soviet

decision to supply Haiphong by sea and the announcement of the Poseidon program.⁶¹ These and other factors⁶² may have decided the new leadership to capitalize on the enforced presence of Soviet naval units in distant sea areas, and led to a significant elaboration of the functions of forward deployment.⁶³ Along with "marking" nuclear strike units, the navy was to contest the West's unhindered use of the seas for the projection of military power; this new departure was probably outlined at the XXIII Party Congress in March 1966.⁶⁴ Soviet naval forces were to adopt a more assertive (even truculent) posture, but to be effective, this would require more ships on station and continuous deployment; this required bases. In May, Gorshkov accompanied Kosygin on a visit to Egypt, reportedly seeking base facilities.⁶⁵

Several new classes of warship were to begin delivery in 1967-68⁶⁶ and this may have determined when the new policy could be implemented. 1967 was the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution, and in his retrospective article in February's *Morskoi sbornik*, Gorshkov went to great lengths to point out how misguided had been the defensively oriented policies which had pertained until the middle fifties, which is when he took over. On April 24th at Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev demanded the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean,⁶⁷ and this signalled a sharp rise in the navigational intransigence of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan.⁶⁸ The exact origins of the Arab-Israeli war are still obscure⁶⁹ but certain dates are clear: the six day war, 5-11 June; 9 July, Soviet warships berth in Alexandria and Port Said to provide "protection" against Israeli attack; in October, Gorshkov is promoted to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union.⁷⁰

By luck rather than good management, and with considerable help from Western commentators, the Soviet navy emerged from these events with their international reputation established, and their operational capability in the Mediterranean greatly increased. Others were less fortunate. The army's prestige took a heavy blow. And the merchant fleet, whose Black Sea ports were the supply points for Vietnam and Pacific Russia, was forced to use the Cape Route and to increase foreign charters; this represented a substantial loss in hard currency earnings.⁷¹

The Soviet navy continued to discharge its deterrent tasks, there was a progressive build-up in the Mediterranean Squadron, and growing political demands for the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet. But from 1968, there was also increasing use of naval units for specifically political purposes in more distant parts of the world; the Indian Ocean from 1968, the Caribbean and West Africa from 1969 and S. E. Asia in 1970. As Weinland points out, their successes (or lack of failures) was due to caution, discretion and luck.⁷² But these qualities do not sail ships, and operationally the Soviet navy was severely overstretched.

Throughout the 1960's the operational demands being levied on the navy rose inexorably, with a sharp increase after 1967. But ocean-going new-construction was joining the fleet at a relative trickle⁷³ and the problem of the block-obsolescence of the large post-war classes was becoming increasingly obtrusive.⁷⁴ Not only was the navy severely overstretched but

in terms of relative capabilities, it was falling behind the West. By 1970, Gorshkov could point out that during the previous 12 years, the navies of Russia's potential enemies had taken delivery of two to three times the number of major combatants as had the Soviet navy; if account were taken of size and combat capability, the disparity was more like three or four to one. The West built more attack carriers during the period than the Soviet Union built missile-cruisers, and until 1968, was outbuilding her in nuclear submarines.⁷⁵

Notwithstanding the higher rate of surface deliveries after 1970, Soviet warship new construction would still be insufficient to meet the replacement requirements of all four fleets and the growing commitment to distant deployment. If the Soviet Union wished to continue using her navy in peacetime to counter the West's nuclear strike capability, and to inhibit their projection of military power, she would have to provide the necessary ships. This would require a substantial and sustained increase in the construction of ocean-going surface ships, and the choice of whether to rely on base facilities in foreign states, or to be totally self-sufficient; the latter would require even more ships.

This was a very fundamental decision, both in terms of resource allocation and of basic foreign policy and military doctrine; and it was one which would have to be decided before the XXIV Party Congress in March 1971. It was probably with this in mind that Gorshkov staged the Okean demonstration in April 1970,⁷⁶ which had the Soviet navy exercising in four distant seas, and then dispersing to visit ports around the seaboard. The Western press helped with the publicity and he had a bit of luck in the Indian Ocean, where the exercise detachment was available to lend the support of its military presence to the Government of Somalia, and produce an outcome favorable to Russia's interests.⁷⁷

Gorshkov's luck then left him, and events began to run against the thesis that naval power would be a cost-effective instrument of Soviet policy. Among the developments in 1970 which could have worked against this idea were:

- a. The requirement to install a Russian-manned air-defense system in Egypt to protect Soviet interests, not least the naval base and naval air facilities.⁷⁸
- b. The Jordanian crisis in October, when the U.S. showed no signs of being inhibited by the Soviet squadron, but sent in additional units and operated this overwhelming force freely in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁹
- c. The growing signs of a fundamental shift in U.S. policy towards China.⁸⁰
- d. The budgetary evidence that the Soviet navy's high visibility was strengthening the hands of those advocating a "Blue Water" foreign policy for America, over those who favored reduced U.S. commitments.
- e. The increasingly negative reaction among unaligned countries in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, to the introduction of super-power naval confrontation into those sea areas.

On the basis of Marshal Grechko's 1971 Navy Day article in Morskoi sbornik, which I assume stems from the XXIV Party Congress, it would seem that Gorshkov did not get the decision he sought.⁸¹ Grechko does not in any way play down the Soviet Union's very real requirement for a navy, or its vital role in the country's defense, and he mentions the role of securing state interests. But the initial discussion covers all branches of the armed forces, the nuclear submarines being bracketed with the Strategic Rocket Troops, and the navy as a whole comes last. The emphasis is on the navy in war and on deterring attack on Russia. Certain nuances may be significant.

- a. Okean is described as demonstrating the navy's readiness to repel attacks on Russia, and to launch its own strikes.
- b. Only three components of Okean receive special mention, (1) submarines, (2) naval aviation (3) the landings in the Arctic, with submarines singled out for a paragraph on their own.⁸² The non-mention of surface ships, by far the most numerous component in terms of individual units and personnel, would seem pointed.
- c. The reference to "U.S. imperialism" is limited to S. E. Asia, confidence being expressed that freedom-loving people will win out through their own efforts, Soviet support being limited to "fraternal air."⁸³

This would seem to read very differently than the Gorshkov series.

The Crux of the Naval Debate and Its Current Status

The five-yearly Party Congresses provide a deadline within the planning process, which encourages the finalizing of longer-term policy decisions during the preceding months, and provides the occasion for announcing Party-approved decisions; public pronouncements around these periods are likely to reflect these decisions. Neither of Gorshkov's statements come within this category, each appearing eleven months after the preceding Congress (XXIII - March 1966, XXIV - March 1971). They do however conform to the same policy-making cycle and they also fit the "decision periods" for naval procurement.⁸⁴ It is relevant that an article about the decisions of the XXIII Congress appeared over Gorshkov's name in the May 1966 issue of Morskoi sbornik,⁸⁵ but there was no similar article by Gorshkov after the XXIV Congress. Instead (?), the article in Marshal Grechko's name appeared in July (Navy Day) 1971 issue.⁸⁶

It would appear that during the period preceding the XXIII Congress in 1966, the Soviet leadership decided to adopt a more assertive naval policy, which began to be implemented in May 1967. The results appear to have exceeded expectations, and during the next two or three years, this new instrument of policy was exercised with increasing frequency and continued success.

However, it would seem that by 1970, two kinds of costs were becoming apparent. A very wide range of political costs, both present and future. And the economic costs of the immediate and substantial increase in naval construction, which would be required to support a forward naval policy without undue risk. It would appear that from 1969 onwards there has been an increasing argument about whether the benefits of an assertive forward naval policy outweighed these costs.

While the Gorshkov series has concentrated on the role of the navy, the crux of the naval debate will have been the future building programs. By 1971, decisions would have been taken on the type and scale of new construction for delivery at the beginning of the eighties, and on production runs during the rest of the seventies. Although it appears that Gorshkov's full requirements were not included in the 8th Five Year Plan, the fact that he was able to run his own argument in eleven installments in his own service journal suggests that in February 1973 the wider political debate, of which the navy's future role was only a part, was still not closed.

We do not know exactly what Gorshkov asked for in the way of new construction. He would need a substantial amount just to stay where he was and he may well have had to fight quite hard not to have existing building rates reduced. To remedy the many deficiencies in his existing capability would need a great deal more, and it seems likely that Gorshkov argued for a substantial increase in the allocation of yard capacity to naval construction, without which his requirement for more ships could not be met.

This requirement would have gone to the very heart of the Soviet planning and decision making process; it would have been of fundamental significance to a wide spread of interests in the Soviet Union, compared to which the navy's role is of narrow and limited concern. But as Gorshkov pointed out in his conclusions, the Soviet leadership must first make the political decision on the role of the navy, and all others will follow from that.⁸⁷

Current construction reflects old decisions and throws no light on the current debate, and we will have to wait several years for shipyard evidence of what was decided. But on the basis of official pronouncements made around the time of the XXIV Congress it would appear that the 8th Five Year Plan did not include all that Gorshkov asked for; but neither were naval allocations cut back.⁸⁸

Gorshkov may have been unsuccessful in influencing the current Plan but the evidence of the present series suggests that by the end of 1971 the argument was still not closed and he still had hopes of changing the longer term verdict, which would take effect in the 9th Five Year Plan.

The Subjects of the Naval Policy Debate

The Gorshkov series can provide little firm evidence on Soviet naval policy, since we do not know what parts of his argument have been accepted or rejected. The most that can legitimately be inferred from these articles are the parameters of the debate on specific issues, and even here, it must be allowed that Gorshkov may have adjusted his arguments to ensure maximum support. It would also be unwise to try to draw conclusions from this series on detailed operational concepts and the employment of forces. Gorshkov is arguing at a more general level about the need for navies in war and peace, and his articles do not discuss the development of the post-war navy and the art of naval warfare.

There appear to be spectrums of opinion on a range of related issues. These axes of opinion include trust/distrust in the efficacy of deterrence, the possibility/impossibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war; a belief in the likelihood of a short/long war, the conventional forces would have no role/a substantial role to play, and the nuclear missiles are/are not a universal weapon system; the need for superiority/sufficiency in strategic systems and the willingness/unwillingness to risk nuclear war to achieve objectives.⁸⁹

There is also discussion about the possibility of limited non-nuclear war and local war, but the latter do not receive the same attention as nuclear-missile war.

If one dare generalize on such a broad range of issues, one might say that Soviet policy tends to occupy an extended middle ground on most of these issues, trying to cover the broadest range of possibilities. The main exception concerns the risk of nuclear where the tendency, so far, has been towards extreme caution.

Besides the tactical and technical disagreements as to the best way of discharging specific naval tasks, individual attitudes towards the main issues of global war have conditioned professional opinion within the fleet:

- Should there be a task-specific or a general purpose navy? This question has been argued since the 1920's within the navy, but the outcome has usually been dictated by the political realities of the nature of the threat and competing demands on industrial capacity. Gorshkov claims that he has been a generalist since the thirties, but the decisions taken between 1954-58 were aimed at a highly task-specific fleet, and have since had to be radically revised.⁹⁰ The shift to forward deployment since 1961 and the requirement to survive in a hostile maritime environment has re-opened this whole question.

- Can nuclear-missiles do it all? The extreme position has been that shore based missiles can dispose of most naval units, using target data provided by external means.⁹¹ As the theoretical potential of surveillance systems and the accuracy of long-range missiles improve, it seems likely that this option will become increasingly attractive to those who wish to cut back on naval forces.⁹² The more generally accepted

position is that missile-armed nuclear submarines and aircraft are the main striking force of the fleet, the former covering targets on land and at sea.

- Can nuclear submarines and aircraft do it all? The 1957-58 decisions appear to have been predicated on the belief that they could, but this was revised in 1963-64. Their Mediterranean deployment suggests they can't. But there would seem to be those who argue that they can in fact do all that needs to be done.⁹³

- Can the sea-based air threat be left to the PVO Strany? It seems likely that the Soviet Union underestimated the problems of countering Polaris at sea, having been misled by their own rather unsuccessful SSBN.⁹⁴ It is possible that the task is now under attack as being unrealistic.⁹⁵ Why should sea-launched strikes warrant special treatment.

- What is the best ASW platform? In the early sixties there was considerable discussion on the relative merits of the aircraft, submarine and surface ship, with the latter getting a surprisingly large body of support.

- Opinions on the importance of ocean communications relate to ideas on whether a nuclear war will be brief or protracted. It has been included in Military Strategy as one of the four main tasks.⁹⁶ In the current series Gorshkov devotes a disproportionate amount of space to this aspect of World War I and II.⁹⁷

- There is now little disagreement on the need and practicability of tactical amphibious operations in nuclear war although Gorshkov states that the army was slow in appreciating the navy's potential contribution.⁹⁸ There might be some discussion on the need for a long-range assault lift, but it would be hard to substantiate on the evidence available.

- In 1967, Gorshkov was emphatic that the carrier was highly vulnerable, and that the Soviet decision not to invest in this type of ship had been completely vindicated.⁹⁹ This was only six months before Moskva ran sea trials, by when procurement for the Kiev class would have been in hand, but the context suggests he was referring specifically to strike-carriers. In the current series Gorshkov says nothing about carriers. He does however stress the importance of naval-subordinated aviation in his analysis of World War II.¹⁰⁰ A 1972 article based on Western developments concludes that naval aviation will continue to play an important role for a long time and that the proportion of carrier to land-based aircraft is rising.¹⁰¹

- Everyone is for balanced fleets, but this is a plastic term which does not imply a specific mix of capabilities, but rather the ability to discharge certain unspecified tasks.¹⁰² There would seem to be considerable room for argument both about the extensiveness of these tasks and the degree of which they must be discharged.

There appears to have been little public debate (as opposed to pronouncement) about the role of the navy in distant sea areas, apart from its mission of "defending the homeland against attack from the sea." Gorshkov does however stress repeatedly that the role of the Soviet navy is completely different to that of the imperialist fleets.¹⁰³

- The defense of state interests is an elastic term, whose limits I suspect have yet to be officially defined.¹⁰⁴ In the recent series Gorshkov used it in a way which could suggest Soviet military intervention in local wars involving Western powers.¹⁰⁵ It seems likely that a central issue of the current debate is just what should be categorized as "state interests," and how far should the Soviet Union be prepared to go in promoting or protecting them.

- For several years, it has been claimed that the presence of Soviet naval units in distant waters increases the Soviet Union's prestige and influence,¹⁰⁶ and Gorshkov¹⁰⁷ lends added stress with historical examples of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean. This view may not be unanimous. There is evidence of Soviet disillusionment over the return on their investment in arms supplied to the Third World, where in many cases the cost/benefit balance has been negative.¹⁰⁸ There may also be those who question whether the benefits of forward naval deployment outweigh the political (let alone the economic) costs, particularly when the availability of naval forces in times of crisis is contingent on general war tasks.¹⁰⁹ It is noticeable that port visits are made selectively and mainly to client states.¹¹⁰

- There has been no discussion of the need for overseas bases, the avowed purpose of port visits being to show friendship and support.¹¹¹ The requirement is however clearly demonstrated by Soviet naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and it can be argued that the navy's requirement for shore-related support facilities has been a primary consideration in the formulation of Soviet policy in certain regions.¹¹² Gorshkov outlines the requirements for afloat support (underway included) in the present series.¹¹³

These issues cut across several lines -- party vs. professionals, defense vs. domestic, and the navy vs. the rest. The continual hauling and veering in the party-professional relationship is well documented¹¹⁴ and some analysts consider that political control over the military has increased in both scale and intensity.¹¹⁵ One of the points which Gorshkov reiterates in both the historical and contemporary analysis, is the complexity of the process of formulating naval requirements, of the need for sound organization and technological forecasting, and how the traditional approach has always led to error and sometimes disaster.¹¹⁶ This could be seen as an argument for leaving the size and shape of the navy to be determined by the professionals. He also stresses the point which he has made in the past that relative naval strength cannot be assessed by relative numbers;¹¹⁷ this could be used in support of several very different arguments.

Some degree of competition must exist between the defense industries and all other sectors of the economy, either directly or indirectly. Navies have always been the most dependent of the armed services on the level of industrial development, and its demands on the economy have been correspondingly greater. Warship construction is an assembly industry, whose requirements for material and equipment reach across the full span of light and heavy industry, competing for scarce resources and skills. The navy is in direct competition with the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets for shipbuilding resources, and a substantial proportion of the latter's tonnage is built outside Russia. All three fleets can be considered as potential instruments of state policy in peacetime.

The Soviet leadership has traditionally placed a high value on national security; yet shipyard capacity was transferred from naval to commercial construction in the middle fifties, and all except one of the newly built yards have been laid out for the assembly of merchant ships.

In his brief concluding paragraphs Gorshkov observes that powerful navies can only be established by coastal states having the necessary resources and a developed economy.¹¹⁸ The significance is not clear, unless he is implying that a naval arms race would only involve Russia and the U.S. Earlier, he emphasized the Soviet Union's military economic potential and, seemingly out of context, unless he was thinking of protracted blockade, the country's almost inexhaustible reserves of energy, raw materials and food.¹¹⁹

One should be chary of imputing inter-service alignments and rivalries on the grounds of apparent common interests. The Soviet navy probably sees the overwhelming size of the army in general, and the ground forces in particular, as being mainly a drawback, but otherwise it is not self-evident where interests will clash or coincide. In functional terms the navy's tasks and capabilities span those of the other four services (Gorshkov makes this same point),¹²⁰ but alignments will depend in part on whether the argument is mainly about what priority should be given a certain functional task, or about who should discharge it. The method of budgeting will also have considerable influence. If "defense" is allocated a fixed global sum, then it may be that a common army/navy belief (and hence professional interest) in the likelihood of protracted nuclear war, will conflict with the navy's institutional interest in ground-force reductions.¹²¹

Gorshkov argues that within the armed forces, navies are growing in relative importance,¹²² and that naval forces are better able to withstand the effects of nuclear weapons than are ground forces.¹²³ He points out that while the army has always been predominant in Russia, the relative utility of different branches of the armed forces can and does fluctuate depending on circumstances.¹²⁴ But I get the impression that he has been careful to avoid implying that the navy should grow at the expense of the ground-forces, and to show deliberate deference to the army's historical role and contemporary interests.¹²⁵

The role of the ballistic missile submarine in destroying targets on land had been announced by 1958,¹²⁶ but their limited capability meant that the potential qualification of this force to serve as a component of the Soviet strategic deterrent was not formally acknowledged until 1966,¹²⁷ and Gorshkov implies that it is still not fully fledged.¹²⁸ He generally links his SSBN force with the Strategic Rocket Troops, but makes one specific reference to the inherent advantages of sea- over land-based systems.¹²⁹ However, the general thrust of Gorshkov's argument makes it unlikely that he is fighting for a larger share of the strategic delivery role.¹³⁰

The air force (as opposed to aviation) is hardly mentioned, but using the German failure in the Battle of the Atlantic as his example, Gorshkov stresses that the air component must be subordinated to naval command,¹³¹ and returns to this example in the final section to emphasize the need for maritime aviation.¹³² This might suggest some conflict over the subordination of air support. On a different subject, there is no significant reference to the PVO Strany.

Seemingly inconsequential parts of the Gorshkov series make better sense if we allow that he is making a substantial number of debating points; these are important indicators of the scope of argument. One can perhaps identify four main categories: (1) Reassure those who have doubts but are still uncommitted, (2) Rally support by emphasizing doctrinal respectability, (3) Rebut earlier attacks on his case and personal record, and (4) Attack certain opposing viewpoints by analogy.

I would judge that the "Attacks" are relatively few, and in general Gorshkov gives the impression of avoiding unnecessary provocation and of being careful not to antagonize whole groups or interests.

Gorshkov takes care in his introductory paragraph to reassure the other branches of the armed forces that he is not implying that naval forces have "any sort of unique importance . . . in modern armed combat."¹³³

On the evidence of the articles, he could also be concerned to reassure other interests who think that his proposals will run across their own policies or beliefs. Most of his reassuring arguments also serve his general thesis:

- International prestige has a high value, and there are those in the Soviet Union who argue that the supply of arms to the Third World has resulted, on balance, in a loss of Soviet prestige;¹³⁴ is it not likely that direct naval involvement will have the same results? Asserting the contrary to be true, Gorshkov supports his case with examples drawn from 200 years of Russian history, right through to the present time.¹³⁵

- A more assertive naval policy has overtones of gunboat diplomacy; this could lead the Soviet Union into ideological error, besides losing them the whip of imperialism for use against the West. Gorshkov stresses that what he is advocating is completely different to how the imperialists use their fleets, and this is one of the ten points he brings out in his conclusions.¹³⁶

- "The struggle . . . cannot be decided by blows at the periphery The complete victory of socialism . . . will come . . . by demonstrating its superiority as a social system. . ."¹³⁷ Gorshkov stresses the navy's role as a show case for the Soviet system and its economic might, and goes out of his way to use a rather obscure quotation from Engels in support.¹³⁸

- Gorshkov makes several points which would defuse the concern that Western maritime preponderance is too great: (1) Strength is no longer related to numbers and size¹³⁹ (2) Forecasting requirements is a complex art with war as the test; the West have a record of failure; the Soviet Navy has mastered the art.¹⁴⁰ (3) the aim is not to challenge the U.S. Navy for worldwide domination, but to be able to achieve local superiority when required.¹⁴¹ (4) Only the U.S. now has the economic and industrial capacity to match Soviet naval building.¹⁴² (5) The Soviet Union has unlimited resources and her economic record shows that she can do this.¹⁴³

- There is no hint that the policy Gorshkov is advocating would require a substantial increase in the numbers of surface warships and a major reallocation of resources to their construction. It might seem that he deliberately plays down this issue, as when he mentions that Russia needed four fleets, in a footnote aside after Tsushima.¹⁴⁴ His stress on capability not being a function of numbers would have the same effect.

In addition to the ten Leninist principles referred to in the earlier section, Gorshkov seeks to emphasize that there is nothing radical in what he is advocating, but that it is supported both by the lessons of history¹⁴⁵ and by established doctrine, with particular stress on the axiom that victory can be achieved by the coordinated use of all branches of the armed forces.¹⁴⁶

Both from this series and from his 1967 article, one might draw the conclusion that Gorshkov is concerned to establish (or defend) his reputation as a "Naval Thinker." Evidence that he does not see eye-to-eye with the navy's professional strategists was discussed earlier in this paper¹⁴⁷ and of course the abrupt and major changes of course since he took over may well have raised doubts about his long-range naval judgment.

It appears that Gorshkov has been attacked concerning "command of the sea," which Soviet doctrine has long categorized as a "worthless theory," this assessment being re-confirmed by the experience of World War II.¹⁴⁸ Discussing the inter-war period, Gorshkov links those who supported the "command of the sea" theory with an offensively

oriented school of thought while the "small war" school was defensively oriented, and he claims that the accepted interpretation of the term implied local superiority.¹⁴⁹ From this one might infer that Gorshkov has been accused of advocating a navy which could achieve "command of the sea" in Mahan's terms. Gorshkov refutes this charge.

By cutting short his survey at 1945, Gorshkov avoids criticizing the development of the post-war navy, which he attacked so strongly in his 1967 article. The latter must have antagonized a number of senior officers, both retired and still serving, particularly since the personal claims he advanced by implications, were not factually correct.¹⁵⁰ By comparison, there is very little "they were wrong and I was right" in this series. He does however deliberately attack on three fronts, making use of established perjorative classifications:

- Tsarists and fools persistently fail to perceive Russia's need for a powerful fleet.¹⁵¹ Imperialists have deliberately fostered the idea that she does not need a navy.¹⁵² For reasons of geography and politico-economic status,¹⁵³ it is self-evident that the Soviet Union requires a large navy, and those who argue otherwise must be tarred with the same brush.

- The explicit attack that there is wavering, and weakening of purpose is only made through Lenin's principles,¹⁵⁴ but historical analogies may also have been drawn.¹⁵⁵ Reflection of this charge can perhaps be seen in one of the concluding paragraphs where Gorshkov credits the Central Committee with "unflagging" attention to (inter alia) increasing the country's maritime power.¹⁵⁶

- His defensive orientation is made explicit in his discussion of the opposing schools of naval thought in the thirties,¹⁵⁷ and he would seem to link this defensive orientation with narrowly defined missions, and primary reliance on submarines.¹⁵⁸

GORSHKOV'S ARGUMENT AND HIS VIEW OF THE NAVY

In the course of his historical survey and contemporary review, Gorshkov develops an argument of which the general points relevant to this analysis are:

- a. It is military power which determines the outcome of interstate interactions.
- b. Naval strength has always been a necessary attribute of great power status; Russia has always suffered when she neglected her naval strength. For a wide range of reasons (geographic, economic, political) the Soviet Union needs a powerful navy.
- c. The relevance and importance of navies as a means of achieving political objectives in peace and war is continuing to increase. The inherent attributes of naval forces have projected them to the forefront of contemporary means of combat.

- d. These attributes lend themselves to protecting a country's interests beyond its border. Naval forces have a unique capacity to demonstrate the state's economic and military might, and to project military power, in peacetime.
- e. The Soviet navy has a vital contemporary role as a means of deterring and waging war, and as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. The main strength of the Soviet navy lies in its nuclear submarine force and its missile-armed aircraft, but to properly discharge its tasks in peace and war it also requires a wide range of surface types and sufficient air support.

These general points are all made quite explicitly, and since their repeated elaboration takes up the greater part of the series, no purpose is served by quoting any specific reference. But this advocacy of "seapower," although central to Gorshkov's case, represents only one part of the whole debate.

The argument centers on the size and composition of the Soviet Navy with Gorshkov advocating a larger and better balanced fleet, which he justifies in terms of missions and tasks in peace and war. I infer him to say in one of his final conclusions that the political leadership must make a conscious decision on the future role of naval power in Soviet foreign policy; and they must not expect to be able to rely on the by-products (in terms of warships) of a policy tailored to deterrence and nuclear missile war.¹⁵⁹

Gorshkov states explicitly his requirement for a wide range of surface types to support naval operations of all kinds. He sets out the characteristics demanded by extended deployments which include (1) long range at high speeds for surface ships, (2) large radius of action for aircraft (3) nuclear propulsion for submarines and (4) substantial afloat support. It can also be inferred that:

- a. He is arguing for more surface ships and general purpose nuclear submarines. Nothing can be inferred (either way) about aircraft carriers.
- b. Opponents are advocating a smaller range of surface types and perhaps diesel propulsion for certain submarine replacement programs.
- c. There is some argument about the subordination of aircraft flying primarily naval missions.

It can also be inferred that opponents have accused Gorshkov of wanting to challenge the U.S. for command of the sea and (separately) argue that it is pointless to try and match the West's naval building capacity.

Gorshkov lays great stress on the utility of the Soviet navy as an instrument of state policy in peacetime and emphasizes the navy's unique advantage in this role. It is not however clear whether he is advocating that existing naval forces should be used more extensively, or whether he is pointing out how larger forces could be profitably employed in this way.

The whole tone of Gorshkov's articles is assertive with their repeated emphasis on the historically proved fact that military power determines the outcome of international relations. He makes one comment which appears to (but doesn't quite) state a policy of direct intervention against imperialists in local war.¹⁶⁰

It can be inferred that points made by his opponents when questioning the relative utility of naval power included (1) the imperialist overtones of gunboat diplomacy, (2) whether, on balance, Soviet prestige has been enhanced by the forward policy and (3) the diversion of resources from the main front of the socio-economic challenge to capitalism.

It is not clear whether Gorshkov's assertiveness is linked with a willingness to risk nuclear war, or whether he considers the risk of nuclear war to be low because of nuclear deterrence.

It can be inferred that Gorshkov is against naval arms limitation agreements, which work in the interests of the dominant maritime powers. He is insistent on the importance of the Mediterranean to the Soviet Union, and on the necessity of maintaining a Soviet naval force in the area. It can be inferred that there are those who advocate some form of mutual withdrawal.¹⁶¹

It can also be inferred that there are those who advocate a radical shift in the Soviet position on the Law of the Sea, which at present is uncomfortably similar to the most intransigent maritime powers, and is in most respects diametrically opposed to the Third World position. Gorshkov is explicit that a change is undesirable.

Two of the three components which Gorshkov gives as the basic mission of great-power navies in the worldwide nuclear war are (1) contribute to strategic strike and (2) blunt the enemy's sea-based strategic strike.¹⁶²

He does not question the usefulness of the naval contribution to strategic strike. Although he notes the SSBN's unique advantages, there is no real indication that he wants the navy's share to be increased.

The task of countering the enemy's seaborne delivery system occupies (by implication) the greater part of the final section. There is just possibly a faint indication that Gorshkov considers the task of countering Polaris to be impractical and that it should be dropped (i.e., in favor of an extended peacetime role). There are no such indications concerning the counter-carrier role.

It is in the context of these tasks that Gorshkov develops his argument concerning the need for surface ships, in addition to nuclear submarines and aircraft.

The third component of the navies' mission is to "participate in the operations conducted by the ground forces," and the historical sections make it quite clear that such naval operations range from the battle of sea communications, through amphibious landings on a strategic scale, to tactical operations in direct support of the army's maritime flank.

If Gorshkov's historical examples are analogies, and if the inferences drawn from them are correct, then it would appear that Gorshkov believes that protracted war at sea is possible. He envisages attacking merchant convoys, troop reinforcements and amphibious assault groups, and perhaps the occupation of the Norwegian coast at the outbreak of war.

It is not clear whether Gorshkov is talking in terms of post-nuclear exchange, or whether he conceives limited war at sea to be possible without eventual escalation. His reference to Russia's unlimited resources and his discussion of the effects of commerce war have overtones of a long drawn-out limited war fought mainly at sea, with no nuclear exchange.

The requirement to fight a protracted war at sea is an excellent argument for a large navy.

Gorshkov brings out certain other points more or less explicitly and these are discussed below.

Gorshkov devotes a whole section to the importance of the Mediterranean.¹⁶³ He returns to the subject again when discussing the Crimean and the eight Russo-Turkish wars, which also serve as two most telling examples of the need for a strong navy.¹⁶⁴ He points out that in the past Russia has always deployed naval forces into the Mediterranean when she has been threatened from the southwest, and that the threat to Russia from this direction has never been higher than today.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, Russia has a natural right to be in the Mediterranean, by virtue of her geographical location and her traditional usage of dating back to the 6th Century.¹⁶⁶

Making due allowance for Gorshkov's personal interest in the Mediterranean,¹⁶⁷ it could be inferred from this special emphasis that when Gorshkov wrote this, there was some discussion of withdrawing or reducing the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. There is no reference to the Mediterranean in his final conclusions.

Gorshkov is quite explicit that despite the priority role of submarines (which he does not dispute) there is an inescapable need for a wide range of surface ship types. He points out that attempts by other countries to build multi-purpose ships to discharge all (or even many) tasks have never been successful.¹⁶⁸

It might be inferred from the last point that he is justifying an increase in the number of different surface ship types, which have remained roughly constant since the 1930's. It might also imply that ships such as Krivac are less successful than their outward appearance might suggest.

Operational characteristics are discussed in the context of the requirement for continuous, instantaneous readiness to fire the "first salvo," and the special operational requirements of the "nuclear era," when opposing forces remain in company with each other in peacetime.¹⁶⁹ Gorshkov stresses three main requirements:¹⁷⁰ (1) long range at high speeds for (surface) ships, (2) large radius of action for aircraft, and (3) nuclear propulsion for submarines. He brings out various other requirements generated by the need for extended deployments:¹⁷¹ (1) surface combatant design must provide for good sea-keeping and long endurance, (2) improved service life and reliability of machinery and equipment (stressed) and (3) improved habitability.

This comes in the final section of the series. It is a list of the minimum requirements for sustained deployment, of what he needs rather than what he's got.¹⁷² He makes the point that the greater the endurance built into the ships, the smaller the number required. Sustained high speed for surface ships could be an argument for nuclear propulsion.

It is noteworthy that he finds it necessary to mention nuclear propulsion for submarines. This might imply that there are suggestions that certain replacement programs for in-area tasks should be diesel units.

To enable extended deployment, he points to the requirements for a powerful fleet train, which should include tenders, repair ships, supply ships, tankers and salvage vessels.¹⁷³

The vital necessity of getting in the first "salvo" and the disastrous, even fatal effects of delay in naval combat are stressed.¹⁷⁴ This must involve issues such as rules of engagement and the location of authority to use nuclear weapons. His earlier reference to the Leninist principle of one-man-command could have been intended to bear on this point.¹⁷⁵

The only unambiguous point is that aircraft which fly in support of naval operations must be subordinated to naval command.¹⁷⁶ The particular stress he lays in this point may indicate that there is some argument on this score.

Gorshkov claims that command of the sea in the Soviet sense of the term, means "to create a situation whereby the enemy is either paralyzed or constrained in his actions, or weakened, and thereby hampered from interfering with our execution of a given operation, or the discharge of our operational tasks."¹⁷⁷ This definition would seem very relevant to contemporary circumstances.

There are certain points which, to judge by the way in which Gorshkov handles the subject, have some particular significance to the case he is making, although this is not self-evident from the text. Although these veiled references may well turn out to be among the most interesting parts of what Gorshkov is saying, it would be unwise to draw firm conclusions from the inferences which I suggest could be drawn. They should be seen as points to watch for in the future, rather than clear indications of Soviet policy preferences or contingency plans.

We should also bear in mind Gorshkov's stated intention of enlightening command personnel in other branches of the armed forces about the special features of naval warfare, in order to improve concerted operations.¹⁷⁸ We are dealing with possible historical analogies, and it is very easy to perceive hidden significance where none exists.

Considerable space is given to analyzing the sea communications aspects of both World Wars; about 60 percent of the relevant section in each case concentrates on this one aspect of naval operations.¹⁷⁹ The conclusions drawn by Gorshkov are clear enough, the contemporary implications less so:

- a. The submarine blockade against Britain had a considerable effect on the course of World War I.¹⁸⁰
- b. In World War II, attacks on sea communications considerably weakened Britain's economy and had a definite effect on military operations in the secondary theaters. But the significance was less in World War II than I because:¹⁸¹ (1) most of Germany's efforts and resources were concentrated on the Eastern Front, (2) the West had time to build up their merchant fleet and ASW forces, and (3) the Germans initially lacked an adequate submarine force, and then failed to provide it with air and submarine support.
- c. In World War II Germany escaped the effects of naval blockage by having Europe's resources at her disposal.¹⁸²
- d. Despite the massive build-up of Western ASW forces, the diesel submarine was never driven from the sea. Consider the impact of nuclear submarines.¹⁸³

There are certain inferences which might be drawn from this:

- a. Gorshkov is arguing that it will be important to disrupt Atlantic communications in the event of war. There have been some indications that this is the subject of continuing controversy.¹⁸⁴
- b. He provides a rebuttal to the argument that Germany tried and failed twice, and asserts that success can be ensured by the coordinated use of naval forces and by the nuclear submarine.
- c. He is pointing out that the Soviet Union is not herself vulnerable to blockade because of her own unlimited resources¹⁸⁵ and perhaps because she too will have gained access to all Europe's resources.

If these inferences have any substance, then it could be seen as part of a larger argument about protracted war after the nuclear exchange, or perhaps even about the possibility of limited war at sea. In either case, there is a cluster of inconsequential references which might have some relevance in such a context. They are outlined below.

● In discussing the beginning of World War II, Gorshkov draws attention to the contract between the dispersal of the numerically small German fleet over the vast ocean expanses, and the concentration of the numerically larger Allied forces in direct proximity to German naval bases.¹⁸⁶ This read as an inconsequential aside, but it might possibly have some significance as an analogy with the present situation. Gorshkov points out that German attacks on shipping during 1939 led to the dispersion of the Royal Navy throughout the Atlantic and that this in turn "created a favorable situation for German naval operation in the coastal waters of Northern Europe."¹⁸⁷ This allowed Germany to carry out a successful invasion of Norway, which had a serious effect on the courses of the war; in part because of the new operational access it gave the German Navy, particularly the submarines.¹⁸⁸

Gorshkov's revision of the Soviet assessment of Jutland could also be read in the same light.¹⁸⁹ He points out that although apparently inconclusive, Jutland was a British victory because it prevented the German Navy from attaining its goal of achieving freedom of action at sea so as to close the blockade on Britain.

A case could be made that these references indicate that Gorshkov is concerned with the problem of ensuring free access to the Atlantic for his Northern Fleet submarines.

● The reference to nuclear submarines and the problems of ASW in the battle of the Atlantic could also be read to imply that it is a waste of naval effort to continue trying to develop means of countering Polaris at sea. In support of this inference, one could advance Gorshkov's remark that the Soviet navy is now posing the U.S. the same problems

as Polaris posed the USSR.¹⁹⁰ And perhaps his specific reference to the fact that Soviet SSBN are now becoming one of the most important factors in deterring the enemy's nuclear strike, had this in mind.¹⁹¹

The inference is very tenuous. It could be argued that the counter-Polaris task conflicts most strongly with the navy's potential peacetime role. If the task could be dropped it would release an immediate surplus of capabilities over requirements, which could be used in more productive ways. However, against this is the fact that the counter-Polaris task demands a large number of forces at present, which are therefore more easy to justify as being essential to the security of the homeland.

● In his 1967 article, which discussed the post-war development of the art of naval warfare, Gorshkov pointed to the Soviet decision to concentrate on submarine launched missiles as the main striking arm of the fleet, and he reaffirmed the correctness of the decision in the light of subsequent experience, which had confirmed the vulnerability of carriers.¹⁹²

In his recent series Gorshkov makes no reference to the carriers vulnerability, but nor does he discuss detailed tasks or contemporary comparative capabilities. And since he does not discuss the post-war period, the omission may have no significance.

If however it were significant, it could possibly mean any of several things, among others:

- a. Vulnerability has always been linked with size, and although the new class now building at Nikolaev is not a strike carrier its credibility might be damaged.
- b. Although Gorshkov has not changed his own mind, there are those on his side of the debate who are arguing for strike carriers.
- c. Gorshkov has always been a carrier man.
- d. They have decided to provide for carrier-borne fighter cover.

The Leninist principle of mastering "all forms of weaponry, all means and devices of combat" possessed by the enemy could have been aimed in this direction. Gorshkov points out that the importance of this proposition, "which has a direct relevance even today," was that it established a principle for determining the correct amount of continuity in military science, in the sense of exploiting specific bourgeois achievements in the art of war.¹⁹³

This comment could refer to carrier aviation. Alternatively, it could be defending Soviet SSBN against attacks from the Strategic Rocket Troops. It could be arguing for MIRV. It could mean something quite different which we don't know about yet.

● Gorshkov brings out the almost universal success of amphibious assaults during the last war, which he attributes partly to inadequacies in the defense, and partly¹⁹⁴ to the increased offensive capabilities of the assault groups and their supporting forces. Although he does not underplay the contribution of amphibious operations in the Pacific war, this section gives the impression of being more concerned to draw lessons from the failure of the defenses, than to advocate a Soviet long range amphibious capability.¹⁹⁵

Gorshkov notes that not once during the war was a continuous attack mounted against a landing force, from the time of its initial assembly to its entry into the landing area. He ascribes this to lack of prior intelligence and insufficient forces.¹⁹⁶ It is relevant that defense against amphibious assault was one of the few naval additions to the first edition of Military Strategy,¹⁹⁷ and (anyway until recently) it has continued to feature in the scenarios of major Soviet naval exercise.

I would infer that Gorshkov is pointing out that defense against sea-borne assault or reinforcement, cannot be delayed until the landing area. This all fits in with Gorshkov's advocacy of attacking sea communications, and emphasizes the requirement for adequate forces and intelligence to undertake this task. It is also relevant that in his discussion of the German submarine campaign in World War I, he devotes the final paragraph to pointing out a "great miscalculation" by the German High Command: They failed to attack the military transports which the Entente used so extensively.¹⁹⁸

● In discussing World War II, half the section "Destruction of the enemy's striking groups" is devoted to establishing a sharply rising trend in the number of war-ships destroyed in port as opposed to at sea, mainly as the result of air attack; Gorshkov goes on to say that this made it essential to disperse ships and facilities in the base zone and to change the methods of support and supply.¹⁹⁹ Discussing the contemporary problem, Gorshkov stresses that the fleet is liable to be attacked without warning, whether at sea or in port.²⁰⁰

Submarine tenders are not being built at a rate which would be sufficient to support the new-construction nuclear units now joining the fleet, unlike the 1958 program.²⁰¹ This either means that the fleet is unable to be dispersed, or that the necessary facilities have been provided ashore. Gorshkov implies a requirement for the dispersal of naval units in general and nuclear submarines in particular, in small groups. It is not clear whether he is advocating or explaining away these extensive but essential requirements.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The extensiveness of Gorshkov's argument gives some indication of the scale of attack being launched against the navy, with the main weight probably against future shipbuilding requirements. We do not know exactly what Gorshkov was asking for, but he needs a substantial amount just to stay where he is. To remedy the main deficiencies in the Soviet navy's existing capability would need a great deal more.

The fact that Gorshkov was able to continue arguing indicates the calibre of those interests on his side of the cleavage. And although he appears not to have won the ship-building battle, he may well be able to persist in an assertive naval policy, using the forces already at his disposal. Much will depend on whether recent changes in the Polit-buro mean that those who oppose the cluster of attitudes which are implicit in Gorshkov's advocacy, are now in more effective control of policy.

The full significance of the Gorshkov series will not be known until it is set within a wider ranging survey of the whole political scene. But fifty thousand words of sustained argument permit systematic analysis which has thrown light on events and pronouncements during the last twelve years and clarified the background to the present debate.

From the naval point of view, the series tells us something about present Soviet policy, about perceived deficiencies, about Gorshkov's nominal aspirations and about proposals which are inimical to the navy's interests. In terms of policy, the series reaffirms what we already know about the Soviet navy's primary tasks in peacetime, and the insight into the war-fighting discussion was probably more revealing; this strategic concept may be one of those under attack. The listing of deficiencies confirmed what has long been apparent to the informed observer of Soviet naval operations. Gorshkov's promotion of the peacetime role of naval power drew heavily on Western experience and added nothing to the concept; the support for his views within the political leadership is not clear and this issue would seem to be one of those currently under debate.

Perhaps most interesting is what Gorshkov's argument has to tell us about the kind of proposals he has been battling against. Three which can perhaps be inferred from this series are particularly significant:

1. Agreement should be sought with the U.S. on the restriction of naval operations, with particular reference to mutual withdrawals from the Mediterranean.
2. The interest of the navy and the fishing industry in the freedom of the high seas and in narrow territorial waters should be sacrificed in favor of gaining influence with Third World countries.
3. The allocation of resources to warship construction should preferably be reduced, and certainly not increased.

It is unlikely that any of the extreme positions will be adopted as the outcome of the debate and it is not suggested that the two lists of attitudes represent two alternative policies. Some compromise will emerge in due course, biased to one side but continuing to reflect several of the attitudes to be found on the other.

Pending such an outcome, and as long as political power on each side of the cleavage remains fairly well balanced, Gorshkov is likely to have greater freedom than would otherwise be the case to pursue his proposals with resources under his direct control.²⁰² Thus, despite the fact that his demands for additional new construction have probably not been met, naval operations may continue to reflect the preferred policies of his political supporters.

I would stress that we do not know Gorshkov's short term preferences. Although he advocates an increased role for the navy in peacetime, he is also arguing for an increase in strength; the first supports the second and may well depend on it. Whatever Gorshkov's long-term aspirations, there are likely to have been more immediate arguments about the navy being asked to do too much with too few ships, and the political risks of interposition with insufficient forces. It is not clear where Gorshkov himself stands in this matter. His record suggests a strong "can do" syndrome and we do not know whether the initiative for reactive deployments during the last 18 months came from him or from elsewhere in the political leadership.

To conclude, it seems unlikely that we shall see any abrupt change in Soviet naval policy, the greater part of which is still determined by the mission of defending Russia against attack from the sea. However, the Gorshkov series has alerted us to the existence of a wide range of opinion on the proper size, role and employment of the Soviet navy in peace and in war. We must now await developments, bearing in mind that Western initiatives and responses are likely to have a major influence on the way in which Soviet naval policy evolves.

NOTES

(References to Morskoi sbornik will be shown as: MS Year/Issue No./Page)

1. By "Gorshkov" I mean the effective naval leadership, whose views are contained in this series. I sometimes wonder how much Kasatanov has to do with the assertive style of naval policy. From statements made by Gorshkov and Kasatanov between 1966-70, I gain the impression of two rather different styles; Kasatanov's more assertive and rocket-rattling, Gorshkov's more measured and carefully worded. Perhaps they have different speech writers, but I was interested that Ullman refers to this same difference, though in a different context. (Harlan K. Ullman, first draft of unpublished Master's thesis "From despair to euphoria: a half century of Soviet Naval developments with emphasis on the years 1960-1968," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, March 1973.) Kasatanov, who is the same age as Gorshkov, but a submariner, took over from him in 1956 as CinC of the Black Sea Fleet after commanding one of the two Baltic Fleets. In 1958, a submarine base was established in Albania with Baltic Fleet units, supported from the Black Sea; in August 1960 there was a relatively major deployment into the Aegean, when Black Sea Fleet surface units exercised with the Valona submarines, probably simulating the interdiction of Western reinforcements to the Turkish Straits. The Soviet Navy was evicted from the Albanian base in August 1961, and Kasatanov was reappointed as CinC Northern Fleet in February 1962. There had been one distant exercise in 1961, but it was from the time of his arrival that activity built up in the North. In 1964, the Deputy CinC of the Navy died in harness, and Kasatanov moved to Moscow in July to take over the appointment; this coincided with the real beginning of the Mediterranean deployment (there was probably a pilot deployment in 1963). Ullman identifies Kasatanov as having argued for well-balanced forces, submarines, aircraft and surface ships, in the defense debate which took place 1960-61 (op.cit., p. 121), while we know that Gorshkov "went along" with the 1957-58 decisions for a pre-dominantly submarine navy. Gorshkov has always had the reputation of being a "political Admiral," where gained I do not know, but it goes back to 1956. It is perhaps Kasatanov who provides the sea power thrust to the naval leadership?
2. There were 5 stages to the initial analysis. (1) The elements of Gorshkov's argument were summarized, in their original order, into 193 "bits" or paragraphs of 1-20 lines, each "bit" covering from 20-2000 words of the original (including direct quotes) depending on the subject matter and Gorshkov's own emphasis. (2) The summary was reworked to throw up about 50 subject heads which Gorshkov seemed to be emphasizing, and these were then grouped into about 35 main issues. (3) Contradictions, ambiguities, factual mis-statements and non-sequitors were sought and re-analyzed from the original text and comparative material. (4) The main strands of Gorshkov's argument were drawn out. (5) Various hypotheses as to why Gorshkov might have written the series were tested against the contents of his articles.

3. "United views, derived from the general axiomatic principles of Soviet military doctrine, have been worked out on the tasks of the fleets in contemporary war, and on methods of conducting maritime operations." (MS 66/5/8). "In the opinion of the editorial board and the editorial staff, the publication of these articles will foster the development in our officers of a unity of views on the role of navies under various historical conditions." (MS 72/2/20).
4. The most clear-cut example is in MS 73/2/20. It might appear that Gorshkov tries to extend this approval, which is limited to nuclear submarines, to other types of warship. Note the shift in tense from the past to the present in the original Russian, which has been lost in translation. See also MS 72/12/20 and 73/2/25.
5. MS 73/2/22.
6. Thomas Wolfe directs attention to evidence of an apparent division of opinion within the Soviet Union concerning strategic arms negotiations since at least 1968 (Soviet Power in Europe, Johns Hopkins, 1971, pp. 273, 455, 508), and there are indications in the literature that the military debate has never really ceased since the early sixties. See also note 63 below.
7. MS 72/5/13-15.
8. One of the distinctions between Gorshkov's articles and two Voenizdat publications is the apparently deliberate omission in the latter of references to Leninism, and the clear indication that although Lenin remains the primary authority on the political aspects of military doctrine, this no longer applies to the military aspects. It can be concluded that Gorshkov was in disagreement with the intellectual defense establishment, who have a large say in the formulation of forward-looking military doctrine. However, see note 10 below.
9. This emphasis on local superiority is very similar to Gorshkov's redefinition of "command of the sea". (MS 72/8/21).
10. Reference to one-man-leadership (edinonachalie) within the military often implies dissatisfaction with the extent of party interference in the command function. This does not appear to be implied elsewhere in the Gorshkov series, and this reference need not therefore indicate friction, but could be directed at the leadership. See note 8 above.
11. That this section may have had personal significance to Gorshkov is perhaps suggested by the fact that two pages further on, when discussing the navy in the Civil War, emphasis has been added to a quotation, and this is followed in the text by "(my underlining - S.G.)".
12. The publication of the series argues this to be the case. See also: Grechko, Pravda, 23 February 1971; MS 71/7; Zakharov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 January 1971.

13. MS 72/8/21.
14. MS 72/11/32.
15. MS 67/2/9-21.
16. MS 67/2/20.
17. MS 66/2/29 "Powerful nuclear-rocket weapons now enable tasks to be discharged independently by a small element of homogeneous forces. Therefore, the concentration of large numbers of different types of forces is sometimes simply wasteful and sometimes it is just not possible. And I do not see any "drama" in this, since both submarines and aircraft are capable, with the help of nuclear-rocket weapons, of discharging major tasks separately on their own."
18. MS 66/1/31-36. Kharlamov's article reads like a contribution to an ongoing discussion.
19. Ullman, op. cit., p. 121. I was unaware of Ullman's conclusions until after I had identified signs of cleavage from my initial analysis.
20. Gorshkov's 1967 article was published 18 months before the 1969 edition of the History went for typesetting.
21. The same tendency can be seen in the third edition of Military Strategy. (The first edition of Military Strategy to be made publicly available was published in 1962. A second edition followed in 1963 and a third in 1968. The three editions are compared in Harriet Fast Scott's invaluable source of reference Military Strategy (Third Edition): a translation analysis, and commentary and comparison with previous editions, Stanford Research Institute, January 1971. When quoting Military Strategy reference will be made to this (HFS) text; where appropriate, the relevant page of the 1968 Russian language edition will be shown in brackets following.) H.F. Scott notes the deletion of certain passages criticizing Stalin's influence (pp. 155-6). A naval example of watering down criticism of earlier periods can be seen in the progressive amendments in both the second and third editions of the two paragraphs on interwar developments; HFS Strategy, 173 (167-8).
22. History of the Art of Naval Warfare (IVMI), p. 562.
23. Ibid., p. 566 and note 17 above.
24. Ibid., pp. 567-8. Such conformity is to be expected. See H.F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: its formulation and dissemination, Stanford Research Institute, June 1971, especially pp. 59-63.

25. See HFS, Strategy, pp. 170-72, notes 1-4, 174 notes 8 and 11, 212 notes 2-3, 415 note 8. The subhead "The Marxist-Leninist Concept of War in the Modern Era" has been changed to read "The Essence of War in the Modern Era" (p. 213 note 5). A new paragraph was inserted in the 1963 edition which began "Speaking of Soviet military doctrine, it must be said that its political aspect was formulated by V.I. Lenin." By omission, the implication is that Lenin did not formulate the military aspect p.68.
26. HFS, Strategy, pp. 347 (365-6).
27. HFS, Strategy, p. 298 (308), p. 348 (367).
28. HFS, Strategy, p. 345-6 (363-365).
29. In August 1964 a long and authoritative article on military matters referred to the destruction of Polaris submarines as the navy's "foremost task," while the anti-carrier role was referred to as an "important task" (Sokolovskiy and Cheredichenko, Krasnaya zvezda, August 25 and 29, 1964). I have not checked the original text.
30. "Simultaneously with the SRT, the main force for deterring the aggressor, and for decisively defeating him in war, is the missile-armed nuclear submarine fleet" (HFS Strategy p. 235 (235), also pp. 240-43 (240-43).) This may also underlie the deletion from the section on "Structuring the Armed Forces" in the 1968 edition, of the sentence "Hence, the principle mission of our navy in a modern war will be combat with naval forces at sea and in their bases," HFS Strategy, p. 298 (308); and the addition in the chapter on "Methods of Conducting Warfare" of a statement on the mission of navies in general of "nuclear strikes against objects on the continents ... and the active search for enemy naval forces, and their destruction...", HFS, Strategy, 319 (330).
31. Admiral Alafuzov gave a reasoned critique, arguing that the Polaris threat had been underplayed, that the role of surface ships had been neglected and that undue emphasis had been placed on ground and rocket forces to the neglect of other means of warfare (MS 63/1/88-96). In 1964 Gorshkov quoted Frunze to rebut a suggestion that resources would be better spent on ground forces than surface ships (Pravda, 26 July 1964). Both references from Ullman (op.cit.) pp. 160-164.
32. HFS, Strategy, 224 (222).
33. Ibid.
34. See MccGwire, "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy," in M. MccGwire (ed.), Soviet Naval Developments, Praeger, New York 1973, pp. 163-167.
35. Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: its continuity 1960-1970, Stanford Research Institute, June 1971, p. 35 quoting the standard Soviet text on this subject.

36. "Given (an adequate economic capacity), it is the policy, premised on the country's need for maritime power, which then becomes the important factor, determining the type of fleet which is built ... and it is an indispensable condition for the development of maritime power." MS 73/2/24.
37. MS 72/8/21.
38. MS 72/6/14. The fact that this comes in a discussion of the Leninist principles of military science during the inter-war period, does not detract from its admonitory power and purpose.
39. MS 72/3/21-22.
40. MS 72/6/12-13, 19-20.
41. MS 72/4/22.
42. HFS, Strategy, 43 (24); MS 72/2/20.
43. MS 72/4/13-15.
44. B. Blechman "Soviet Interests in Naval Arms Control" in MccGwire, op.cit., p. 441, notes 2 and 3.
45. MS 72/5/22, 5/24, 6/14, 12/18.
46. Gorshkov also mentioned the SAL negotiations; this is probably because it tends to prove his assertion that the power which is afraid of losing its superiority is the one which seeks a limitation treaty. On the basis of his arguments in this series I would suspect that Gorshkov probably favors SALT, since it will release shipbuilding capacity from task-specific strategic delivery units, to more general purpose types of nuclear submarine.
47. Gorshkov worked with Khrushchev on the Southern Front during World War II, and can be seen as the naval member of the "Stalingrad Group." See R. Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton U.P., Princeton, 1967, Appendix A.
48. It seems unlikely that the navy would have volunteered for this task, given their limited operational capability and Gorshkov has admitted that it required the "organic restructuring of the navy" Krasnaya zvezda, 11 February 1968). The decision would have been taken before the end of 1961 (MccGwire, op.cit., p. 175) and may have been part of the modified-Khrushchev defense policy announced by Malinovskiy at the XXII Party Congress in October 1961. The decision seems likely to have been triggered mainly by the success of the Polaris system (which only became apparent during 1960), and the very sharp acceleration of the program by President Kennedy on taking office. The construction of 14 Polaris had been authorized during the three years 1958-60, but on 29 January 1961, Kennedy authorized the construction of a further 27, 15 of which were to start building within six months! The 1962 edition of Military Strategy makes specific reference to this increase in the rate of production. (HFS, Strategy, p. 145 and p. 470 note 54).

49. This role was clearly, if laconically, spelt out in the 1962 edition of Military Strategy, and the wording has remained unchanged in all three editions. E.g.: "Neither must the navy's operations be tied to the land theaters, since in contemporary circumstances it is basically required to wage war on the ocean expanses - often far from the land theatre of operations." (HFS, Strategy, 328 (341); see also pp. 330 (334) and 345 (363) for similar statements). This certainly does not describe the 1954 policy; it could be stretched to fit the 1958 version; but it best describes the more extensive policy adopted after 1961.
50. This is important when it comes to analyzing then-contemporary pronouncements. There were two very different arguments in progress.
51. To the extent that the navy argued about the possibility of limited war during this period, they were probably concerned that their ships be able to defend themselves against preventive seizure or attack by the West. They may have had difficulty in convincing the leadership at this stage, that one needed more than the protection of the deterrent in such circumstances.
52. See MccGwire, op.cit., pp. 173-176.
53. David Cox, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP), June 1969, pp. 38-39. Gorshkov was the first promotion to Fleet Admiral in the Navy since Kuznetsov's forced retirement in 1955. Kasatanov, who became First Deputy Commander of the navy in June 1964, was also promoted to Fleet Admiral in 1965.
54. I am indebted to Harlan Ullman for his stress on the argument about surface ships (op.cit., p. 121).
55. The navy achieved this by moving the construction of each class down one "type-yard". Thus, the cruiser-size Kara is building in a "destroyer" yard(s), and the destroyer-size Krivac is building in "escort" yards. At the bottom of the scale, this meant collapsing the capabilities of three of its standard types (escort ship, Mirka; large sub-chaser, Poti; and rocket-cutter, Osa) into two new classes. Thus Grisha, which is properly the Mirka replacement, is building at the sub-chaser yard, and the 800 ton missile-armed Nanuchka has squeezed into Petrovskiy at Leningrad. (See MccGwire, op.cit., p. 123).
56. It seems likely that the Moskva class was originally intended to extend the ASW coverage in the Barents Sea (and perhaps other fleet areas), which relied heavily on shore-based helicopters. In that geographically-restricted role its small complement of aircraft and limited maintenance support facilities would have been adequate.
57. David Cox concludes that from about mid-1963, the tone of naval comments swung from disquiet to satisfaction (op.cit., p. 37).

58. This emphasis probably stemmed from Khrushchev's deterrence-based policy, announced 14 January 1960. Throughout most of the sixties the Soviet navy had to make do with 13 N-Class first-generation torpedo-attack submarines, and in relation to their requirements they continue to be very short of general-purpose attack units.
59. The existing programs for tenders and repair ships were wholly geared to provide support for the nuclear submarines then building, while lying at sheltered berths in the North or Pacific.
60. By coincidental misfortune, the Soviet navy was evicted from its Albanian base in August 1961. Between December 1961 and January 1967, Gorshkov made an unparalleled series of visits to Egypt, which taken with other evidence, strongly suggests that he was pressing for base facilities. See "The Mediterranean and Soviet Naval Interests" in McCWire, op.cit., pp. 320-321.
61. Announced to U.S. Congress January 18th, 1965. Gorshkov has frequently stressed the shift in U.S. emphasis from land- to sea-based strategic delivery systems. E.g.: Krasnaya Zvezda 5 February 1965, MS. 66/5/10 and 67/2/16.
62. For example: (a) the failure of the Soviets' December 1964 United Nations proposal that the Mediterranean (inter alia) should be declared a nuclear-free zone, (b) the bombing of Hanoi during Kosygin's visit in February 1965, (c) the Soviet leaders' success in resolving the Indo-Pakistan conflict, (d) the potential situation in Cyprus, and (e) overestimation of West European dissatisfaction with U.S. domination of their affairs.
63. David Cox identifies a disagreement about the level of defense expenditure in 1964-65, with Kosygin, Suslov and Kirilenko arguing for increased expenditure and Brezhnev, Podgorniy and Shelepin advocating a reduction in the arms race (op.cit., pp. 39-40). Thomas Wolfe notes that a Soviet-initiated cooling in Soviet-U.S. relations first became evident in early 1965 (op.cit., p. 266).
64. See the 4th part of the 1st Resolution on the World Situation of the XXIII Congress, which discusses foreign policy in terms of Soviet interests and international revolutionary duty. In considering the aggressive forces of imperialism which are "aggravating international tension and creating hotbeds of war" (the previous para. had discussed Vietnam), the resolution states that the CPSU would continue "to reinforce the defense potential of the USSR so that the Soviet armed forces be ever ready to defend the gains of socialism dependably and deal a crushing blow to any imperialist aggression." (HFS, Continuity, p. 33, quoting 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Novosti Press, Moscow, 1966, p. 289). See also Gorshkov's report on the Congress which refers to being ready to "protect the achievements of Socialism and inflict a crushing rebuff to any imperialist aggression," (MS 66/5/10); compare this with Grechko's "readiness to repel aggression directed against our country" in 1971, (MS 71/7/5). See also Kasatanov's reference to the U.S. smothering of national liberation movements in

- Izvestia, 8 January 1966 (Ullman, op.cit., p. 195). From about 1965, Soviet naval leaders stressed the political utility of foreign visits (Cox, op.cit., p. 43).
65. Pravda 9 May 1966. Middle East Mirror 25 June 1966. After the visit the U.A.R. press published denials that Egypt would concede base rights.
 66. E.g.: Kresta, Moskva, C-Class SSGN and V-Class SSN. SAM Kotlin and Alligator LSV began delivery in 1966. Kanin began delivery in 1968.
 67. A conference of the 24 European Communist Parties, 23-26 April at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia. The purpose was to discuss proposals for all-European security, increased West-East European technical cooperation, and to agitate against the U.S. presence in Europe. See Wolfe, op.cit., p. 325.
 68. This led to collisions in the Sea of Japan within three weeks and in the Mediterranean within three months.
 69. It is known that the Soviet Union supplied Syria and Egypt with false intelligence about an Israeli build-up. A case can be made that the Soviet Union was acting as an agent provocateur, but lost control of the situation at an early stage.
 70. Equivalent to Marshal of the Soviet Union, and the first appointment to this rank in the Soviet navy.
 71. See R.E. Athay, The Economics of Soviet Merchant Shipping, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1971; also in MccGwire, op.cit., p. 83.
 72. R.G. Weinland, The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Arlington, Va., Professional Paper. No. 80, September 1971; also in MccGwire, op.cit., p. 272.
 73. Kashin/Kynda/Kresta, an average of 4 units p.a. in toto; 1000 ton escort ships at 7-8 a year; plus the two ASW cruisers at the end of the period.
 74. Skory built at a rate of 16 per year, Riga at about 10; their design vintage is about 1943-44. Kotlin built at 12 per year and all this class have been modernized or converted. The distant deployment of all three classes is handicapped by inadequate boiler feed-water capacity.
 75. See "Comparative Warship Building Programmes", MccGwire, op.cit., pp. 126-131.
 76. The transfer of nuclear submarines from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet early in 1966 was publicized as an "around the world cruise submerged," and appears to have attracted considerable interest and favorable response. Ullman has noted that in Gorshkov's article on the XXIII Congress, he refers to this event as "an important gift to the Congress" (MS 66/5/10). In fact, the timing of this deployment would have been dictated by the requirement for fair weather in southerly latitudes, and the route and date underlined the limitations of Soviet submarines. But the exploitation of this operational necessity for the purpose of domestic public relations is relevant

to the Okean demonstration. David Cox suggests that Soviet overflights of U.S. carrier from early 1963 had the same purpose of influencing the internal debate (op.cit. p. 37).

77. See J. McConnell, The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean. CNA Professional Paper No. 77, August 1971; also in MccGwire, op.cit., p. 355.
78. A former Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District was appointed to command the very large military mission in Cairo. (M. Mackintosh "Soviet Military Policy" in MccGwire, op.cit., p. 59). It seems likely that PVO Strany would have doubts about deploying their advanced weapon systems into unstable areas overseas, with no Soviet ground-force support.
79. See Admiral I.C. Kidd in USNIP, February 1972, pp. 25-27.
80. Among indicators of Soviet concern at becoming isolated, was the 1969 proposal for a South Asian security agreement.
81. MS 71/7. See also note 88.
82. Submarines, 5 lines, including a special 2-line paragraph; naval air, 2 lines; amphibious, 2 lines. MS 71/7/5.
83. MS 71/7/4.
84. See MccGwire, op.cit., pp. 151-181. On the basis of my analysis of past patterns of Naval shipbuilding I would expect new families of ships to begin delivery in 1972-3, 1977-8 and 1982-3; decisions on outline operational requirements and specifications, and finalizing the details outstanding would run about ten and five years ahead respectively.
85. MS 66/5/3-13.
86. MS 71/7.
87. MS 73/2/24. Gorshkov also stresses that in building a modern fleet, one must allow that building a modern warship takes years. (MS 72/5/24).
88. Herrick quotes Marshals Zakharov and Grechko as saying in January and February 1971 (respectively) that time had proven that the right course had been selected for the development of the navy (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 January, and Pravda, 23 February). These statements come within the shadow of the XXIV Congress, and taken together with Grechko's Navy Day article in Morskoi sbornik (71/7) would seem to imply that naval allocations were to go on as before.
89. See J. Erickson, Soviet Military Power, RUSI, London 1971, Part 1; and T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, John Hopkins, 1970, Chs. 7, 8, and 18. Also HFS, Strategy, pp. 320-332 (332-437), particularly p. 326, para. 2 (338:4) which was new to the 1968 edition.
90. See MccGwire, op.cit., pp. 173-176.

91. The 1968 edition of Military Strategy (HFS, Strategy, p. 347 (366)) could be read in this way. In his 1967 article, Gorshkov refers scathingly to those who thought that "all basic tasks in a future war could be discharged without any naval participation, even when this required military action on the open seas and ocean expanses." (MS 67/2/19). His criticism was directed at the middle-fifties period.
92. The vulnerability of merchant convoys and naval task forces to high yield weapons is obvious, but shore-based missiles could also be used against Polaris submarines if their location were known. The standard counter-force quota of 3 missiles per launcher would allow 48 missiles against each submarine, covering a sea area of 24 n.mi. radius, which would allow for submarine displacement during time of flight. This was a particularly appealing theoretical option when the Polaris range was only 1500 n.mi., and IRBMs could have been used for this task; MRBMs can cover the Eastern Mediterranean. It also simplifies the authorization problems of kill-on-command.
93. E.g. Panteleev, note 17 above.
94. Two paragraphs in HFS, Strategy, p. 335 (350) which have lasted unchanged since the 1962 edition, illustrate this approach, which imputes the limitations of the Soviet H-I Class SSBN to the Polaris system. This under-rating was the object of Alafuzov's criticism (note 31 above).
95. I construe Penzin's article to be arguing against those in the Soviet Navy or elsewhere, who are skeptical of being able to counter Polaris. MS 66/7/35-43.
96. HFS, Strategy, pp. 367-8 (366-7).
97. MS 72/5/16-18, 72/9/16, 72/11/25-30.
98. MS 67/2/20.
99. MS 67/2/19.
100. MS 72/11/27.
101. MS 72/1/28. N. Aleshkin "Trends in the development of naval forces".
102. Gorshkov defined a "well balanced fleet" as one which can discharge its assigned tasks in both nuclear and non-nuclear war, and also protect state interests in peacetime (MS.67/2/20).
103. One whole paragraph (out of eight) is devoted to this point in the final conclusions (MS 73/2/24.also 72/2/32 and 72/12/21-22.)

104. Gorshkov claims that the Red Fleet had the capability in contiguous naval theaters by 1941 (MS 72/8/24). In 1962 he gave it as an (additional) naval task, which was the particular responsibility of the submarine force; the context suggested that the term was being used as an euphemism for "strategic strike" (or deterrence) which could not properly fit within the meaning of "defending the homeland from attack from the sea." (Krasnaya zvezda 30 October 1962). By 1965 it was linked with the merchant fleet (Krasnaya zvezda 13 July 1965). See J. McConnell, The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, CNA, Professional Paper No. 77 (August 1971), for an extended discussion of this term. It brings to mind the British use of the term "vital interests," which events during the last two decades have shown to be less than explicit.
105. MS 73/2/21.
106. E.g. Kasatanov, Krasnaya zvezda, 30 July 1967.
107. MS 72/3/27, 29, 30.
108. Oral presentation by Uri Ra'anani, October 1972; see also his The USSR, Arms and the Third World, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge 1969, pp. 10, 171-2, 244-5.
109. E.g. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Some might argue that the Soviet navy would only become a useful instrument of peacetime policy if it were released from its General War tasks.
110. See J. McConnell, op.cit., "Good Will Visits". The very Large number of different ports visited during the first 12 months of the Indian Ocean deployment was exceptional, and during 1971, port visits were almost wholly concentrated on Somalia and Aden.
111. One reference to the need for bases is made when discussing the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, and the requirement for inter-fleet deployment (MS 72/4/23); the decision not to annex Pacific Islands in the 19th century is also mentioned (MS 72/4/11). The requirement for four self-sufficient fleets is referred to in the past tense (MS 72/4/23).
112. For a discussion of the Mediterranean case see McGwire, op.cit., p. 320; (also "The Mediterranean and Soviet Naval Interests" in International Journal, Autumn 1972).
113. MS 73/2/22.
114. E.g., R. Kolkowiz, The Soviet Military and Communist Party, Princeton, 1967, and HFS, Continuity.

115. A.L. Monks and K.N. Griffin "Soviet Strategic Claims, 1964-70" in Orbis, Summer 1972, p. 541, who also refer to A.L. Monks "Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking", Military Review, March 1971, pp. 89-92. The March 1973 conference in Moscow of Military political workers may also have some bearing on this.
 116. MS 72/5/23, 24; 72/8/20; 73/2/19, 21.
 117. MS 72/2/20; 73/2/21; i.e. in the opening and concluding sections of the series.
 118. MS 73/2/24.
 119. MS 73/2/19.
 120. MS 72/2/21.
 121. David Cox makes this point in "Sea Power and Soviet Foreign Policy," USNIP, June, 1969, p. 37.
 122. MS 72/2/29 -- introductory paragraph of series; MS 73/2/24 -- one of the final conclusions.
 123. MS 72/2/21.
 124. MS 72/2/22, 24; 72/11/34; 73/2/13.
 125. E.g. "in all cases, one aspect remains unchanged; the results of victory in a campaign or war can only be secured by ground forces, capable of proving the reality of it by their actual presence." (MS 72/2/22). The latter part of the quotation echoes the reasoning of a 1963 ground forces article, which justified the requirement for mass armies; it pointed out that despite the wholesale destruction of strategic nuclear strikes, in order to achieve complete victory in war it would be necessary to crush the enemy's armed forces, to capture his surviving bases and to establish control of his most important strategic areas (Maj-Gen V. Krushinin in Krasnaya zvezda 11 January 1963).
- In the final article of the present series, Gorshkov gives the three basic missions of great power navies, in the event of nuclear war, as (1) nuclear strikes (2) blunt the enemies sea-launched strike and (3) "to participate in the operations being carried out by ground forces in the continental theatres of military action," the latter implying a wide range of naval tasks." See also MS 72/2/29, 30; 72/12/33.
126. Sovetski Flot, 25 February 1958.
 127. Military Strategy (1968); see note 30 above. This edition went for typesetting in November 1966.
 128. "...is becoming a most important factor in deterring the enemy's nuclear attack." MS 73/2/21.
 129. MS 73/2/21.

130. He appears to be arguing for general purpose forces. Task-specific SSBN take up scarce nuclear building capacity and require additional support by naval units and shore facilities. There are those officers in the Soviet navy (as in other navies) who argue that the task of strategic delivery detracts from the navy's proper and most useful role.
131. MS 72/11/27.
132. MS 73/2/20.
133. MS 72/2/23.
134. Oral presentation by Uri Ra'anan, October 1962.
135. MS 72/3/27, 32; 72/12/17, 21/22.
136. MS 73/2/24.
137. World Marxist Review, June 1962; this journal provides doctrinal guidelines for Moscow-tied Communist Parties.
138. MS 72/12/25. This is also an argument for surface ships, which are excellent industrial showcases. Submarines, however powerful, are sinister and externally boring.
139. MS 72/2/20, 73/2/21.
140. MS 72/5/23, 24; 73/2/19/21.
141. MS 72/10/21.
142. MS 73/2/24.
143. MS 73/2/19. In the text, this is a non-sequitor, and has been brought in for some purpose.
144. MS 72/4/23.
145. He points out that the role and relative predominance of different branches of the armed forces can change with circumstances. (MS 72/2/21/22.
146. MS 72/2/22, including a quotation from Frunze.
147. It may be relevant that the History of the Art of Naval Warfare (IVMI) does not favor Gorshkov in its description of World War II operations. He rates one quarter page picture (as do various other officers and men) towards the end of the book; and there are two brief quotations from his 1967 article, one about the growing threat from U.S. seaborne delivery systems (p. 561) and the other about setting out to build an oceanic fleet (562). Allowing the Soviet tendency to quote higher authority in support, I suspect that Gorshkov has been given rather less exposure than his position would usually call for.

148. IVMI, pp. 524, 530.
149. MS 72/8/29.
150. See MccGwire, op.cit., pp. 136-166. Although Gorshkov appears to have been skillful in his handling of the navy's internal politics when he took over as CinC, there must have been some resentment. This would have increased when the policy which he had been brought in to implement, turned out to be thoroughly mistaken.
151. MS 72/3/20, 21; 72/4/9, 22.
152. MS 72/3/20, 21.
153. MS 72/3/20; 73/2/18. Gorshkov stresses that the Communist Party has always been aware of the requirement for a powerful fleet, starting with Lenin (MS 72/5/20) and that the XVIII Congress in 1938 decided on an oceanic fleet (MS 72/8/17).
154. MS 72/6/12.
155. Gorshkov emphasises how Tsarist naval policy fluctuated, and what it cost Russia each time her naval strength was allowed to wither away.
156. MS 73/2/25.
157. MS 72/8/21.
158. See p. 28 above.
159. MS 73/2/24.
160. MS 73/2/21.
161. In June 1971, Brezhnev expressed willingness to enter into negotiations with the U.S. on limiting the extensiveness of naval operations (TASS 25 June 1971).
162. MS 73/2/21.
163. MS 72/3/27 - 32.
164. MS 72/4/11 - 15.
165. MS 72/3/31.
166. MS 72/3/31.
167. Gorshkov spent the war years in the Black Sea, and as a very young Rear Admiral was in command of the River Flotillas working directly with the army advance on the Southern Front. He returned to the Black Sea as a Squadron Commander 1945-48, was Deputy CinC 1948-51, and CinC 1951-55 when he was called to Moscow in July at the age of 45.
168. MS 73/2/21.
169. MS 73/2/23.

170. MS 73/2/22.
171. MS 73/2/22.
172. "The new ways of using naval forces are an important factor in determining technical policy in the development of modern naval forces." (MS 73/2/22).
173. MS 73/2/22. He refers to the requirement for "repairing and rendering assistance to ships damaged at sea."
174. MS 73/2/22.
175. MS 72/6/15.
176. MS 72/11/27.
177. MS 72/8/21.
178. MS 72/2/22.
179. MS 72/5/15-18, 72/11/25-30.
180. MS 72/5/18.
181. MS 72/11/27, 28.
182. MS 72/11/27.
183. MS 72/11/26.
184. See Panteleev (MS 66/2/29) and Kharlamov (MS 66/1/35-36).
185. MS 73/2/19.
186. MS 72/9/15.
187. MS 72/9/16. This fits very well with Gorshkov's interpretation of "Command of the Sea".
188. Ibid.
189. MS 72/5/16.
190. MS 73/2/19.
191. MS 73/2/21.
192. MS 67/2/19.
193. MS 72/6/14.
194. MS 72/11/30.

195. Soviet naval doctrine and practice appear to concentrate on tactical landings, with emphasis on rapid response rather than carefully staged long-range set pieces. See Panteleev (MS 66/2/30) and IVMI, p. 523. The majority of Gorshkov's war service was concerned with such operations.
196. MS 72/11/31.
197. See note 27 above.
198. MS 72/5/18.
199. MS 72/11/31, 32.
200. MS 73/2/22.
201. Paralleling the first ten years production of nuclear submarines (1958-67), support ships were built at the rate of one tender and one repair ship/missile support ship for every 5-6 submarines. In the event, the tenders were diverted to support the shift to forward deployment. A newly built tender was supplied to the Indians in 1968 and although construction is continuing at the same low rate, it must be assumed that the Soviets have now decided on other arrangements for supporting nuclear submarines in their fleet areas.
202. I am indebted to Robert Weinland for this point.

GORSHKOV'S DOCTRINE OF COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN BOTH PEACE AND WAR

James M. McConnell

GORSHKOV'S MAIN POINTS

The Gorshkov series is not easy to interpret. While I am convinced that he has a view of Soviet naval power that systematically hangs together, both in its own right and in its relationship to Soviet military power as a whole, his presentation of that view is not systematic and open. In order not to mislead the reader on this point, I will first list what appear to be his main points, as he himself presents them, discretely and without interconnection. The reader is warned, however, that not all the points are in the "raw;" a few are summary interpretations, which may be off the mark, and the ordering of the points is mine, not Gorshkov's. I have placed an asterisk beside those points made by Gorshkov (either explicitly or by omission) in his final one-page summary on the theory that what he considers significant ought to be in that summary. While I feel the list to be exhaustive as far as Gorshkov's main points are concerned, some selectivity was unavoidable. Gorshkov has written a book; I cannot write a book to interpret him.

- The USSR is not only a formidable continental power but also a "mighty sea power."*
- The importance of combat at sea in the "overall course of a war" has grown, although Gorshkov avoids references to the role of the navy in "decisively defeating" the enemy.*
- In war, navies are a powerful means of achieving the "political goals" of the armed struggle.*
- The importance of fleets-in-being at the close of wars to influence the peace negotiations and achieve political goals is repeatedly emphasized through historical examples.
- Gorshkov specifically endorses Jellicoe's strategy of holding back his forces at the Battle of Jutland in World War I, thereby reversing previous Soviet

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naval historiography in its condemnation of the British Admiralty's "politico-strategic" rather than "military-strategic" approach to war, its "fleet-in-being" method, its "doctrine of conserving forces" and consequent reluctance to risk the main forces of the fleet in a "decisive clash" to achieve "complete victory," preferring instead to retain them "as an important factor at the moment of concluding peace and also for the postwar rivalry with erstwhile allies."

- In World War II, although "military-geographic" conditions facilitated the British blockade, the Germans were successful, through diversion, in scattering British ASW forces throughout the Atlantic, creating a favorable situation for German naval operations "in the coastal waters of northern Europe."
- Due apparently mainly to "military-geographic" conditions, Russian requirements for naval forces have differed from those of the West.
- Although the USSR gives priority to submarines, they require air and surface support to ensure combat stability.
- ASW is not very cost-effective against modern nuclear "submarines," especially if the latter are supported by aviation and surface ships.
- SSBNs are "more effective" in "deterrence" than land-based launch facilities, because of their "great survivability." This claim, made for the first time, occurs in a passage in which Gorshkov, if we are to take him literally, is treating "deterrence" as a "role in modern war." Elsewhere, when the discussion turns, explicitly or contextually, on deterrence "in peacetime," Gorshkov follows the traditional formula of coupling the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy, in that order, as the main factors in demonstrating resolve.
- The very first duty of the navy is to maintain a high state of "readiness" to carry out the mission of "defending" the USSR against possible attacks from the sea. *
- This "defense" mission is the "main task" of the navy, with the implication that "deterrence" and offsetting politico-military pressure is the main component of "defense."

- "Navies fulfill the important role of one of the instruments of state policy in peacetime," including the protection of its "state interests" in the seas and oceans. *
- Tasks associated with protecting these state interests are "especially important," because of the many "local wars" that imperialism "leaves behind in the wake of its policy."
- Because of the "truly inexhaustible wealth" of the seas, they have become direct objects of contending "state interests;" and navies "cannot take a back seat in this struggle."

In addition to the Gorshkov series, note should also be taken of a couple of points recently made by other Soviet naval specialists:

- SSBNs specifically (and not just "submarines") are incapable of realizing their full potential "without appropriate support from other forces."
- When the long-range Trident comes into operation in the U.S. Navy, SSBNs will be positioned in U.S. coastal waters, permitting the allocation of a "new function" to the main U.S. ASW forces -- "guarding the strategic missile forces."

All in all, a large number of points, almost all of them new -- at least to me. Even though the ordering of the points is biased toward a certain interpretation, it is still no easy matter to use them to come up with a coherent rendering of the thrust of Gorshkov's presentation that will inspire any great degree of confidence. We will nevertheless give it a try and perhaps no harm will be done as long as we realize that this is an ordered, interpretive, connected and elaborated account of the Gorshkov argument and its implications, rather than what Gorshkov himself actually says other than in his discrete points.

INTERPRETATION OF GORSHKOV

One cannot help but be impressed by the attention that Gorshkov devotes to peacetime naval diplomacy in the series. It suggests a firmer commitment to "peaceful co-existence" and to the gaining of political advantages within that framework, an enterprise in which the navy is demonstrably more useful. His main emphasis is on the value of visible, highly mobile naval forces in ordering great-power relationships -- deterrence of a direct attack on the Soviet Union, offsetting politico-military pressure on the Warsaw Bloc, negotiating from a position of strength, displaying by proxy the economic, political and military power of the USSR and thereby enhancing its international authority and prestige and securing it a definite place among the powers. However, in addition to this main stress on directly ensuring the security of the Bloc and the USSR, "which is building communism," there is a strong secondary stress on offsetting indirect threats to the Soviet position beyond its maritime frontiers -- protecting the so-called "state interests" of the USSR in the seas and in the Third World. In protecting these "state interests," the Soviets could become involved in "local wars" that, under certain unspecified circumstances, have a high potential for escalating into general nuclear war.

But Gorshkov may be saying something more -- that naval diplomacy will not cease even with the outbreak of general war. The Soviets may have decided on a "fleet-in-being" role for their SSBNs, i.e., they will withhold at least some of their SLBMs throughout the main combat period to conduct intra-war bargaining and influence the ensuing negotiations for peace. This is bound to be the most controversial part of my analysis. Taken singly, none of the many items of evidence on this head carry conviction; massed together, they make a case even if considerable reserve is still warranted.

The withholding strategy, if it exists, has preconditions and carries corollaries. The old formula of the military-strategic era, that the SSBN is "vulnerable" and can be "successfully combatted," has to give way to the formula of the politico-strategic era, that the SSBN has "great survivability." One must be able to argue that the West cannot deprive the USSR of its means for achieving the "political goals of the armed struggle," even if the sword cuts both ways and the same security has to be implicitly granted to a Western wartime deterrent. Hence Gorshkov's depreciation of ASW, especially if the submarine is supported by aviation and surface ships. The Soviets are just now acquiring an SLBM with a range sufficient to obviate the West's "military-geographic" advantages. No longer will Soviet SSBNs have to run the gauntlet of Western ASW forces through relatively narrow exits and then attempt to survive, precariously, on the World Ocean. They can be sited in local waters, protected in a wartime environment over a protracted period by the main ASW and other forces of the Russian fleet.

Even if it means further speculation on a foundation of slim and impressionistic evidence, it might be useful to set forth a perspective on these developments -- to review where the Soviets have come from, the direction they have been moving, and where the

Gorshkov series seems to leave them. It is often pointed out how profoundly the Soviet conception of deterrence and war differs from our own. This is true, but perhaps the gap is narrowing. In the early sixties, deterrence and war were hardly differentiated. The Party Program introduced at the 22nd Congress in 1961 deemed it necessary to maintain the defense power of the state and the combat readiness of the armed forces at a level that would ensure "the decisive and complete defeat" of any enemy that "dared to attack" the USSR. And Marshal Malinovskiy provided the following formula in 1962: We must warn the enemy of our strength and readiness to "defeat" him on his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression. There is a confusion here of deterrence goals -- preventing aggression -- and military-strategic goals -- defeating the enemy. The formula introduced at the 23rd Congress in 1966, however, separates "deterrence" out as a separate category, while still maintaining the viability of a logic-of-war perspective should deterrence fail. Malinovskiy said that the Strategic Rocket Troops and the navy's SSBNs are the main means for "detering" an aggressor and "decisively defeating" him in war.¹

Today's formulas, on balance, seem to place a more definite accent on deterrence and to show less certainty about the viability of war. The Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops says that his branch alone is the main means for deterring an aggressor and decisively defeating him in war.² The Minister of Defense declares that the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy's SSBNs together are the main means only for deterring an aggressor. That on the one hand; on the other, he asserts that the Strategic Rocket Troops alone are the foundation of the "combat might" of the armed forces, the navy coming last in this respect, behind all the other branches of the armed forces. Admiral Gorshkov heavily stresses the navy's deterrence role; however, the Soviets would not be the Soviets if they thought of deterrence as the "only" solution. All is not lost if it comes to war, but political goals are to be achieved, not necessarily as a consequence of following the logic of war through to complete victory over the international class enemy (the military-strategic approach) but through the combat operations of all branches of the armed forces, coupled above all with the wartime deterrence and coercive capabilities of an SSBN fleet-in-being acting as a direct instrument of policy (the politico-strategic approach). Gorshkov's scenarios seem to span the range from the navy's role in forcing the U. S. to "conclude peace" after a Soviet victory on the continent to gaining only an "honorable peace" after a stalemate or the threat of actual reverses on the continent. There is, then, a certain retreat from Armageddon, but only to the extent of semi-optimism rather than pessimism over the outcome of a general war. Does the retention of this half-way outpost reflect only the belief that a declared readiness and psychological preparation for war is an indispensable component of a credible deterrence posture? Or is there still more than a remnant of the old belief -- however much weight one should assign to it -- that the USSR should be actively out doing the work of History, that some real "good" can come from war, even if it should involve the most terrible trials?

The case Gorshkov makes for naval might is vigorous and sustained, in both the war and the peacetime aspects of its utility. At the end of his final one-page summation of the series, he reiterates the theme pursued throughout -- that the Soviet Union is a great sea as well as landpower. Nevertheless, I do not think the series should be regarded as simply an interested plea for naval power, although there are more than enough polemics against the marshals in it to suggest otherwise. Gorshkov makes a spirited case but does not appear to overstep the limits of the "possible." To me it bears the earmarks of realistic compromise rather than institutional aggrandizement. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the withholding strategy, if it exists, was sponsored by the navy. It can only fetter command initiative, call in question the psychology of the offensive that is most natural to the warrior and replace the traditional wartime subordination of policy to the achievement of victory with an unaccustomed subordination of operations to the requirements of diplomacy.

What then, is the purpose of the Gorshkov series? It is necessary to consider the background. The navy for long was the step-child of the armed forces, but there are signs that the situation may be changing -- in the navy's greater formal representation on the General Staff, in its acquisition of a much greater proportion of the higher flag ranks. A dozen years ago there was not a single four-star admiral in the Soviet Navy. Five years later there were only two -- the Commander and his first deputy. Since that time, parallel with the expansion of the SSBN fleet and the naval diplomacy role, there has been an accumulation of honors. Today the Navy has one five-star admiral and six four-stars, one of which is seconded to the General Staff. The navy's status under "peaceful co-existence" is heightened; in this respect, service trends in the USSR apparently parallel those in the U.S.³ One would not be surprised to learn that there are now two "main branches" of the Soviet Armed Forces -- the Strategic Rocket Troops (because of their potential for both peacetime deterrence and actual combat) and the Navy (because of its serviceability to diplomacy throughout the entire spectrum of peace and war).

Gorshkov evidently wants to capitalize on this more favorable setting, to rationalize the general case for naval power and gain formal recognition for it. At the outset of the series we were told that the intention was to promote a "unity of views" not only within the navy but within the "command personnel of the armed forces" as a whole.⁴ In other words, he is setting forth military doctrine, because that is the function of military doctrine -- to promote a unity of views⁵ -- in contrast to military science, which tolerates diverse views. Armed with a military doctrine, Gorshkov can use it to influence policy.

"POLITICO-STRATEGIC" APPROACH TO WAR

Withholding Strategy

At the 23rd Party Conference in 1966, Marshal Malinovskiy introduced the following formula: the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy's SSBNs were the main means for

detering an aggressor and decisively defeating him in war. The formula was subsequently interpolated into the third edition of the Sokolovskiy work,⁶ and was repeated by numerous military and naval spokesmen.⁷ Since the 24th Party Congress in 1971, however, I have been unable to find an instance of precisely this formulation by prominent spokesmen. In his 1971 Navy Day article for the Naval Digest Marshal Grechko said that the Strategic Rocket Troops, together with the Navy's SSBNs, "constitute the main means for detering an aggressor, a reliable shield covering the world socialist system."⁸ Nothing is said about their joint role in "decisively defeating" an aggressor in war. And Gorshkov in his series does not seek to demonstrate the value of the navy in achieving a decisive military victory. Instead, we get a formula which seems to extol the navy as a tool of diplomacy in both peace and war.

In his final one-page summary of the series, where expression is at a premium and main points are being made, Gorshkov sums up the navy contribution thus: it fulfills the important role of one of the instruments of state policy in peacetime and is a powerful means for achieving the "political goals" of an armed struggle in war.⁹ I must admit fretting and fussing over this formula. It seems just to miss the traditional mark -- or does it? Consider Sokolovskiy on the military-strategic approach to war: "The past war completely confirmed the vitality of the main theme of Soviet military doctrine, that only as the result of a resolute offensive can one defeat the armed forces of the enemy, seize his territory, break his will to resist and gain final victory in war."¹⁰ In other words, first gain the "military-strategic goal" of the war -- "annihilation or capitulation of the enemy" -- and the "political goal" will be almost automatically delivered unto you.¹¹

It is true that the Russians, as students of Clausewitz, have always regarded war as a continuation of politics by violent means, but they have also followed Engels in the assessment that once military operations have begun, they are subject to laws of the military system and not to diplomacy. The Sokolovskiy volume is studded with references to "achieving victory" and "decisively defeating" the enemy, which signifies that in war the political struggle shifts from non-military to military forms, and that war has its own logic and goals, which only in the "last analysis" lead to the attainment of political objectives. As Sokolovskiy has said, the diplomatic struggle does not cease in war, but it is "completely dependent" on the armed struggle.¹² No doubt diplomacy reassumes command here and there and can always do so if the occasion requires, but the Gorshkov formulation seems to imply that subordination to policy is the norm for the navy in war rather than the exception. He uses almost the same formula for war that he earlier does for peace. Many examples are known, he says in the penultimate article of the series, devoted to navies as instruments of policy in peacetime, "when the mere presence of a powerful navy... has permitted the attainment of political goals."¹³

I do not want to be accused of torturing texts and therefore would not dwell on the subject if we were dealing with an isolated expression; but the fact is that the theme pervades Gorshkov's historical excursions into naval warfare. While naval victories are

also recorded, an exceptional amount of stress is put on attaining "political goals" and supporting important "political moves" in war, winning an "honorable peace" rather than victory, and influencing "peace talks" and the overall course of a war, simply by having naval forces in being.¹⁴

Let us look at some of Gorshkov's cases. In treating the Crimean War, for example, he is preoccupied with the problem of influencing the peace negotiations through naval power. The importance of fleets in that war, he says,

was determined by the extent to which their presence in a given theater could be used by the diplomats of the opposing sides to support their positions at the peace talks. Russia, almost entirely deprived of a fleet in the Black Sea, could not counter the navies of the coalition of enemy states with her own naval forces and thus was forced to accept the conditions of the Paris Peace Treaty....

Shortly after this, in commenting on Russia's bitter experience at the Berlin Congress of 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War, Gorshkov made the generalization that, "in the closing moments of war, when the seapower on which policy could be grounded was especially needed, the Russian navy often proved not strong enough to make the enemy and the states supporting him agree to accept the peace terms indispensable for Russia...." Subsequently, in treating the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, he observes that when "the question of peace was raised" after Tsushima and the rise of the revolutionary movement in Russia, the tsarist regime was in a poor bargaining position due to "the impact of the loss of the Russian fleet." And he complained that Petrograd, in failing to draw the appropriate conclusion from the debacle, did not grasp the significance of a navy in achieving "political goals."¹⁵

However, Gorshkov's treatment of the Battle of Jutland in World War I is even more to the point, since here we find him explicitly blessing a British strategy that had previously been condemned by Soviet naval historians precisely because it prematurely short-circuits the military process in favor of the political process and fails to aim at "complete victory." For example, in 1964 Admiral Belli observed that, in World War I, both the Germans and the British had a "doctrine of conserving forces," the "method" being that of the "fleet-in-being." The German Command wanted to save its forces, "partly in order to have an argument when conducting peace negotiations" but mainly because of the superiority of the British fleet. The British approach, on the other hand, was strictly "politico-strategic," i. e., they did not use their fleet directly to pursue military-strategic goals but political ones. The Admiralty sought to preserve its fleet "as an important factor at the moment of concluding peace, and also for the postwar rivalry with erstwhile allies, inevitable for imperialist states." It was precisely this, says Belli, which explained the "extreme caution" of Admiral Jellicoe's decisions and

operations, which verged on an attempt to avoid a "decisive clash" with the main forces of the German fleet. Belli is highly critical of Jellicoe's politico-strategic approach. "If the German fleet had been destroyed at Jutland or had incurred significant losses, then German submarine operations would not have had the support of major combatants in the struggle to leave base and deploy," and so forth and so on.¹⁶

On this whole question Gorshkov does a 180-degree turn. After introducing his discussion of the Battle of Jutland with an innocuous quotation from Lenin, he noted that, in previous treatments of this subject,

many researchers have observed the indecisiveness displayed by the fleet commanders (especially the English), their reluctance to risk major combatants in order to achieve complete victory. Moreover, some of them came to the conclusion that the Battle of Jutland had no influence on the course of the armed struggle.

Such a conclusion, in our view, lacks objectivity. The fact is that Germany in this battle had the goal of defeating the English fleet in order to secure freedom of action to crush England with a subsequent unrestricted naval blockade.... But the German fleet did not achieve its assigned goal.

England tried, through this battle, to maintain her existing position on the seas and to strengthen her blockade operations against Germany. She essentially achieved these goals.

Thus the Battle of Jutland determined the immutability of the further course of the protracted war and contributed to keeping it in the old channel. This promised no success to Germany....¹⁷

This is one of Gorshkov's more sanguine scenarios, when he identifies with the side which is winning the ground war on the continent. In his discussion of the period after Jutland, however, he identifies with the losing power in the ground war, which wants to use its Navy to salvage something from the debacle. He leads off the discussion of the post-Jutland period with a quotation from Lenin which sets the context -- influencing the peace. "A turn" has begun "in world politics," said Lenin, "from an imperialist war.... to an imperialist peace" (emphasis in the original). Gorshkov then goes on to say that

Germany, having lost hope of a rapid end to the war through the efforts of her ground troops and having failed to attain her goals in the Battle of Jutland, saw what appeared to her as a way out in unrestricted submarine operations against England's sea lines of communication, in order to force her to capitulate before the arrival in Europe of American troops. The German leaders, including even the ground

force command, saw in the unrestricted submarine campaign the only and last chance, if not to achieve victory, then at least to conclude an honorable peace (emphasis added).¹⁸

Before moving on, I would like to take a look at one final item that may or may not bear on the withholding strategy, but in any event serves as a transition to the next discussion. In the last section of his series, Gorshkov asserts, for the first time in Soviet military literature, that SSBNs are a "more effective means of deterrence," due to their "great survivability" in comparison with land-based missile installations. Now, in listing their main forces for deterrence, Russian military spokesmen (including Naval spokesmen) traditionally couple the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy's SSBNs, in that order. Since the Strategic Rocket Troops have many more missiles, it is only reasonable that they should be accorded precedence, if the Soviets have a pre-emptive or launch-on-warning philosophy (or wish others to think they have).¹⁹ It would be different if the goal were a second-strike capability; then the superiority of the SSBN could perhaps be acknowledged.

It was with all the more curiosity, then, that I examined Gorshkov's one apparent lapse from orthodoxy, to see if it had second-strike implications. It seemed to have none. He was discussing "deterrence," and in every other case in the series when deterrence is the context Gorshkov adheres to the traditional formula of according pride of place to the Strategic Rocket Troops, as if survivability had little or nothing to do with deterrence. Moreover, Gorshkov did not seem to be helping very much by what appeared to be a clumsy manner of expression; he literally spoke of "deterrence" as a "role in modern war." Time after time I brushed off this formulation with irritation, as something to be explained later. Then it came to me with a start that this is precisely what a withholding strategy amounts to -- deterrence in war -- and that the SSBN in this role would, in fact, be more effective, because more survivable, in a wartime, second-strike environment. But let us look at the passage in question.

In the last section of the final article, where Gorshkov is reiterating his main points, he examines the impact of various external factors on modern naval development. One of these factors is the influence of military-geographic conditions, which compel the Soviets to put a premium on protecting the submarine with aviation and surface ships in a wartime environment. As I have already indicated in summary and will show in more detail later on, this new emphasis in the naval literature on safeguarding the submarine in itself is redolent of a "withholding" context. However, Gorshkov then goes on to say (emphasis added):

The external and internal preconditions examined above, which have determined the development of the navy in the postwar period, have had a significant impact on the formation of our views on its role in modern war. Thus, as a result of its equipment with strategic

nuclear weapons, the navy objectively acquires the capability not only of participating in the destruction of the enemy's military-economic potential, but also of becoming a most important factor detering his nuclear attack.

In this connection, missile-armed submarines, due to their great survivability in comparison with land-based launch facilities, are a more effective means of deterrence....²⁰

Now, what did Gorshkov actually say? He said: role in modern war -- thus -- deterrence; and he coupled this with the assertion that SLBMs are superior to land-based ICBMs in this role. Perhaps on the one hand it is a case of slipshod writing; on the other hand, a case of Gorshkov's inability to curb his parochialism. But it is interesting that, only a few sentences later, in explicit reference to deterrence "in peacetime," he reverts to the traditional formulation, by mentioning the Strategic Rocket Troops ahead of the Navy in demonstrating resolve. And on two previous occasions in the penultimate article of the series, when the context clearly relates to peacetime deterrence, he refers to the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy, in that order, as the main factors.²¹

However, this is the worst sort of Kremlinological word-weighing, as everyone hastens to assure me, and I will say no more about it.

Survivability of SSBNs

In the 1962 edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy's work on military strategy, the Soviet navy's anti-Polaris task was spoken of simply as "important" (i. e., secondary), in contrast to the anti-carrier task which was "most important." In the 1963 and 1968 editions, however, the anti-Polaris task, too, was elevated to the category of "most important." In all three editions American SSBNs were characterized as "in reality vulnerable;" SSBNs could be "successfully" combatted, just as aircraft carriers could be "successfully" combatted.²²

Gorshkov's treatment in his series seems to call much of this in question. He does say at one point that submarines, in addition to making excellent strike forces, "are also becoming fully valuable antisubmarine vessels, capable of detecting and destroying the enemy's underwater missile-carriers," but this was added almost as an afterthought.²³ Elsewhere, as we have noted, he makes the unprecedented admission that SSBNs are "more effective" than land-based launch installations because of their "great survivability." This in itself implies an acknowledged loss of faith in the efficacy of ASW. However, Gorshkov goes beyond this directly to depreciate ASW, which he alleges not to be cost effective. In a truly significant discussion of Allied ASW activities in World War II, he notes that for each German U-boat there were 25 British and U.S. warships plus 100 aircraft, and for every German submariner at sea there were 100 Englishmen and Americans carrying out ASW.

It is scarcely possible to find a similar ratio of forces between attackers and defenders among the other branches of the armed forces!

And nevertheless, so significant a numerical superiority of defenders was not enough to compel the attackers to stop active operations completely. Therefore, the question of the ratio of submarines to antisubmarine forces is of no small interest even under contemporary conditions, because if the antisubmarine forces, which were so numerous and technically excellent (for the time) and which repeatedly had superiority, proved only partially able to limit the operations of diesel submarines, then what does the superiority have to be today to counter nuclear submarines, the combat potential of which cannot be compared with the potential of the submarines of the World War II period?²⁴

Opinions will no doubt differ as to the weight and significance of these admissions. Even if significance is attached to them one can debate their implications. I do not know what they imply, but one can pursue certain lines of thought. It can scarcely mean that the Soviets have given up the quest for an ASW breakthrough; this would be uncharacteristic. On the other hand, it probably does reflect today's bleak technological perspective, and the admissions are hardly compatible with substantial investments in ASW hardware to counter SSBNs. But more might be involved than an objective evaluation of ASW potential and a disinclination to waste resources. The admissions must have required a political decision, because they have political consequence. The absence, in fact, of a technological perspective has not prevented the Soviets in the past from optimistic pronouncements on the state-of-the-art, which one can well suspect were calculated to give an "objective" foundation to optimistic predictions about the outcome of a general war. Now this "objective" prop has been weakened, if not removed, and this could conceivably be the explanation for Gorshkov's general avoidance of talk about complete defeats and decisive victories.

However, Gorshkov can hardly be as concerned with acknowledging the security of Polaris as he is with asserting the survivability of his own missile boats. Moreover, their great natural survivability can be improved by additional steps.

Safeguarding the Submarine

If the Soviets intend to fire off all their SLBMs in the mass strikes of the initial period, there would be no special requirement to safeguard the SSBN. If they intend to withhold them for a protracted period in a wartime environment, however, special protective efforts might be required. Some small support is given to the withholding theory, therefore, by the circumstance that, simultaneously with his favorable evaluation of a politico-strategic approach to naval warfare, Gorshkov displays an unprecedented

interest in the need to support submarine operations with aviation and surface ships and to divert the enemy fleet covering one's submarines away from the latter's operating areas.

The Russians have referred before to the surface-ship mission of safeguarding the submarine.²⁵ However, in this series Gorshkov goes well beyond anything previously encountered in this regard. He seems to be suggesting that the requirement to safeguard the submarine stems in part from Russia's military-geographic situation. And it is not just the torpedo attack submarine that needs support; it is the main arm of the fleet, whatever that might be -- battleship, aircraft carrier,²⁶ attack submarine and, by implication, today's SSBN. Thus, in discussing the period after the Russo-Japanese War, he criticizes the tsarist government for focusing its efforts on heavy armored gunnery ships alone, while the construction of other forces was relegated to a secondary status.²⁷ Jutland, too, was an affair of battleships but, according to Gorshkov, that engagement

showed that it was impossible to transfer to new conditions the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War on employing major homogeneous line forces as the main and only forces for attaining victory in the struggle at sea. Therefore, it was a landmark registering the moment in the history of the naval art when the need for cooperation among heterogeneous naval forces and means was recognized.²⁸

Gorshkov's point becomes clearer when he discusses the German unrestricted submarine campaign after Jutland. He had already noted that, at the outset of the war,

England had at her disposal an extensive base system at home and in her colonies, and her geographical position relative to the bases of the German fleet created favorable conditions for a naval blockade of Germany.... Germany, on the other hand, had a base system suitable for defense against blows from the sea but not ensuring direct access to the ocean. In addition, her basing system permitted a quick concentration of forces in the Baltic or North Seas (but in exiting beyond their limits she had to reckon on the possibility of clashing with the superior English fleet).²⁹

In my opinion, this German geographical and general naval disadvantage -- analagous to that of the Russians today -- is important background for Gorshkov's discussion of the German unrestricted submarine campaign after the failure at Jutland. To counter this campaign, the Entente threw "enormous" ASW forces into the struggle. Nevertheless,

The effectiveness of the submarines was reduced only in the latter part of the war, more than anything else because the German command, having laid the execution of the main mission on them, did not bring

up other naval forces to safeguard their operations (which was especially necessary as a consequence of the growth of the antisubmarine forces of the Entente countries). The Germans tried to respond to the sharp increase in the antisubmarine defense forces and resources of the English only by introducing new submarines into service. However, their introduction was too little, too late (because of the lack of support for their operations)....³⁰

Later on Gorshkov adds that

Great Britain succeeded in avoiding a catastrophe only because of the mistakes of the German command, which made a strategic miscalculation and did not provide for a timely augmentation of its submarine forces to the extent necessary and for broad measures to safeguard their operations... with the entire power of its fleet.³¹

Essentially the same point is made about German strategy in World War II. After the fall of France in 1940, says Gorshkov,

It looked as though the plan of Hitler Germany to gain supremacy in Western Europe with ground troops and aviation alone was near success. But England was still unsubdued and it was impossible to compel her surrender without sufficient naval forces. The German military command (just as in the First World War) tried to find a way out of this situation by suffocating England with a naval blockade....³²

This did not succeed. Gorshkov complains that,

despite the exceptional threat to submarines on the part of antisubmarine forces, the German naval command did not conduct a single operation or other specially organized combined action aimed at the destruction of these forces....

Later, observing the failure of the German submarine campaign in spite of the great losses it inflicted on the Allies, Gorshkov said that

One of the important reasons for this was that the submarines did not have the support of other forces and above all of aviation, which could have carried out reconnaissance for the submarines and destroyed antisubmarine forces, as well as operated against the enemy's economy by hitting his ports and targets in the shipbuilding industry, not to mention his ships at sea....³³

Gorshkov returns to this theme in the final article of the series, when he is reiterating his main points. He notes that "military-geographic conditions" have always had an important influence on naval development; today the imperialists try to take advantage of these conditions to surround the socialist countries with a ring of naval and air bases and with groupings of naval forces. These circumstances -- both military-geographic conditions and the operational-combat characteristics of new weapons and equipment -- have influenced the construction of the Soviet Navy, "the ships of which have differed from those of Western states in both design and armament." Nuclear-powered submarines are the foundation of the USSR's Navy.

However, a modern fleet...cannot be simply an undersea fleet. The underestimation of the need to support submarine operations with aviation and surface ships cost the German command dearly in the last two world wars. In particular, it was pointed out before that one of the reasons for the failure of the "unrestricted submarine campaign" waged by the Germans was the lack of such support for submarines, which forced them to operate alone, without the assistance of other forces.

Therefore, in giving priority to the development of submarine forces, we feel a need not only for submarines but also for surface ships of various kinds. The latter, aside from imparting combat stability to the submarine, are designed to execute a wide range of missions both in peace and war....³⁴

Diverting Enemy ASW Forces

Gorshkov apparently does not want to rely entirely on assigning surface ships and aviation to protect the submarines. If I correctly understand the lesson he draws from German operations in World War II, he also feels it desirable to divert Western ASW forces away from their valuable prey. At the outset of the war, says Gorshkov,

The English plan for military operations at sea was predicated on the fact that conditions for using the fleet would not differ essentially from those in which it operated during the First World War, and provided for a distant naval blockade of Germany and the protection of their own sea lines of communication. The military-geographic situation facilitated the organization by the English of the naval blockade of Germany, although in the conditions that were taking shape this already could not be as effective an approach as in the First World War.

The French fleet and part of the forces of the English fleet, relying on a developed basing system, were to ensure supremacy in the Mediterranean.

Thus, the naval doctrines of both of the contending coalitions were oriented toward the achievement of their decisive goals by active methods of employing the forces of their fleets but they differed in content. If the German command intended to spread the operations of its fleet practically throughout the entire Atlantic Ocean, then the English and French commands aimed at concentrating their main efforts in comparatively limited regions of the seas contiguous to German territory, in direct proximity to the basing system of the German- Fascist fleet (emphasis added). ³⁵

The Germans were successful in forcing the British to alter their strategy.

In order to protect its transoceanic shipping and, therefore, in order to counter the naval forces of Fascist Germany, the English fleet had to scatter its forces throughout the entire Atlantic theater, which caused great difficulties in making effective use of the insufficient number of antisubmarine, anti-mine and convoy ships....

Later Gorshkov adds that the scattering of British forces in the Atlantic "created a favorable situation for German naval operations in the coastal waters of Northern Europe." All this had a grave impact on the "further course of the war," since among other things it permitted the Germans to expand the combat operations of their fleet and "especially" their submarines. ³⁶

What is the lesson here? Is it simply that the Germans were successful in scattering forward ASW forces, so that their submarines could operate more freely everywhere? Or does the point lie in the relatively unaccented portion of the discussion, i. e., having diverted ASW forces to the Atlantic, operations could go on in local waters relatively unmolested? In mulling over this passage the following thought occurred to me, which I do not in any way insist upon as compelling. Now that the Soviets have an SLBM of sufficient range, they can keep their SSBNs "in the coastal waters of Northern Europe" under the protection of enough surface ships, aviation and attack submarines to ward off Western hunter-killer efforts. And one way to assist in this is to decoy forward either with a portion of the SSBN force or (less likely perhaps) with SSNs operating on lines of communication, requiring the West to scatter its forces away from, say, the Norwegian and Barents Seas.

Problems of Interpretation

The objection can be fairly made that Soviet navymen are not Kremlinologists, that Gorshkov's historical discussions turn on blockades and anti-SLOC (sea lines of communication) campaigns with attack submarines, and that it is unwarranted to reason from this to strategic operations with SSBNs. However, it seems to me that this objection can be countered with a number of arguments, without asserting that the case is thereby conclusively demonstrated.

In the first place, if Gorshkov wants to appeal to history to "scientifically" substantiate the need for SSBN support, he would have to find a surrogate, for the simple reason that SSBNs are a recent introduction. The argument, of course, has no positive force.

A second point has to be made in addition, since the first one does not address the question of why Gorshkov did not openly acknowledge the surrogate character of his historical examples, Soviet sailors not being Kremlinologists. However, the force of some of this objection is vitiated if Gorshkov was primarily interested in entering the record with a military doctrine that could subsequently be used as a foundation for policy. Presumably the men in the Kremlin are Kremlinologists.

Third, as I have already indicated, Gorshkov demonstrates an historical interest in the failure to support, not just attack submarines, but also battleships, etc., that is, whatever arm is playing the leading role at the time. He tells us this in his complaint about the Germans in World War I, that having tasked the submarine with the "main mission," they were culpable in not supporting them. Today the main mission is performed by the SSBN.

Fourth, is it not interesting that when Gorshkov, for the first time, asserts the "great survivability" of the SSBN as such, thereby implying a less than exalted view of the potentialities of ASW, he also for the first time finds historical reasons to downgrade the cost-effectiveness of ASW against "nuclear submarines," to demonstrate the compelling need to support "nuclear submarines" with other components against ASW forces,³⁷ to reverse previous Soviet historiography on the value of a withholding strategy and to point out the utility of a fleet-in-being (not just a "submarine" fleet) for directly pursuing political rather than military goals in war? It would be different if all these "firsts" did not "hang together" in a consistent theory, but they do.

Fifth, we can take for granted that Gorshkov, in his historical excursions, is not an academic seeking the truth for its own sake; he is interested in drawing lessons for the present. He proved this in the above quotation from his final section entitled "Problems of a Modern Navy," when he reiterated the lessons from both world wars on the failure of the Germans to support their submarine operations and argued the current need for surface ships as well as submarines. Now Gorshkov does devote an extraordinary

amount of attention to anti-SLOC campaigns in his historical treatment. If we are to take him literally in this, we would have to assume he is drawing the lesson that the anti-SLOC mission is vital today; but it is precisely here that the argument fails.

Over the past decade the previous Soviet emphasis on the importance of the anti-SLOC mission has tended to be downgraded. The attention of the Soviet planner is on general nuclear war, not protracted conflicts where logistics are important. As Admiral Stalbo wrote in 1969, the anti-SLOC mission in recent years has been transformed from a "main" into a "secondary" mission.³⁸ Admiral Kharlamov had earlier stated that, while in the past armed combat at sea had always included operations against and in defense of communications, "it is impossible to maintain that this will occur again in the event of a nuclear-missile war." Attacks on the SLOC will not be significant during the "initial" period of war (the phase of intense nuclear strikes), which may well be decisive in determining the outcome of the war. They will assume greater importance only if the war is protracted, but even here the requirement is vitiated by NATO stockpiling practices.³⁹ Moreover, even with regard to the later phases of the war, the Russians believe, according to Stalbo, that

As a result of the use of nuclear weapons against ground targets the losses of the enemy, can turn out to be several times larger than losses from the most successful operations against his shipping.... Finally, the devastation caused by the massive use of nuclear weapons against targets located on the territories of the belligerents will sharply curtail all spheres of consumption and in many cases may even eliminate the need for it.⁴⁰

For this reason the anti-SLOC mission has been transformed from a mission "no less important" than the "basic" mission of combatting the enemy fleet (1962 edition of Sokolovskiy)⁴¹ into an "important" task (1968 edition of Sokolovskiy)⁴² which only remains mainly because of its relevance in the later phases of a broken-back nuclear war.

Gorshkov himself does not deal, in a contemporary setting, with the anti-SLOC mission in his series. The "basic mission" of navies in general nuclear war he lists as participating in strategic nuclear strikes, blunting (*oslablenie*) the strikes of enemy naval forces from ocean axes and taking part in operations conducted by the ground forces in continental theaters. This does not mean the navy no longer has anti-SLOC responsibilities. Gorshkov adds that the navy will have to carry out a number of "tasks" to accomplish the "basic mission,"⁴³ and one of these tasks is almost certainly operations against communications. He probably still considers the task "important" (i. e., secondary), as he did in 1967.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, if he devotes a great deal of attention to the anti-SLOC task in his series the intention may be to boost the efficacy of the submarine as such and specifically the SSBN, the main arm of the fleet today, rather than one historical mission of the submarine that is now of secondary importance.

Finally, it should be noted that, outside the Gorshkov series, in the naval literature, the talk today is of protecting the SSBN specifically, not just the submarine. An article appearing on the very eve of the Gorshkov series declared that SSBNs were incapable of realizing their full potential "without appropriate support from other forces."⁴⁵ Moreover, in a recent article by Svyatov and Kokoshin of the Institute for the USA, it was said that when the long-range Trident comes into operation in the U. S. Navy, SSBNs will "evidently" be positioned in zones contiguous to U. S. coasts. "In the opinion of American specialists, this will also make it possible to concentrate here the principal PLO (antisubmarine defense) forces, which will be assigned a new function -- guarding the strategic missile forces...."⁴⁶ The implication apparently is that the U. S. has a withholding strategy; otherwise, why guard the SSBNs? It apparently does not bother Svyatov and Kokoshin to say in one breath that the U. S. will assign its main ASW forces to this "new function" and in the next breath that, if it comes to war, the U. S. plans to deploy 50 percent of all its ASW forces to forward positions in Europe.

It could be, of course, that Svyatov and Kokoshin really meant the U. S. rather than the USSR in their discussion. However, it is the USSR which has traditionally had the "geographic-military" disadvantage, with her submarines required to run the gauntlet of forward-based Western ASW forces before emerging through narrow exits into an open sea where, as Gorshkov says of the Germans in World War I, they "had to reckon on the possibility of clashing with a superior fleet." The Soviets have just acquired an SLBM with the range to make it practical to position SSBNs in home waters and protect them with surface ships and aviation. Is it not curious that, precisely when they acquire this capability, Gorshkov begins to speak of the utility of navies in attaining political goals in war, praises Jellicoe's politico-strategic withholding strategy and indifference to "complete victory" in World War I, repeatedly insists on the value of intact fleets in influencing peace negotiations, asserts the "great survivability" of the SSBN as a second-strike threat, impeaches the effectiveness of ASW especially if submarines are given protection, and observes with satisfaction Germany's World War II success in offsetting its military-geographic disadvantages through diversion of British ASW resources, one consequence of which was to permit naval operations to go forward in the coastal waters of Northern Europe? The coincidences are, of course, great but perhaps they can be lived with as just that -- coincidences.

DETERRENCE

"Defense" and "Combat" Capabilities

Gorshkov declares at one point that the Navy's "main task" is the "defense" (oborona) of the USSR against "possible" attacks from the sea. This is a task of long standing. I had previously inferred that it might be the Navy's main task, but I am not aware that it has ever been openly referred to as such. Although earlier Soviet treatment of the task had been singularly devoid of content, I had hypothesized that it comprised both peacetime deterrence and wartime action against direct threats to the security of the Bloc, in contrast to indirect threats to the security of the Bloc beyond its sea frontiers, which is covered by a task of lower priority -- protecting "state interests."⁴⁷

Unfortunately, although Gorshkov provides far more information on the "defense" task than in the past, we are still unable to determine with confidence its precise scope and components, much less determine whether there has been a shift over time in its content or the relative weight of individual components.

The Russian word oborona has literally the same meaning -- and the same fuzziness -- as the English word "defense." It is employed, for example, in opposition to "offense," and so we get "anti-air defense," "anti-submarine defense" and "strategic defense." It is also a "nice" word. No country has a Ministry of Aggression; and the Russians are no exception -- they have a Ministry of Defense. The use of the word in this connection in itself suggests that its meaning spans the entire panoply of military security measures, from low-level military diplomacy through deterrence to all-out war. In a tour de force of 1962, Marshal Malinovskiy managed to pack all these meanings into a single formula: being peace-loving, the USSR does not hold to the aphorism that attack is the best form of defense; on the contrary, the best means of "defense" lies in a "warning" to the enemy of Soviet readiness to "defeat" him on his very first attempt to commit an act of aggression.⁴⁸ The formula has a little bit of everything: defense in contrast to offense, deterrence in peace, victory in war.

So far, then, the word oborona does not appear to differ appreciably from our own understanding of "defense." However, there are some unique conventions as to its use. The most relevant appears to be the distinction made by the Soviets between the "defense" capabilities of the homeland and the "combat" capabilities of the armed forces. I have never come across any reference to the combat capabilities of the homeland or to the defense capabilities of any branches of the armed forces; the armed forces, though, do contribute to the defense capabilities of the homeland. Thus defense capability has the broader compass: it includes, inter alia, the economic base of the country as well as military potential narrowly conceived. As Marshal Grechko has recently explained, "Today the problem of further strengthening the defense of the homeland is being solved on the basis of a highly developed economy and the latest achievements of science and technology."⁴⁹ Admiral Gorshkov treats the term in the same broad manner. He says that, in order to strengthen the "defense of the homeland" from the sea, the Party was strengthening its sea power, which includes not only the Navy but also oceanography, the merchant marine, and the industrial fleet for exploiting the animal and mineral resources of the sea.⁵⁰

This, however, does not exhaust the differences between the two concepts. In the Sokolovskiy work on military strategy, separate chapters are devoted to problems of "preparing the homeland to ward off aggression" and the "leadership of the armed forces." As already suggested, the former evidently relates to defense building, the latter to improving combat capabilities. Certain Soviet critics of the first edition of the work objected to the inclusion of defense building, on the grounds that this was a "matter of policy" rather than military strategy. The Sokolovskiy collective, however, defended

its inclusion, maintaining that the two sets of problems were interdependent aspects of a single leadership process that could not be mechanically separated. As an example, the authors adduce the fact that the "defense capabilities" of a country are expressed first of all in the "combat readiness" of the armed forces.⁵¹

Combat capabilities, then, do intersect with defense capabilities in the orthodox view, although it would be a mistake to think of combat capabilities as simply the military component of defense capabilities. Content analysis of the Gorshkov series in fact shows little or no intersection at all in the peacetime aspects of defense. In the penultimate article of the series (eight and one-half pages long), devoted entirely to the use of Navies as instruments of policy in peacetime, he employs the words "defense," "defense capabilities," and "defense power" eight times, without once referring to the "combat capabilities," "combat might" or "combat readiness" of the Soviet Navy or armed forces in general.⁵² It is not that these latter terms are rare; in the appropriate place Gorshkov strews them in profusion. Thus, in a discussion following on the treatment of current wartime missions (two and one-half pages long), he never mentions the word "defense" or any of its adjectival derivatives, but he does refer to "combat capabilities," "combat potential," "combat power" and "combat readiness," as well as to "combat operations," "combat training," "combat tasks," "combat traditions," etc., a total of fifteen references to the adjective "combat" or the noun "battle" from which it is derived.⁵³

However, there is still another distinction between the two concepts. Combat capabilities belong in the sphere of armed forces leadership but, as Sokolovskiy explains, leadership of the armed forces belongs to the "subjective side" of the exploitation of laws of strategy.⁵⁴ I take this to mean that it involves all those factors that make strategy a branch of the military art rather than military science, factors within the military system that transcend a mere external determination. By that same token, I would assume that defense is mainly concerned with the "objective" side of the leadership process, i. e., with the external determinants of the military system.

At any rate, this is consistent with Gorshkov's treatment in the series. In discussing defense in the article on peacetime naval diplomacy, Gorshkov tends to reduce naval might to its external determinants. A warship is not just a warship; it is a "most important" instrument of policy. Policy, however, as Lenin taught, is "the concentrated expression of the economy," the state of which "determines" the power of the Armed Forces. Put another way, the state of the Armed Forces "reflects" the "economic power" of the state. To create a modern warship one needs a high level of development of industry and science, which means that real naval development is only within the capabilities of a state with a well-developed economy.

This is why throughout history the navy, to a much greater degree than other branches of the armed forces, in concentrating in itself the latest achievements of science and technology has reflected the level of

the economic and scientific-technical development of the state. This situation permits us to look on the navy as a unique index of the level of development and might of a country's economy and as one of the factors in its ability firmly to occupy a definite place among the other powers.

The navy, thanks to the high mobility and endurance of its ships, possesses the capability of graphically demonstrating the economic and military power of a country beyond its borders during peacetime....

And later on Gorshkov observes that, when the Soviet navy makes port visits, people in foreign lands "see ships embodying the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry...."⁵⁵

The naval diplomacy discussion is in marked contrast to the treatment of wartime missions and combat potential, where the inherent requirements of the naval system are the determinants of naval development. External determination is replaced by internal and a warship is precisely what it seems to be -- a warship. Gorshkov begins by saying that "a most important precondition determining naval development is the constant improvement of its readiness for immediate combat operations in the most complex situations...." However, the special way that navies are being used in the nuclear era is also "determining the new requirements for forces and the facilities to support them," and therefore constitutes an important precondition "influencing" the trend in contemporary naval development and "determining" technical policy.⁵⁶

Just as external determination was replaced by internal, so the objective factor was replaced by the subjective. It is only in the discussion on combat readiness that we encounter "socialist humanism" as it manifests itself in the military sphere -- the moral factor in war, the will to victory, selfless idealism.⁵⁷ It is also here that we first encounter references to the Party apparatus within the military establishment. In the naval diplomacy discussion the Party was simply part of the external chain of command⁵⁸ but in the wartime discussion the role of the navy's internal political apparatus is underscored.⁵⁹ All this would appear to be quite orthodox; Sokolovskiy, for example, discusses the work of party military organs in his chapter on leadership of the armed forces.⁶⁰ If, as Soviet writers remind us, the subjective side of the leadership process comes to the fore when war "becomes a fact," so that both policy and the economy are "entirely subordinated to the attainment of victory,"⁶¹ the same might be true to a lesser degree when the peacetime perspective is one of war.

Although the need to increase both the defense capabilities of the homeland and the combat capabilities of the armed forces are always considered to be "main tasks" of the Party, further research would be needed to determine whether one or the other has been more emphasized during a particular period as a main task. Gorshkov in his series

seems to stress defense as the only truly independent factor for naval tasks. In his final one-page summary of the whole series he employs the word "defense" or its derivatives five times. He says that the Central Committee and the Soviet government, in implementing Lenin's precepts on strengthening the "defense" of the homeland, are displaying unflagging attention to the "defense might" of the state. He then quotes from Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, that it remains as one of the "very main" tasks both to increase the "defense capabilities" of the motherland and to strengthen her armed forces, which may be only another way of saying strengthening the combat capabilities of the armed forces.⁶² Immediately afterwards Gorshkov declares it the seaman's very first duty to maintain a high state of "readiness" for "defending" the state from the sea and to increase his skill in using "combat" equipment.⁶³ Even if (as seems likely) "readiness" implies "combat readiness," it is interesting that this factor comes in mainly only insofar as it intersects with and supports the "defense" task.

What do we have then? A number of distinctions seem to have been uncovered between "defense" and "combat" terminology:

- Defense includes peacetime as well as wartime security measures;
- Defense relates to economic as well as military strength;
- Defense is more a "matter of policy;"
- Defense capabilities concern the "objective," combat capabilities the "subjective" side of the leadership process.

In addition, in the case of the navy, defense capabilities seem to take priority, combat capabilities serving mainly to bolster defense capabilities. It would be tempting to speculate, too, whether these two different sets of leadership responsibilities can be traced to two separate organizations -- defense capabilities to the so-called "Council of Defense" and combat capabilities to the "Main Military Council" of the Ministry of Defense.⁶⁴

With all this discussion as background, we will now proceed to examine Gorshkov's reference to the Navy's "defense" task, with the aim of determining its content and the relative weight of its components.

"Defense" as the "Main Task"

One thing is clear from Gorshkov's discussion -- that today peacetime deterrence and the offsetting of politico-military pressure on the Bloc is a significant component of defense. On several occasions he even manages to leave the impression, wittingly or unwittingly, correctly or incorrectly, that deterrence occupies so large a part of the Navy's defense task that the two terms are interchangeable. The first such occasion comes early in the penultimate article of the series, devoted entirely to peacetime naval diplomacy. There he discusses the post-war period, when the U.S. reduced its entire

policy and diplomacy to "nuclear policy and nuclear diplomacy." The fact that imperialism has not unleashed a new world war is due to the sobering effect of the growth in the USSR's might.

The economic might and defensive (oboronnaya) power of the Soviet Union ensures the security of all the countries of the socialist commonwealth and is changing the fundamental balance of forces in the world arena in favour of revolutionary progress and general peace....

Among the main means ensuring the Motherland's high defense capability (oboronosposobnost'), one must name above all the Strategic Rocket Troops and the Navy, the latter of which has assimilated as much as practical of those means of conducting an armed struggle as are available to the other branches of the armed forces. Aviation, the Ground Troops and other branches of our valiant armed forces are, to a large extent, a means of deterring (sderzhivanie) the aggressive acts of the imperialists....⁶⁵

There are two things about this passage that suggest the equivalence in Gorshkov's mind, at that time and for his purposes, of "defense" and "deterrence." The first is obvious: he begins by extolling the contribution of the Strategic Rocket Troops (SRT) and the Navy to the country's "defense capability" and ends by saying that the other branches also "deter." The second point is less obvious; it lies in the coupling of the SRT and the Navy as among the main means for ensuring defense capabilities. This is close to the formula used today for deterrence capabilities but not for war-fighting capabilities. As Marshal Grechko has said, the SRT and the Navy's SSBNs together are the main means for "deterring" an aggressor, but the SRT alone are the foundation of the "combat might" of the armed forces, the Navy in this respect appearing last among all the branches of the armed forces.⁶⁶

However, a slight difference in language should be noted. The formula for defense capabilities refers to the Navy as a whole; the formula for deterrence capabilities refers only to the Navy's SSBNs. This raises the question whether defense might not comprehend both deterrence and war-fighting, as one might expect a priori from its literal meaning. In this case, the Navy's contribution to deterrence would be so great as to more than compensate for its lesser contribution to military-strategic efforts, thereby enabling it to retain front-rank status in overall defense. This leaves unanswered, however, the question of why Gorshkov treats deterrence in apposition to defense, as if they were interchangeable terms. We could assume a lapse into pars pro toto thinking, but could we be comfortable in this assumption, even with regard to the Russians, unless the part constituted a very large portion of the whole?

Later in the penultimate article, Gorshkov returns again to the specific theme of deterrence in a contemporary setting. He observes that "times are changing" and the methods of the capitalist states for using their fleet as an "instrument of policy in peacetime" are also changing. Time and again, says Gorshkov, the leading capitalist powers have used naval "demonstrations" to "put pressure" on the Warsaw Pact. He refers to "aggressive, openly anti-Soviet deployment trends" -- the "widely advertised" patrols of nuclear submarines, the "demonstrative operations" of aircraft carriers, the "systematic overflights" of Soviet ships, the "demonstrative visits" to the Black and Baltic Seas and the Sea of Japan -- all of which constitute the underpinnings of imperialist "military doctrine" and serve as a "means of nuclear blackmail."⁶⁷

However, says Gorshkov, the Soviet Armed Forces, including the Navy, have also emerged as "one of the instruments of policy" of the USSR -- an instrument of the policy of "peace and friendship" of peoples, of the "deterrence" of military adventurers and of resolute opposition to "threats" against the security of peace-loving peoples by imperialist powers. Realistically appraising the growing "threat" to the security of the USSR, the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government have seen that the "way out of the situation which has been created" lies in opposing the forces of aggression on the World Ocean with "strategic counterforces of defense" (strategicheskie kontrsily oborony),⁶⁸ the core of which consists of the Strategic Rocket Troops and the high-seas fleet (again the formula for deterrence capabilities or perhaps deterrence together with war-fighting capabilities but not for war-fighting alone). The creation of a new Soviet Navy "at the will of the Party" and its emergence onto the ocean expanses have given the Soviet Armed Forces

a powerful means of defense (oborona) on ocean axes, a formidable force for deterring (sderzhivanie) aggression, always ready to deliver punitive retaliatory strikes and frustrate the plans of the imperialists. And this, its main task (I ety svoyu glavnyu zadachu) -- the defense (oborona) of the homeland against attacks by the aggressor from ocean axes -- the Navy is successfully fulfilling together with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. The ships of our Navy threaten no one, but they are always ready to give a merited rebuff to any aggressor that dares to infringe on the security of the Motherland.

Thus, those who are inspiring a new arms race and preparing for a new world war, in relying on the forced-draft development of their own naval forces and the creation of new problems that are difficult to resolve for the defense (oborona) of the Soviet Union, have themselves been confronted with even more complex problems as a result of the strengthening of our Navy on the oceans. The previous inaccessibility of the continents, which in the past allowed them to count on exemption from punishment for aggression, has now become a matter of history.⁶⁹

What do we have here? In an article devoted to the peacetime use of navies as instruments of state policy, and in a discussion the specific context of which is "deterrence" and countering "threats" and "demonstrations," Gorshkov says that "this" is the Navy's main task, which he equates with the "defense" of the homeland and which in turn appears in apposition to "deterrence." The Navy, he says, "is" fulfilling this task, right now, today; it is not just prepared to fulfill it if war comes. And it fulfills the task by posing the same threat to the home territory of the U.S. (strategic missiles) that the U.S. poses to the USSR. It is true that the Navy is "always ready" to deliver "punitive retaliatory strikes"⁷⁰ but this formula does not appear to escape from the purely negative logic of deterrence: threaten me and I will threaten you; strike at me and you will suffer punishment. There is no hint of anything positive, anything "constructive." There seems to be no implication of a military-strategic goal -- defeating the enemy.

In the last section of the final article Gorshkov returns to the "defense" theme. He begins the section by saying that, considering the importance of problems connected with strengthening the "defense of the homeland from sea axes," the Warsaw Pact is strengthening its "sea power" -- oceanography, the merchant marine, the "industrial" fleet for fishing and exploiting the mineral resources of the sea. However, according to Gorshkov, the "most important" component of the sea power of a state is the Navy, "which has been assigned the mission (prednaznachenny) of protecting state interests in the seas and oceans and defending (oborona) the homeland against possible strikes from ocean and sea axes."⁷¹

What is the content of this mission of "defending" against "possible" strikes from the sea? Gorshkov goes on to say that the need to have a powerful navy corresponding to the geographical position of the USSR and its "political significance as a great power" became especially acute in the post-war period, when the Warsaw Pact found itself encircled by a hostile coalition of maritime states posing the serious "threat" of a nuclear-missile attack from sea axes. The Soviet Union could not put up with a situation where the U.S., having encircled the USSR, had not itself experienced an "analogous danger." The Party and the Government fully appreciated both the "threat" to the USSR from the oceans and the need to "deter" the enemy's aggressive aspirations. Continuing their "policy of peaceful coexistence" and the "prevention" of a new world war, they have built up powerful armed forces, including the Navy, capable of "countering" any of the enemy's "intrigues," including those on ocean axes, where the simple "presence" of the Soviet Navy alone poses for a "potential aggressor" the requirement "to solve those very same problems that he meant to create for our Armed Forces."⁷² Again, we seem to have a pure logic of deterrence, with no hint of a military-strategic objective in war.

However, the solution to the puzzle of "defense" may not be so simple. For Gorshkov then goes on to treat other "objective" determinants of Soviet naval development in addition to the strategic threat from the West: the policy, military doctrine and economic

potential of the USSR; the characteristics of weapon systems provided by science and technology; and military-geographic conditions. All these external determinants, says Gorshkov, have influenced Soviet views on the Navy's "role in modern war," including "deterrence." He then treats deterrence "in peacetime" and the "protection" (zashchita) of the "state interests" of the USSR and the "security" of the socialist countries. After a brief discussion of the need for a "balanced" force to accomplish these tasks (as determined by an "objective" analysis), the Navy's "basic mission" (osnovnoe prednaznachenie) in general war is summarily treated and then (with some circumlocution) the local war mission, in which the Navy could become involved through carrying out the "peacetime" task of protecting state interests. The subsequent discussion is purely "subjective," i. e., having earlier given the external determinants of Soviet naval development following on the introduction of the "defense" theme, he now gives the inner military determinants of naval development and the role of the Navy's political apparatus in inculcating the will to victory, following on the introduction of the wartime missions.⁷³

The question is whether all this further discussion is a continuation and elaboration of the subject floated at the beginning of the section. He began with the tasks of "defending" the USSR and protecting its state interests; in the middle he discusses deterrence (apparently including deterrence in war) and the protection of state interests and Bloc security; and at the end he treats general and local war missions. The fact that there is at least one common denominator between beginning and middle -- protecting state interests -- is consistent with the interpretation of a continuation of theme. In this case defense would equate to peacetime deterrence and, if we are correct in our interpretation of the passage, to wartime deterrence (the withholding strategy). It could be, too, that military-strategic tasks are also involved; this depends on the interpretation of the expression, "protecting the security" of the Bloc. Finally, we have to ask ourselves, without feeling secure in any answer, whether the end discussion, too, is only a further elaboration of the initial theme. In this case "defense" would have to be expanded to include the "basic mission" in general war, with the protection of state interests comprehending the local war mission. One difficulty is that protecting state interests is explicitly referred to, here and elsewhere,⁷⁴ as a "peacetime" task. The difficulty can only be evaded by the assumption that "peace" is loosely used to denote any condition below the level of inter-Bloc conflict.

There are then, considerable ambiguities about the word "defense" as well as the word "deterrence." Nevertheless, one can say that Gorshkov does put a heavy stress on the value of his Navy in deterring direct attacks and offsetting politico-military pressure on the Bloc. In his final one-page summary of the series, he declares that "navies fulfill the important role of one of the instruments of state policy in peacetime."⁷⁵ He realizes that, under conditions of peaceful coexistence and the emerging climate of detente, the case for naval aggrandizement has to be made as much on "the diplomatic significance of navies in peacetime"⁷⁶ as on the Navy's contribution to war. Navies do not have to wage war to earn their keep. The mere ownership and display of a substantial fleet confers

prestige on a country, since only the technologically advanced and economically powerful can bear the burden. A formidable Navy adds to a country's international weight, points up its right to a high place among the powers, earns it the respect of the capitalist world, attracts allies, makes it a factor in all calculations. This is an era of peaceful coexistence; one must negotiate, but only from a position of strength. "Numerous examples from history testify to the fact that ... all problems of foreign policy have always been settled on the basis ... of the military strength of the "negotiating" parties...."77

NAVAL MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF STATE INTERESTS

Protection of State Interests

While measures directly affecting USSR security constitute the Navy's main (most important) task, steps indirectly affecting that security are an "important" (i. e., secondary) preoccupation. Gorshkov proceeds, as he tells us early on, "from the special character of the Navy as a military factor that can be used even in peacetime to demonstrate the economic and military power of states beyond their borders, and from the fact that, over the span of many centuries, it has been the only branch of the armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country abroad...."78 His articles are a powerful justification for the current use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of Weltpolitik -- to advance and protect the "state interests" of the USSR.

The content of the term "state interests," in a naval context, has never before been so clearly defined by any Soviet writer. Protecting state interests is not a new naval mission; it is just that new interests have apparently been added to the list from time to time, especially in recent years. Gorshkov declares that, in the 1930s, the navy was capable of protecting state interests only in "contiguous naval theaters;"79 presumably at that time this meant protecting only the merchant marine and fishing fleet. With the expansion of Soviet operations onto the high-seas in our own era, they could enlarge the area of protection of a merchant marine and fishing fleet that were themselves undergoing rapid expansion. Moreover, as Gorshkov himself has said, in the mid-1960s "new requirements" were laid on the navy in protecting state interests;80 these apparently involved Soviet political, military and economic investments in non-Communist countries of the Third World. The surprise of the current series is the stress on protecting state interests in the mineral resources of the seawater and seabed outside territorial waters. Why all these interests are referred to as "state" interests is still somewhat mysterious, but recourse to Marxist-Leninist theory, coupled with an examination of the formula in its context, where it is often juxtaposed against ideological interests, suggests that it covers those more pragmatic objectives which are either ideologically neutral or cannot be justified directly by ideological canons. We must remember that all states -- and the Soviet state is no exception -- are concessions to the "original sin" of class society and

are destined to disappear along with this society. From the standpoint of ideological doctrine, therefore, state interests are not to be glorified, since they do not belong to the same ideal order as Communist interests.⁸¹

It was previously realized that the Soviets were interested in the naval protection of commerce, fishing and Third World clients,⁸² but we were unprepared for Gorshkov's great attention in this series to the mineral resources of the seawater and seabed. After citing Lenin at the beginning of his discussion, he goes on to declare that the exploitation of the sea is "becoming one of the most outstanding state problems, aimed at ensuring the economic might of the Soviet Union." His thesis on the seas is tantamount to an expansion of the Leninist theory of imperialism. Previously the ocean played only an ancillary role in imperialist aggression as the route for connecting land masses. The seas "were in the main only an arena for the struggle of rival navies over control of lines of communication, but not objects for the clash of state interests." Today, because of the "truly inexhaustible wealth" of the World Ocean and its strategic military potential, it has become a "direct object" of imperialist expansion.

Now this is one of the most important international and national problems entering the orbit of world politics. Just as in the 19th century the question of allocating spheres of influence on land was posed in an especially sharp manner, so the intention of certain capitalist states to establish spheres of influence over the World Ocean assumes at the present time a no less acute character. The imperialist states are already refusing to confine their rights simply to the exploitation of the natural wealth of the continental shelf; they intend to extend their national jurisdiction to open waters of the seas and oceans located at an enormous distance from their shores.

Gorshkov thinks it "quite obvious that navies, as a weapon of policy of the aggressive states, cannot take a back seat in this struggle."⁸³

Although Gorshkov places a new emphasis on the USSR's state interests on, in and at the bottom of the sea, he has not downgraded its state interests in the maritime land masses of the underdeveloped world. Navies can be used to win friends. In extolling the value of port-calls as an "instrument of state policy in peacetime," Gorshkov says it is impossible to overestimate the "principled influence" which Soviet sailors exercise over their hosts. Port-calls are valuable, not because they promote proletarian solidarity and advance the class struggle, but because they make a vital contribution to the enhancement of mutual understanding between "states and peoples," strengthen the "international authority" of the USSR, and promote "the development of the Soviet Union's international ties with developing sovereign states."⁸⁴

But the navies are the instruments par excellence of coercive diplomacy, with a great value in communicating attitudes and intentions. He refers to naval demonstrations as "exhibitions" and "propaganda" measures, which reveal one's readiness to support "friendly states" and to deter or stop a potential enemy from carrying out his intentions. There are many degrees of refinement in displaying intentions. Navies can be used to apply pressure, demonstrate, threaten lines of communication, harass commerce, even in peacetime. These aim at "startling probable opponents with the excellence of the equipment displayed, demonstrating a moral ascendancy over them, intimidating them right up to the outbreak of a war, bringing home to them beforehand the hopelessness of a struggle with the aggressor. . . ."85 If milder demonstrations do not work, then fleets can be moved right up to the water's edge, posing "a real threat of immediate action" against a country's home territory.

The ability of navies to appear suddenly off the coasts of various countries and proceed at once to the execution of their assigned missions has been exploited since antiquity by various aggressive states as an important instrument of diplomacy and policy in peacetime, which in many cases has permitted the achievement of political goals without recourse to military operations, with only the threat of their initiation.

Consequently, the role of the fleet is not confined to the execution of missions in armed combat. While a formidable force in war, it has always been a weapon of policy of the imperialist states and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime on the strength of its inherent properties, which permit it, to a relatively greater degree than other branches of the armed forces, to put pressure on potential opponents without the direct use of its weapons.86

The capitalists engage in such practices all the time, but Gorshkov finds it "of no little interest" that Russia, too, in the past has employed its navy as "a political instrument in peacetime." In 1780 Moscow, owing to the growing strength of its fleet under Catherine II, was the prime mover in a great-power declaration against England in favor of the freedom of neutral commerce. Again in 1863, during the American Civil War, deteriorating relations between Washington and London

led to an armed conflict on ocean lines of communications. Under these circumstances, Russia felt it expedient, not anticipating the initiation of military operations, to move its squadrons out to the trade routes of the Atlantic and Pacific and thereby put pressure on its opponents for peaceful resolution of the conflict that had emerged. . . . The sudden arrival in U.S. ports of two Russian squadrons able to cut vitally important English and French ocean lines of communication made a strong impression on the leaders of England and France, and forced them to alter their political positions.87

Many of his historical examples are devoted to the lesson that fleets are one of the weapons for the primary accumulation of capital, that imperialism is strong because of its "colonial" possessions and that historically the loss of colonies has meant reduction to second or third-class status.⁸⁸ England has now lost out in the race for world supremacy, not only because of superior U.S. competition, but also because of the national liberation movement, which the U.S. is now trying to stifle by "ever more refined methods of demonstrating force" and "crimes against mankind." Gunboat diplomacy is the favorite expedient of imperialism.⁸⁹ The Soviet naval mission of protecting state interests in peacetime, he tells us,

is especially important, since local wars, which imperialism wages practically without interruption, are invariably left behind in the wake of its policy. Today one can look on these wars as a special way of implementing the strategy of "flexible response." In seizing individual regions of the globe and intervening in the internal affairs of countries, the imperialists are trying to take possession of new advantageous strategic positions in the world arena, which they need for the struggle with socialism and for an easier execution of the task of combatting the emerging national-liberation movement. Local wars, therefore, can be looked upon as examples of the highly resolute methods used by imperialism against the movement for national independence and progress....⁹⁰

This direct naval threat to the national liberation movement is thus at the same time an indirect threat to the USSR, and it is in the Soviet state interest to have a navy that "prevents disturbances... and plays a deterrent role" in the underdeveloped world, "promotes the cause of stability" and supports Brezhnev's policy of the "active defense (*zashchita*) of peace."⁹¹ The Soviet navy is an "instrument of the policy of peace and friendship of peoples, of deterring military adventures and of resolute opposition to threats against the security of peace-loving peoples by imperialist powers."⁹²

Local War

Now the use of the fleet in the protection of state interests almost necessarily requires a corollary decision in principle on the question of participation in actual war should compulsion not succeed. Gunboat diplomacy is a peacetime practice; if it leads to war, it has failed. Nevertheless, such failures are historically notorious in spite of the best intentions and calculations. If a state takes up the practice, it must be prepared to face this possibility and draw the necessary consequences. Resolute stands require conviction and conviction cannot consistently be founded on bluff.

In the first half of the 60's the Soviets were apparently not prepared to commit themselves to coercive naval diplomacy or war on behalf of client states in which they had vested "state interests." Perhaps some of Moscow's inhibitions should be attributed to ideological factors, to remnants, only reluctantly overcome, of an old all-or-nothing approach. In calculating the balance of gains and risks in gunboat diplomacy a Communist regime may not assign the same values to the factors in the equation as any up-and-coming bourgeois state. Greater love hath no man than that he lay down his life for a friend; but what sort of friends are these that the Soviets have in the Third World? Should the Soviet armed forces not be reserved for missions that promote Communism? Should Soviet blood be shed in causes that have only the remotest relation, if any, to the attainment of that bright future that Marx has promised? For gunboat diplomacy aims at winning influence, not control; the beneficiaries are not Communists but nationalists, whatever the theoretical gloss put on them by Stalin's epigones. There are some a priori grounds for thinking that it may have been an occasion for soul-searching.

And, yet, how well the Soviets had resigned themselves strategically to the philosophy of half-a-loaf, even before they had entered the sixties! They were willing to trade with all bourgeois regimes and to some of them they were willing to give military as well as economic aid; one would not think, in view of this, that ideology itself could still throw up a barrier of principles to coercive diplomacy and its minimum corollary, local war, on behalf of client states and movements in the Third World. Indeed, in the first (1962) edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy's authoritative work on military strategy, the West was already being threatened with the possibility of nuclear strikes from Soviet territory should it engage in a local war against "one of the non-socialist countries that affects the basic interests of the socialist states."⁹³ This is already coercive diplomacy on behalf of state interests, even if not a very credible branch of coercive diplomacy; it does not suggest any self-denying ordinance imposed by ideology. And yet the Soviets hesitated to take the final step. In 1960 General-Major Talenskiy declared it to have "been proved that, under present-day conditions, local or limited war would be nothing but the prelude to a general missile-nuclear war,"⁹⁴ which implies, given the peculiarities of Soviet discourse, that local wars are to be avoided because of their high escalation potential.⁹⁵ Two years later, in the Sokolovskiy work, military strategists were enjoined to "study" the methods of waging local wars,⁹⁶ which would make the latter an object of military science not military doctrine.

If ideology was no longer a major factor in Soviet hesitation, perhaps the reluctance was due to the low opinion entertained by Moscow of its own military capabilities. Deficiencies at the local level might provocatively invite a challenge that could not be deterred because of a lack of parity at the strategic level. By the mid-sixties, however, these deficiencies were being rapidly reduced by the expansion of anti-carrier warfare and strategic missile forces, which provided more credibility for local deployments and at the same time more assurance from the strategic level that local conflicts could be kept local. The new possibilities for peacetime diplomacy were thus coming as

byproducts of earlier investments in capabilities for nuclear war. The military debates of 1965, therefore, did end with some concessions to "flexible response," though the Soviets did not go as far as the West feared at the time. A thoroughgoing "flexible response" strategy was not recognized for all rungs on the escalation ladder; instead the Soviets moved doctrinally down the ladder only to local wars,⁹⁷ ignoring or making only relatively minor adjustments at the intermediate levels below general nuclear war.

Admittedly, the Soviets do not spell this all out; one must, like a medieval monk, carry out textual exegesis. In 1967, in the very same article in which he referred to "new requirements" laid on the navy for protecting state interests, Gorshkov stated that the Soviet navy was "capable of carrying out missions assigned to it, not only in a nuclear war, but in a war which does not make use of nuclear weapons."⁹⁸ An article by Admiral Stalbo in 1969 indicated that these conventional wars were local wars. After discussing the "inevitable" escalation of wars between the great powers to "world-coalition nuclear wars," Stalbo added that

Soviet military doctrine also recognizes the possibility of local wars arising, which will be conducted without the use of nuclear weapons.

In all these wars Soviet military doctrine assigns an important role to the armed struggle at sea, which has taken on an enormous strategic significance.⁹⁹

It only remained for Gorshkov, in the present series, to indicate that Soviet participation in local wars would flow from their preoccupation with defending "state interests" in the underdeveloped world.¹⁰⁰

Gorshkov does realize that there are risks involved. He says that "under certain circumstances, such action is fraught with the danger of escalating into world war," which the Soviets by implication ought to avoid. He does not spell out what these circumstances are, but one would guess they refer to local wars in which the great imperialist powers are directly involved. Indeed, Gorshkov almost says as much; the wars in which the USSR might engage are those that imperialism has "left behind" in the "wake" (orbit) of its policy.¹⁰¹

Elsewhere, in discussing the emerging "rules of the game" in coercive diplomacy,¹⁰² I have suggested that superpower military initiatives in crises depend on relative strength of will, and that superpower strength of will in turn may depend, first, on the value of the interest at stake to the respective parties and, second, on which party is in recognized "possession" of the interest. All other things equal, the power with a security interest in an area or the patron of a client which is defending the status quo will have greater strength of will than the power lacking a security interest or the patron of a client violating the status quo. Experience shows that if the former takes the initiative to protect

its interests, the latter will stand aside; and the Soviets may have calculated this reaction in advance. In other words, now that there is a rough parity in strategic weapons and the Soviets are able to field a credible naval deterrent on the World Ocean, it is not so much forces that count in strength of will as interests. One must, of course, actually deploy a militarily credible force on the spot; without a demonstration of interest and readiness to uphold the "rules," such constraints do not exist. But if all the "conventions" are observed, theory and experience suggest that the outcome of any confrontation will probably reflect the varying impact of interests and the "fact of possession" of the interests.

In Eastern Europe it is the Russians, and in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere (Cuba excepted) it is the U.S., which has the greater security interest and is also in recognized "possession" of the interest. Each superpower, then, while prudently avoiding intersphere military initiatives, would presumably feel it had a free hand within its own sphere; if it fails to act in particular crises, it would be for reasons (political, military, moral) other than a fear of superpower military confrontation.

In the intermediate Third World, however, the interests of the rival superpowers are generally equal; recognized possession of the interest becomes the main variable for predicting responses. By their behavior since 1967, the Soviets apparently deem it safe to support Third World client states against domestic opposition. In clashes between client states of the rival superpowers they also apparently deem it not necessarily imprudent to support a client when it is clearly on the defensive and the Soviet investment in the regime is in jeopardy (Egypt), at the same time withholding support when the issue of the struggle is in doubt or when the U.S. feels compelled to protect its "state interests" in a rival client that is being worsted (South Vietnam). In following this course in coercive diplomacy and local war, the Soviets might regard the risks, while not entirely absent, as nevertheless acceptable.

Cuba, of course, constitutes a unique case. Here the greater American security interest has to be balanced off against the vested interest that the Soviets were allowed to acquire in the Castro regime. Following out the logic of the "rules of the game," one would assume that, in the event of a domestic crisis in Cuba, with strength of will on both sides relatively equal, neither superpower would find it wise to intervene.

It is difficult to say what is presaged by Gorshkov's greater candor in discussing state interests and local wars. At a minimum it suggests that the recent Soviet experience in naval diplomacy has been favorably evaluated. Perhaps it means that the mission will be allotted more assets to do the same job better, or to do more along the same line, or to operate more aggressively in the "grey areas" within the "rules." It could even imply -- though we doubt it -- a Soviet willingness for greater risk-taking in conflicts involving U.S. interests.

Requirements for State Interest and Local War Missions

As we have previously noted, Gorshkov in the series especially singles out the need for surface ships. This is a sore point with the navy, dating back to quarrels with the marshals and politicians in the Khrushchev era; and Gorshkov is obviously concerned to have their value enshrined in doctrine. He stresses their utility in imparting combat stability to the submarine, but also in accomplishing a wide range of missions "both in peace and war." He does not say what kinds of surface ships are needed. He simply says that

The diversity of the missions confronting us has brought about a requirement for numerous classes of surface ships each with its specific inventory of equipment. It is characteristic that the attempts made in a number of countries to create universal ships for the execution of all (or many) missions have not been successful. Therefore, surface ships continue to be the most numerous (in type) of the forces of the fleet.¹⁰³

Current Soviet capabilities for protecting state interests and local war appear to have come basically as by-products of the Soviet preoccupation with strategic defense of the homeland. As a consequence, the great strength of the Russian navy lies in its ability to pose a counter to American initiatives at sea; lacking substantial projection capabilities (attack carrier air and strategic amphibious forces), it lags behind the U.S. in its ability to take the initiative itself against defended coasts. In his article of February 1967 announcing the new Soviet local war doctrine as well as the "new requirements" imposed on the navy by the need to protect state interests, Gorshkov sought to dispel any speculation that attack carriers would be part of the equipment package. He said that, with the arrival of the nuclear missile, the Soviets had long ago come to the conclusion that the carrier "has no future" and that "time has confirmed the correctness of these views." The sun was "setting" on the carrier, a process which was irreversible."¹⁰⁴

This was straightforward enough. However, now that the Soviets have had 5-6 years of experience in coercive diplomacy, it is not inconceivable that they might have changed their mind about the need for a projection capability. It would have been useful if Gorshkov had alluded to this, in however circumspect a fashion. He does not repeat his negative view of 1967 on the carrier, but he makes no positive pronouncements either; he simply avoids the question.

However, in drawing a lesson probably intended for the present, Gorshkov takes the tsarist government to task for building large warships similar to Western ones, for prestige considerations, after the Russo-Japanese War. He complains that "they tried to build ships similar to foreign ones, not taking into account the conditions under which they would operate and ignoring the requirements unique to Russia that stem from her

geographical position."¹⁰⁵ This same complaint has also been made about the Stalinist naval building programs for "large expensive surface ships" in the 1930's. According to all three editions of the Sokolovskiy work,

it was not taken into account that two of our fleets were based in closed seas, and that exiting by the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets onto the open sea was attended with great difficulties. Under these conditions the main emphasis should have been on the development of a submarine fleet and naval aviation....¹⁰⁶

It makes some sense, then, to consider Gorshkov's 1972 critique as in part a repudiation of carrier construction, a repudiation which has to be indirect and veiled because particular Soviet vessels now under construction (the air-capable ship at Nikolaev) may be close enough in design to Western carriers to cause confusion among the Russian public.

POLEMICS IN THE GORSHKOV SERIES

Against the Marshals

The Navy evidently has enemies within the establishment with little sympathy for its claims on resources. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the sharp polemical tone of numerous passages, in which Gorshkov takes long-dead tsarist and even Soviet military and political officials to task for their neglect of the navy's war-fighting and deterrence capabilities and its ability to protect state interests. Apparently he wants their "mistakes" entered on the record, so that they will be less likely to happen again.

Gorshkov reverts again and again, each time with historical justification, to the uneven development of the Russian navy. "Upsurges in the naval might of Russia have been followed by decadence. And each time the reduction in seapower raised up fresh obstacles in the historical path of the state and led to grave consequences." He does attribute some responsibility for the ebbs in naval power to requirements for continental defense and to the lack of resources; nevertheless, he insists these constituted only initial premises for the under-evaluation of the navy by tsarist officials under the spell of the Western bourgeoisie, the real villains of the piece. Their "hostile propaganda continually promoted the idea that Russia is not a maritime but a continental country and therefore does not need a fleet. And even if she does need one, then only for performing missions of coastal defense...." This "psychological coercion" by the West has periodically had its effect. "It penetrated into Russia and frequently found ardent supporters among influential tsarist dignitaries, who defended the view that the country did not need a powerful fleet, that the expenditures for building it up and maintaining it in the necessary state of readiness ought to be curtailed in every way possible...."

In opposing naval development, these tsarist officials did appreciable damage to the country's "defense capability" (oboronosposobnost').¹⁰⁷

Gorshkov alleges a change after the Bolshevik Revolution. "In contrast to the ruling circles of tsarist Russia, who did not understand the role of the fleet in the military might of the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have attached great significance to it."¹⁰⁸ Having made this allegation in the fifth article of the series, he repudiates it in the sixth, pointing out that in the 1930's the question of combined operations between the navy and the ground troops was not given the necessary attention. "In this can be discerned one instance of the underestimation by certain leading personages of the Armed Forces of the role of the navy in the coming war."¹⁰⁹ He strongly implies that the syndrome is still alive today in his commentary on President Nixon's speech of 4 August 1970, in which a distinction was made between the differing needs of the two superpowers in the way of military preparations, the USSR being a landpower, the U.S. primarily a seapower. After denying that this bore any relationship to the real state of affairs, Gorshkov goes on to say that:

The opponents of seapower for Russia have extensively falsified (and are still falsifying) her military history. In particular, they maintain that all Russian victories have been won by the army alone and that she can be powerful only by strengthening the army at the expense of the fleet. For example, ... [War Minister] Kuropatkin in 1900 reported to the Tsar: "The lessons of history have taught us to tread the same path taken by our forefathers and to see the main strength of Russia in her ground army...."¹¹⁰

When Gorshkov can refer in one and the same breath to War Minister Kuropatkin, President Nixon and unknown "opponents" who are "still" falsifying Russian military history in favor of the army, when he can refer to other former Russian officials as "mediocrities" with "intellectual limitations" and "reactionary ideas," whose "narrowness of thought" betrays "a complete lack of comprehension...of the importance of seapower," the conviction grows that he is flogging, not simply the dead, but dead surrogates of the living. When he observes the uneven development of the Russian navy, with the alternation of periods of expansion and decline, there is the implication that someone would like to confront him with a policy that spells decline. By stressing the foreign origin of his opponents' ideas, he seems to be preparing a case for tarring them with the brush of the class enemy; and he warns his readers that, should they listen to these men, the consequences will be the same as in tsarist times. "On each occasion that the ruling circles of Russia gave insufficient consideration to the development of the fleet and its support at the level demanded by the times, the country either suffered defeat in war or its peacetime policy did not achieve planned objectives."¹¹¹

Against Naval Limitations

Gorshkov also seems sensitive to the possibility that detente can adversely affect his institutional interests through arms limitation agreements. He concludes one article with the statement

that, as the First World War showed once again, in the epoch of imperialism navies play an essential role in the armed conflicts of states, while in the periods between the wars, "the political force at sea," as F. Engels termed navies, continues to have the most important significance as a weapon of policy of the great powers.

Recognizing the essential role of fleets in both war and peace, the imperialist powers repeatedly tried, in the period after the First World War, to regulate the growth of naval armaments at special conferences (it is interesting that other branches of the armed forces were not exposed to this). However, as is well known, none of these attempts led to reduction in the navies of the powers, who from the mid-thirties on launched a new naval arms race, unrestrained and unregulated in any way.¹¹²

In another article he refers to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 as a "war of the diplomats for command of the sea." He describes as "unrealistic" the pursuit of a naval agreement in the mid-thirties. "The negotiations in London on limiting naval armaments testified... that the imperialist powers were coming together not for the purpose of limiting naval armaments but to wage the forthcoming war, and were seeking allies for this future war."¹¹³ The repeated attempts at naval agreements during the interwar period accomplished nothing constructive.

They performed only a restraining function... and that only roughly up to the mid-thirties (after that the naval arms race proceeded without any limitations). It is interesting that, right up to our own day, no such attempts had been made with regard to other branches of the armed forces. Even now, when arms limitation talks have become a reality, arms control at present is being extended [only] to strategic missiles, including those in the fleets.¹¹⁴

When Gorshkov can present arms limitation initiatives as coming from the capitalists,¹¹⁵ when he can describe them as "unrealistic" or only another way for the capitalists to achieve supremacy, it is justifiable to conclude that perhaps he is not a present-day supporter of arms control. True, he does not polemicize against the Treaty on Preventing Incidents at Sea and he definitely blesses the Seabed Treaty, undertaken, let it be noted, at "the initiative of the Soviet Union."¹¹⁶ But this only arouses all the more wonder that he is permitted to cast doubt on arms limitations agreements in general.

Gorshkov also seems to have reservations about agreements to limit forward naval deployments. With regard to Mediterranean deployments, for example, the Soviets have separate soft-line and hard-line tactics. The soft-line claims a Russian desire to negotiate an agreement for mutual deployment limitations; Brezhnev himself broached such a proposal in the summer of 1971¹¹⁷ and over the past year several important articles on naval affairs have ended on this theme.¹¹⁸ The hard-line tactic, adopted during non-cooperative moods, stresses the historical and geographical right for the Russians to be in the Mediterranean while denying on geographical grounds any legitimate U.S. claim for a presence.

Gorshkov, in this series, clearly takes the hard line. In the course of doing so, he manages to convey, in veiled fashion, the mission priorities behind Soviet forward deployments. After reviewing his country's naval experience in the Mediterranean, especially in the late 18th and early 19th century, he says that

historically it has turned out that, with the origination of an enemy threat to invade Russian territory from the southwest, a Russian fleet has been put in the Mediterranean, where it has successfully executed large-scale strategic missions in protecting (zashchita) our country's borders from aggression. In other words, our Navy has shown the whole world that the Mediterranean is not anybody's forbidden ground or closed lake and that Russia is a Mediterranean power. The existence of her ships in these waters is predicated not only on geographical conditions (the proximity of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean theater), but also on the centuries-old necessity for the presence there of a Russian fleet.

Today, when the ability of the imperialist aggressors to mount an attack directly against the Soviet Union from the Mediterranean has increased to an extraordinary degree, this region has acquired an especially important significance in the defense (oborona) of our Homeland....

Later on in this same article, Gorshkov refers to the Soviet gain in "influence" and "prestige" in the Mediterranean and to the role of the Navy in preventing "disturbances," promoting "stability," and supporting Brezhnev's policy of the "active defense (zashchita) of peace."¹¹⁹ In other words, the mission of the Navy in the Mediterranean appears to the three-fold: first, to be prepared for actual combat ("protect" the USSR's borders from aggression); second, to deter an attack on the USSR ("defend" the Homeland); and third, to advance and protect state interests. The priority accorded here to readiness for actual combat seems to be seconded by Gorshkov's treatment of "long cruises" under the general and local war heading in the concluding section of the final article.¹²⁰

In stressing the requirement for a Russian presence in the Mediterranean and failing to mention the Brezhnev proposal for deployment limitations, it is difficult to say whether Gorshkov is at one with a significant portion of the political leadership in opposing deployment limitations, is being used by the leadership to establish a better bargaining position, is conducting "agitation by omission," or is handling in his own way a question not yet authoritatively resolved.

NOTES

(References to Morskoi sbornik will be shown as: MS Year/Issue No./Page)

1. V. D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (3rd ed.), Moscow, 1968, pp. 6, 7, 10; Speech of Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy, XXIII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 29 Marta - 8 Aprelya 1966 goda: stenograficheskiy otchet, Moscow, 1966, I, p. 411.
2. V. Tolubko, "Reliable Guard of the Motherland," Sel'skaya zhizn', 23 February 1973, p. 2.
3. The U. S. Navy has increased its share of the military budget from 32.1 percent in 1970 to 35.5 percent in 1973. The Soviets are well aware of this trend. See the articles by G. I. Svyatov and B. Teplinskiy in S. Sh. A., #9 and #10, respectively, of 1972.
4. MS 72/2/20, 23.
5. As General-Major S. N. Kozlov has recently stated, by studying military doctrine, Soviet military personnel "acquire a unity of views on all the basic problems of contemporary military affairs; they are guided by obligatory principles and rules which are the same for all" Spravochnik ofitsera, Moscow, 1971, p. 73.
6. V. D. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. 235.
7. For example, by Col. V. Larionov in Krasnaya zvezda, 23 September 1966 and Fleet Admiral V. A. Kasatonov, ibid., 28 July 1968.
8. A. A. Grechko, "Fleet of our Homeland," MS 71/7/6.
9. MS 73/2/24.
10. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., pp. 170f.
11. Ibid., pp. 243, 244.
12. Ibid., pp. 30, 31; also General-Major A. Milovidov in Krasnaya zvezda, 17 May 1973.
13. MS 72/12/16.
14. In addition to the material cited below, see MS 72/2/29, 72/3/25-31, 72/4/17, 18, 72/6/15-17.
15. MS 72/4/13, 15, 22, 23.
16. Rear Adm. V. A. Belli, Deystviya flotov na severnom, sredizemnomorskom i okeanskikh teatrakh, Vol II of Rear Adm. N. B. Pavlovich (ed.), Flot v pervoy mirovoy voyne, Moscow, 1964, 2 volumes, pp. 118-120.
17. MS 72/5/15, 16.


18. Ibid., pp. 16f.
19. It is probable here that we are dealing with military doctrine, but as Soviet authors point out, when it comes to war, doctrine retires and strategy takes over. See Gen-Maj. S. N. Kozlov, op. cit., p. 78.
20. MS 73/2/20, 21.
21. MS 72/12/15, 20.
22. V. D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Soviet Military Strategy (1st edition by RAND, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963) pp. 409, 420-422; V. D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (2nd ed., Moscow, 1963), pp. 381, 398-399; ibid. (3rd ed., Moscow, 1968), pp. 350, 365.
23. MS 73/2/20.
24. MS 72/11/26; but also see MS 72/5/17, 72/9/18, 72/10/21, 72/11/24-26, 28, 33, where the same points are made.
25. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (RAND ed.), p. 348.
26. MS 72/11/31-33.
27. MS 72/5/12, 13.
28. MS 72/5/16.
29. MS 72/5/14, 15.
30. MS 72/5/17.
31. MS 72/5/21.
32. MS 72/9/17.
33. MS 72/11/25, 28.
34. MS 73/2/20-21.
35. MS 72/9/15.
36. MS 72/9/16.
37. See the historical treatment of anti-SLOC missions in Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (3rd ed., 1968), pp. 316, 328; Capt. 1st Rank V. I. Dmitriev in Adm S. E. Zakharov (ed.), Istoriya voennomorskogo iskusstva, Moscow, 1969, pp. 452-457; Rear-Adm. K. A. Stalbo in ibid., pp. 515-527; but especially see V. P. Bogolepov (ed.), Blokada i kontrblokada: bor'ba na okeanskomorskikh soobshcheniyakh vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne, Moscow, 1970, pp. 590-647.
38. Stalbo in Zakharov (ed.), op. cit., p. 540.

39. Adm. N. V. Kharlamov, "Trends in the Development of Navies," MS 66/1/35-36; Capt. 1st Rank S. I. Filonov, "Armed Conflict and Ocean Communications," MS 65/3/39-41; Adm. Yu. A. Panteleev, "Certain Problems of Fleet Operations in Modern War," MS 66/2/33-34.
40. Stalbo in Zakharov (ed.), op. cit., p. 540.
41. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (RAND ed.), p. 348.
42. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (third edition), p. 308.
43. MS 73/2/21.
44. MS 67/2/18.
45. Capt. 1st Rank N. Aleshkin, MS 72/1/25.
46. G. Svyatov and A. Kokoshin, "Sea Power in the Plans of American Strategists," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 3, 1973, p. 81.
47. J. M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," in Michael McGwire (ed.), Soviet Naval Developments, Praeger, New York, 1973, p. 392 and p. 404, f. n. 20.
48. V. D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (3rd ed.), Moscow, 1968, p. 6f.
49. A. Grechko, "Guarding Peace and Socialism," Kommunist, 7, 1973, p. 16.
50. MS 73/2/18.
51. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., (third edition), p. 8.
52. MS 72/12/14-22.
53. MS 73/2/22-24.
54. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (third edition), p. 17.
55. MS 72/12/15, 16, 21.
56. MS 73/2/22.
57. MS 73/2/22-23.
58. MS 72/12/20, 21; 73/2/19.
59. MS 73/2/23, 24.
60. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (third edition), p. 44lf.
61. Gen. - Lt. I. Zavyalov, Krasnaya zvezda, 19 April 1973; Gen. - Maj. A. Milovidov, ibid., 17 May 1973.

62. This is the interpretation given by Marshal Grechko, Na strazhe mira i stroitel'stva kommunisma, Moscow, 1971, p. 5.
63. MS 73/2/24-25.
64. See Malcolm Macintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct 1973, pp. 3-4.
65. MS 72/12/14, 15.
66. MS 71/7/6, 7; Krasnaya zvezda, 17 December 1972.
67. MS 72/12/20.
68. We should not be misled by the reference to "counterforces." To judge from the context, as well as from what I am told a Russian would understand by the word kontrsily, it does not mean what a Westerner would understand by the term.
69. MS 72/12/20, 21.
70. The Russian words used by Gorshkov here for "retaliatory strikes" are udary vozmezdiya (literally "strikes of retribution") rather than the standard otvetnye udary (literally "answering strikes") which is still employed by the political and military leadership outside the navy. This may simply indicate Gorshkov's verbal independence rather than any difference between SSBN strikes and strikes by the Strategic Rocket Troops.
71. MS 73/2/18.
72. MS 73/2/18, 19.
73. MS 73/2/19-24.
74. McConnell, in MccGwire (ed.), op. cit., p. 392.
75. MS 73/2/24.
76. MS 72/12/17.
77. MS 72/2/21; 72/5/22; 72/12/15-17.
78. MS 72/2/23.
79. MS 72/8/24.
80. MS 67/2/21.
81. McConnell, in MccGwire (ed.), op. cit., p. 392.
82. Ibid., pp. 392-401.
83. MS 73/2/13-15.

84. MS 72/12/21, 22.
85. MS 72/2/29; 72/3/22; 72/12/15-17.
86. MS 72/12/16.
87. MS 72/12/17.
88. MS 72/2/25-29; 72/4/16-18; 72/5/12.
89. MS 72/12/18-20.
90. MS 73/2/21f.
91. MS 72/3/32.
92. MS 72/2/32.
93. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (RAND ed., 1963), pp. 286-287.
94. Editorial note, ibid., p. 290.
95. Editors' Introduction, ibid., p. 49.
96. Ibid., p. 288.
97. See Brezhnev's report to the 23rd Party Congress, XXIII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 29 Marta-8 Aprelya 1966 goda: stenograficheskiy otchet, Moscow, 1966, I, p. 39; also the interpolations on local war introduced into the 3rd (1968) edition of the Sokolovskiy work, pp. 5, 20, 222.
98. MS 67/2/20.
99. Stalbo in Zakharov (ed.), op. cit., p. 560.
100. MS 73/2/21, 22.
101. Ibid.
102. J. M. McConnell and A. M. Kelly, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis" in MccGwire (ed.), op. cit., pp. 449-451.
103. MS 73/2/21.
104. MS 67/2/19.
105. MS 72/4/22; also see 73/2/19.
106. Sokolovskiy, op. cit. (RAND ed.), pp. 232-233; 2nd ed., p. 170; 3rd ed., p. 168. I am indebted to R. W. Herrick for this reference.
107. MS 72/3/20, 21.
108. MS 72/6/20.

109. MS 72/8/23.
110. MS 72/3/20, 21.
111. MS 72/3/21; 72/4/22, 23.
112. MS 72/5/24.
113. MS 72/8/14, 24.
114. MS 72/12/18.
115. MS 72/8/14, 24.
116. MS 72/12/20; 73/2/15.
117. Pravda, 12 June 1971.
118. To name only a couple: B. Teplinskiy in S. Sh. A., 10, 1972, translated in Survival, 2, 1973, p. 80; G. Svyatov and A. Kokoshin, op. cit., p. 86.
119. MS 72/3/31f.
120. MS 73/2/22-24.



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